Syracuse University

SURFACE at Syracuse University
Dissertations - ALL

SURFACE at Syracuse University

Winter 12-22-2021

North Korea's Policy Toward the United States: Rappochement to
Confrontational Diplomacy in the 1970s and the 1990s
Seongryeol Kim
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Kim, Seongryeol, "North Korea's Policy Toward the United States: Rappochement to Confrontational
Diplomacy in the 1970s and the 1990s" (2021). Dissertations - ALL. 1358.
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1358

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at Syracuse University at SURFACE at
Syracuse University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of
SURFACE at Syracuse University. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

ABSTRACT
This research project challenges the common belief that North Korea’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons and their related delivery systems in the 1990s was a fundamental shift in its
foreign policy objectives toward the United States. It argues instead that North Korea has
continued to pursue the rapprochement policy announced by Kim Il Sung in the early 1970s.
Its findings demonstrate that the shift from rapprochement in the 1970s to provocation in the
1990s was a tactical rather than a strategic change in North Korea’s foreign policy. The U.S.’s
indifference to the acute security anxieties caused by exogenous factors associated with the
end of the Cold War led to North Korea’s adoption of an asymmetrical deterrence posture in
its foreign policy toward the United States. The findings of this research project demonstrate
that this fundamental dynamic, which has underpinned U.S.-North Korea relations over the
last three decades, has not been analyzed systematically by the leading experts in the field of
North Korea studies. Nor have its implications received the requisite attention from the
policymakers of successive U.S. administrations over the last thirty years. The result is a
growing conviction in the U.S. that diplomacy with North Korea is inevitably doomed to
failure.
This research also argues that an objective analysis of this dynamic can be parlayed
into a model, or diplomatic tool kit, for constructing an effective North Korea policy.
The main components of this model emerge from an empathetic investigation of North
Korea’s foreign policy decision-making and its pragmatic transformations in recent decades.
The investigation has been guided by a predictive model of foreign policy behavior that
explains foreign policy outcomes as the product of strategic decision-making by relationallyembed actors responding to situational influences in either intentional or ad hoc ways. This
analytical framework for interpreting foreign policy behavior counters the instinctive human
tendency to interpret an adversary’s actions as blameworthy due to the enemy’s ‘bad nature’
rather than situational concerns. This is an especially pernicious tendency in the study of
North Korea since it has been the focus of pervasive ‘demonization’ efforts in the U.S. for
over 70 years. These efforts have resulted in a counterproductive reliance among U.S. foreign
policymakers on coercive diplomacy and the forced diplomatic isolation of North Korea.
Isolation and coercion have obscured North Korea’s pragmatic adaptations to the changing
international environment of the Northeast Asian region. While North Korea’s policy matrix
was modified significantly when the confrontational approach began to displace the

rapprochement approach in the 1990s, if the nuclear program-related developments of the
early 1990s are taken out of context and made the critical starting point for analysis, the
continuity in the core objectives of North Korea's foreign policy is bound to be misconstrued,
if not entirely overlooked.
In this study, then, two fundamental questions are posed: 1) How and under what
conditions did North Korea's rapprochement behavior toward the United States emerge in the
1970s? and 2) How did this behavior gradually change from attempted accommodation in the
1970s to confrontational brinksmanship in the 1990s? Next, it investigates the causal
relationships between the changes in the eco-geopolitical international environment in the
early 1970s and 1990s and North Korea’s foreign policy toward the United States. Based on
the findings of this investigation, the conventional assumption of the purported irrationality
of North Korea’s regime and its foreign policy is challenged on the grounds that it has not led
to a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic of North Korea’s foreign policy stance
toward the United States. It also has not accounted for North Korea’s adjustments in its
foreign policy to counter imperative changes in the international environment. To provide
more plausible answers to the two questions posed above, a situational imperative model of
foreign policy behavior is employed that is based on an emic approach drawing on realist and
constructivist theories in an eclectic fashion.
On this basis, it is clear the rationale for North Korea’s initial foreign policy shift
toward the United States was inspired by the Nixon Doctrine and the Shanghai Communique
that codified the underlying principles of the détente between China and the United States in
the early 1970s. In response to this hugely significant change in the international environment
in Northeast Asia, North Korea began to make its own efforts at achieving a diplomatic
accommodation with the United States by reaching out to both governmental and civil
organizations in a concerted effort to achieve its foreign policy objectives. On the other hand,
despite these outreach efforts, North Korea failed to get a favorable response from the
authorities in Washington. Although China attempted to support North Korea’s efforts by
relaying its eight-point ‘peace proposal’ to the United States, the United States maintained its
stance of indifference because it was focused squarely on maintaining a stable environment in
Northeast Asia favorable to its geopolitical interests.
In the early 1990s, when North Korea was challenged by South Korea’s success in
achieving détente with the Soviet Union/Russia and China, North Korea’s policy toward the

United States immediately was seized by a sense of existential crisis. As the regime’s very
survival was put in question, the need for achieving high level talks with the United States
became compelling. Reflecting on its previous failed efforts, North Korea surmised that
implementing a confrontational approach was the only effective option available. The bottom
line of the confrontational approach was to obtain positive security guarantees from the U.S.
which inevitably would require a normalization of relations. In this respect, it’s motivation in
reaching out to the United States in the 1990s was fundamentally the same as in the 1970s,
but the sense of urgency had become exponentially higher due to the changed existential
implications. This is the reason North Korea was prepared to risk everything by adopting a
confrontational approach based on nuclear brinksmanship beginning in the early 1990s.
In this way, North Korea achieved its objectives with the successful negotiation of
the Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994. It eventually proved to be a pyrrhic
victory when the United States peremptorily withdrew its support for the agreement only
eight years later. Based on the findings of this research, however, the Agreed Framework
serves as a model for a lasting resolution of the endemic conflict on the Korean peninsula and
the opening of a new era in U.S.-North Korea relations. Still, even if it had survived the
domestic U.S. political opposition to it, the Agreed framework would have failed to resolve
the underlying sources of enmity between the United States and North Korea. Although it
addressed North Korea’s security anxieties on paper, no accommodation was reached in
actual terms between the United States and North Korea about their respective national
interests. This failure precluded any transition to the diplomatic normalization required to
make a positive security guarantee a reality. Moreover, effectively, there also was a failure to
reach an accommodation on the changes to the regional security architecture that were
needed to ensure the long-term viability of an arrangement such the Agreed Framework.
North Korea’s national interests are security, regime survival, development, and international
recognition of its sovereign right to self-determination. The U.S. government has its own
well-known existential or ontological security needs in the Northeast Asia/Indo-Pacific
region. To achieve each country’s goals, diplomatic tools such as an active inter-Korean
dialogue, a Pyongyang-Seoul-Washington dialogue, and the negotiation of bilateral and
multilateral agreements on practical collaborative steps toward peaceful reconciliation are the
initiatives needed to cut the Gordian knot that has blocked the realization of amity among all
the players involved in the unfolding drama of the Korean peninsula for the past 70 years.
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Chapter Ⅰ: Introduction

1-1. Defining the Problem and Core Issue
Nuclear issues have been an unsolved problem for 30 years between the United
States and North Korea. Both countries have been trying to reach an agreement on the
solution to the problem. However, deals that were made by the two countries in the last three
decades have either failed or been inactivated. After the 1994 Agreed Framework was
abrogated in 2002, the development of North Korea’s nuclear program advanced from
producing plutonium to enriching uranium, which is a second ‒ potentially easier ‒ route to
the manufacture of atomic weapons.1 Having nuclear weapons for the North Korean
government is a means of guaranteeing its national security, regime survival, and economic
development. Even though the United States and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
have imposed economic sanctions on North Korea, the country continues to promote its
nuclear capabilities by undertaking aggressive military actions, including nuclear and InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) tests.
The U.S. government perceives North Korea's aggressive actions as threats to its
mainland as well as to the international community, including its alliance partners in East
Asia. Military countermeasures take place whenever either side undertakes military
operations, and tensions increasingly have become escalated in the region. In 2017, both
countries reached an apex of tensions that raised the specter of war. For instance, on
September 3, North Korea conducted its sixth underground nuclear test. Reported to be a

1

“Centrifuges and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation.” FAS. Web. May 14, 2021.
https://fas.org/issues/nonproliferation-counterproliferation/nuclear-fuel-cycle/uranium-enrichment-gas-centrifugetechnology/centrifuges-nuclear-weapon-proliferation/
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hydrogen bomb, it was much stronger than previous tests.2 Furthermore, in the same year,
North Korea fired 23 missiles. The last missile, which was fired in November, reached higher
and farther than any previous missiles.3
The United States and South Korea responded immediately to these aggressive
actions, albeit with different strategies. The Trump administration considered carrying out a
‘bloody nose strategy’ focused on destroying long-range missiles and nuclear weapons
facilities.4 This strategy was to be deployed only if economic sanctions failed. Meanwhile,
the South Korean government was considering a ‘decapitation strategy’5 aimed at ‘taking out’
the current North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. This strategy had been in place since the
beginning of Park Geun-hye’s administration. The continuation of this pattern of aggressive
nuclear and missile testing by North Korea followed by countermeasures taken by the U.S.
and South Korea raised global fears about the potential outbreak of a second Korean War.
In the North Korean studies field, some scholars analyzed the scale of the damages
that would ensue or compared military capabilities if a second nuclear strike would be needed.
A commonplace assumption among these analysts was that North Korea is “evil” or a country
threatening the international community. Scholars of North Korea also contributed to the
general tendency to demonize the leaders of North Korea and its presumptively war-prone
military elites.6
The primary purpose of this study is to provide a new perspective on North Korea's
attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. My research relies on two
hypotheses. First, North Korea's aggressive approach to the United States that entails a

2

Lee 2017.

3

Berlinger 2017.

4

O’Hanlon and Kirchick 2018.

5

Bae 2017.
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Cochran and McKinzie 2005.
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reliance on a threatened deployment of nuclear weapons was not its original intent in the
1970s. The conventional wisdom of U.S.-North Korea relations is that North Korea's
motivation in developing nuclear weapons was to threaten the international community,
including the United States and its allies in the Asia Pacific region. This interpretation is
buttressed by dubious explanations of the irrationality of the country's leaders and its status as
a rogue state. By contrast, this study offers an alternative analysis of the origins of North
Korea's engagement efforts toward the United States.
The second hypothesis is that the original rapprochement stance gradually became a
confrontational approach in the 1990s. By investigating the historical changes in the
international political economy during these two decades, I will show how these changes
influenced North Korea’s original and subsequent approaches toward the United States with
respect to various goals and interests.
The main argument of this study is that two international environment changes in the
1970s and 1990s are independent variables in the systemic analysis of how the international
political economy influenced North Korea's policy toward the United States. These changes
accounted for the shift from a policy of rapprochement to an offensive strategy, which are the
dependent variables of this study. The two external factors that I focus on are the China-U.S.
détente in the early 1970s and the normalization of relations with South Korea by the Soviet
Union and China in the early 1990s. These are independent variables in explaining the shift in
North Korea's policy toward to the United States. As I will explain in the following chapters,
the policy was not launched with an aggressive intent. Rather, it was a response adapted to
the permissive diplomatic environment in Northeast Asia created by the rapprochement
between China and the United States. At the same time, though, North Korea's original
outreach to the U.S. with rapprochement measures eventually was modified to assimilate a
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confrontational approach.
In analyzing the evolution of North Korea-U.S. relations, then, several questions are
critical: How have external factors affected North Korea’s policy toward the United States?
How was the policy formulated initially? How and why has North Korea’s diplomatic
behavior toward the United States changed from peaceful approaches to aggressive
approaches? To answer these questions, this dissertation will investigate in-depth North
Korea’s motivations for its outreach to the United States from the vantage point of the impact
external factors had on its diplomatic behavior. This study will analyze and apply lessons
from case studies and foreign policy frameworks to explore North Korea's diplomatic
approaches to the United States during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.
The rationale for investigating the two hypotheses cited above is the assumption that
North Korea's foreign policies were/are highly dependent on the international political
economy and regional strategic relationships.7 Prior to the establishment of a détente
between China and the United States in 1972, the United States was the common enemy of
China, Russia, and North Korea. However, after the agreement to normalize relations was
reached between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong in 1972, North Korea ‒ known officially as
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or the DPRK ‒ started to invite reporters from
major U.S. newspapers to the country. Letters were sent to the White House and the U.S.
Congress as well. These were just part of an extensive effort by North Korea to achieve its
goal of diplomatic normalization with the U.S. within the framework of the Cold War era.
North Korea’s reasons for approaching the United States at that point need to be
analyzed. For research purposes, in this study, I have assumed that the intent of this peaceful
outreach during the Cold War era was different from the confrontational strategy North Korea

7

Gray and Jong-Woon Lee 2021, 8.
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added to the mix of its diplomatic ‘tool kit’ during the post-Cold War era. I also have assumed
that North Korea’s foreign policy behavior was different before and after the détente between
the United States and China in 1972. Given the dynamics of international politics at the time,
without the changes brought about by the détente, North Korea presumably would have
continued its aggressive behavior towards the United States.
After the Korean War and the division of the country, a communist government was
established by Kim Il Sung in the North, whereas a democratic government was established
in the South with the support of the U.S. Army. From that point, it is an axiom of Korean
history scholarship that Kim wanted all foreign military forces ‒ including the Chinese
liberation army and the U.S. Army ‒ to withdraw from the Korean peninsula. In 1958, Kim Il
Sung requested the withdrawal of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China from the
North even though the U.S. army remained deployed in the South. Kim believed that any
foreign forces on the Korean peninsula were a residue of colonialism or imperialism, and
their presence was not compatible with the principle that Koreans should solve Korea's
problems by themselves.
Kim and his followers believed that launching a second Korean war with a strong
military force would be the best way to expel the U.S. army from the South, but the support
of China and the Soviet Union would be required for this effort to succeed. The leadership in
Beijing and Moscow, however, consistently opposed Kim's plan to resolve the division of
Korea militarily (Kim, 2012, p. 34). Despite this rejection by his allies, Kim continued to
focus his efforts on building up North Korea’s military power in preparation for a second war
(Cha, 2002, p. 51). After the détente in 1972, however, discussion of the military option was
downplayed as the prospects of utilizing diplomatic approaches instead emerged.
The U.S.-China détente was the casual mechanism that changed North Korea's stance

６

toward the United States from aggression to rapprochement. This new way of approaching
the U.S. had never been in evidence before the détente. Identifying the causes of the change
in North Korea's diplomatic behavior during the period of détente is crucial because it reveals
how Pyongyang perceived the unfolding events and adjusted its diplomatic stance to be more
in tune with the dynamic international situation. This was an early striking example of the
essentially pragmatic underpinnings of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior.
The normalization of relations with South Korea by the Soviet Union and China in
the early 1990s, on the other hand, challenged North Korea’s foreign policy pragmatism to
the very core. The normalization process was precipitated by the impending collapse of the
Soviet Union and its rebirth as the Russian Federation (aka Russia). This led to a change in
the status of these two major allies of North Korea. In the face of such a drastic change in its
national security posture, it is not difficult to imagine why North Koreans concluded that they
were facing an existential threat to their very survival as an independent nation. North
Korea’s decision to strengthen its military forces was an inevitable response to the loss of its
heretofore allies while being confronted by a constant and growing threat from the South
Korea.
This response included the ratchetting up of nuclear weapons-related activities that
later would become a major bargaining chip with the United States. The normalization of
Russia and China’s relations with South Korea was a unique test of North Korea’s foreign
policy pragmatism primarily because of the implications for the Korean question raised by
the cross-approval issue. China and Russia officially recognized South Korea as a state, but
the United States and Japan initially did not reciprocate by officially recognizing North Korea
as a state. Under the duress of abandonment by its allies and faced with instability internally
and externally, North Korea felt compelled to undertake confrontational actions to get the
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attention of the international community, especially the United States. This was a desperate
effort reflecting North Korea’s perceived need for negotiations to ensure its very survival.
Given the two external factors just delineated, the core research questions for this
study are:
1) How and under what conditions did North Korea's rapprochement behavior
toward the United States emerge in the 1970s? and
2) How did this behavior gradually change from a peaceful approach to a
confrontational approach in the 1990s?
To find evidence for answers to these questions, my research has focused on the primary
documents of the 'North Korea International Documentation Project' at the Woodrow Wilson
Center and articles published in Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean
Worker’s Party. This newspaper is considered one of the most authoritative sources on
official policy positions in North Korea. I also have drawn on articles published on the
website of the Korean Central News Agency, which is another authoritative source on official
government policy positions as well as commentary on foreign relations and other subjects.
These sources have been complemented by published interviews of former North
Korean diplomats who served in various capacities for some period before escaping the
country. These former diplomats held different positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Some worked abroad in overseas missions, and others held positions of responsibility within
the ministry related to foreign relations with China, Russia, the United States, and other
countries. The information gathered from former diplomats is intrinsically limited by their
liminal status in South Korea as well as by the limitations posed by the stove-piped nature of
the North Korean state bureaucracy. Even relatively high ranking former North Korean
officials may have only a general understanding of the North Korean government's
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motivations and goals that inform its diplomatic behavior toward the United States.
The objective of this research is to challenge the conventional wisdom of the U.SDPRK relationship, which heavily focuses on North Korea's nuclear weapons and its
intention to become a nuclear state. It will probe the North Korean government's actual goals
and motivations beyond the nuclear weapons issue by analyzing the documentary evidence
from the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Rodong Sinmun along with the information
provided by former North Korean diplomats.

1-2. General Views on North Korea
The mainstream of scholarship in North Korea studies subscribes to a very different
perspective on the country’s approaches to the United States.8 The conventional wisdom in
analyzing the North Korean regime is that it is a ‘status quo power’ or ‘security seeker’. This
means North Korea is perceived to be trying to preserve the Kim family’s legacy by
improving relations with the United States in the aftermath of a collapsing Eastern Bloc.
The implication of the ‘status quo’ position is that North Korea’s diplomatic
approaches to the U.S. are focused on internal factors. This interpretation emerged after the
end of the Cold War because the North Korean regime at that point was unstable both
economically and politically. It was a critical juncture for North Korea as it had to choose
either to adapt to the free-market system or to preserve the pristine version of Juche ideology.
Eventually, the North Korean leadership decided to maintain the Juche ideology which is a

8

This study attempts to reflect an emic perspective on North Korea’s foreign policy behavior as a counterbalance to the etic
perspective that is overwhelming represented by the mainstream discourse on North Korea by scholars, pundits, and the
mass media. The goal is to supplement the assessment of North Korea’s foreign policy objectives with descriptive in-depth
accounts that reflect how insiders ‒ North Korean foreign policymakers, in this case ‒ understand their decisions and the
reactions to them by their diplomatic partners. Kang Sok Ju quoting a passage from Gone with the Wind during the Agreed
Framework negotiations in 1994 that had not occurred to the Americans with whom he was negotiating illustrates an emic
perspective. Cf. Admin. “Difference between Emic and Etic,” Difference Between. July 23, 2015. Web. June 5, 2021.
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composite of: 1) national self-defense (jawi); political self-determination (jaju); and
economic self-sufficiency (jarip).
In terms of national defense, in the early 1990s, the Kim Jung Il regime added
‘nuclear ideology’ to this complex in the interest of regime survival. The nuclear ideology
provides security against an external threat while also serving normative and symbolic
functions. That is, it rationalizes the need to possess nuclear weapons and to make domestic
audiences accept the justifications for the nuclear policy (Howell, 2020, p. 1058).
This new internal factor was aiming at external threats, the South Korea-U.S. alliance
(Hong, 2011a, p. 106). This commitment to the acquisition of the ‘nuclear card’ emerged after
North Korea failed to obtain security assurances from the U.S. or to normalize its relations
with the U.S. These kinds of dependency relationships are neo-classical approaches that weak
powers resort to as a means of making themselves subordinate and subservient to a great
power (Choi, 2007, p. 82). Despite North Korea’s principle of anti-imperialism, which was
dominant after the Korean War, the country was confronted in the early 1990s with a
challenge to the regime's survival. Back in the 1960s, leaders in Pyongyang viewed the U.S.’s
international relations as imperialist since the U.S. was attacking communist countries and
establishing military bases in the process all over the world (Hong, 2011b, p. 104). In the
post-Cold War era, North Korea became concerned primarily about regime survival or
preserving the status quo by obtaining a U.S security guarantee.
After the failure of its negotiations with the United States, the country resumed its
anti-American campaign along with its nuclear weapons program in the early1990s. The
emergence of the nuclear program ‘provocation’ has been viewed in a distorted way by some
scholars of U.S-North Korea relations. The perception of North Korea as a ‘rogue state’ or an
‘irrational’ and even ‘impossible’ regime has focused attention exclusively on internal factors
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that supposedly are designed only to preserve the ‘Kim family’s legacy’ buttressed by the
Juche ideology (Cha, 2002; Howell, 2020; Haggard and Noland, 2010; Chung, 1993).
Employing only these internal factors in analyzing North Korea’s foreign policy
behavior leads to a biased and unbalanced view. After all, no one among these analysts has
access to the official documents or other information about internal deliberations in North
Korea needed to make this determination conclusively. The lack of accurate or reasonably
complete information about North Korean foreign policy decision-making often has been
exacerbated by speculative interpretations. This approach to the analysis of North Korea’s
foreign policy has led some scholars to conclude that the eponymous North Korean leader is
an irrational and crazy tyrant who seeks to incite war on the Korean peninsula and destroy
regional stability in the process.
Daniel and Phillip (2003) make it clear that these scholars face five barriers in their
efforts to understand North Korea: 1) linguistic barriers; 2) ideological barriers that distort
interpretations of developments in North Korea; 3) intellectual constructs that conceal
important information; 4) lack of imagination and a reluctance to acquire a deeper
comprehension of the North Korean mindset; and 5) deliberate misrepresentations for
political or policy convenience (p. 81).
Scholars and policymakers on Korean issues frequently misunderstand North Korea’s
official statements when they are translated into English. Ideologically, the country is
perceived as a Stalinist political system despite Pyongyang’s signaling a desire to open up its
economy on the condition of being able to maintain its regime. The rogue state framework
also lacks accuracy since it implies a preemptive attack is the only way to deal with
‘unreasonable’ states. This framework creates misunderstandings and overlooks the security
needs these states share along with all other states.
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These preemptive narratives from the United States and ‒ to a lesser extent ‒ the
West in general potentially lead to misperceptions of the inevitability of military conflicts and
the associated dilemmas. Also, they shape the public debate of foreign policy options both for
domestic and international audiences. Therefore, an internal-factors-only analysis has serious
intrinsic limits in providing an understanding of how North Korea’s foreign policy toward the
U.S. has changed over time.
The primary purpose of this study is to provide a new perspective on North Korea’s
diplomatic approaches to the United States from the 1970s. The research for this study relies
on the two hypotheses cited above. These two external factors ‒ the China-U.S. détente
during the Cold War era and the normalization of relations with South Korea by the Soviet
Union/Russia and China in the post-Cold War era ‒ might not have directly formed and
constructed the foreign policy of North Korea, but it is assumed that the leadership in
Pyongyang observed these momentous events closely, redesigned their policy agenda, and
adjusted their course of action toward the United States accordingly.

1-3. Defining of Rapprochement and Confrontational Approaches
In international relations, leaders in the world's anarchic system act and think
rationally in the pursuit of power and legitimacy (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 5-6). Also, the
anarchic structure of the system compels leaders to act rationally, and seek the settlement of
disputes before escalation, since the threat of force always looms in the background (Waltz,
1979). According to these theories of the international system, all nations must pay close
attention to what is happening globally. The rationality premise underpinning these theories
reflects the viewpoint of realists in international relations theory that obtaining security
guarantees to ensure survival is the main goal for all nations as international actors. This
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realistic rationality view focuses on the environmental factors of the international system that
define the national power of states and the geopolitical conditions that affect their interactions
(Glaser 2010, p. 1-23; Wohlforth 2008, p. 32-48).
On the other hand, foreign policy theory focuses on individual actors and their
interactions, groups of elites pursuing their own objectives, and the ethos of bureaucratic
politics. The pioneers of this theory are Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962). Their argument is
that foreign policy cannot be explained without defining the individual actors who observe
and perceive international situations and are responsible for the process of foreign policy
decision-making. Another eminent scholar Hudson (2005) argues that the origin and
dynamics of international politics are determined by individuals or a group of people (p. 6).
His core claim is that ‘human’ actions, beliefs, and perceptions fundamentally influence a
‘groupthink’ that determines and constructs international political dynamics. This
conventional wisdom of international politics and foreign policy rejects the employment of a
nation’s rationality as an explanatory factor and posits instead decision-making by human
actors based on their ‘psychological environment’ ‒ including perception, cognition, and the
human psyche (Snyder, 1962, p. 8; Sprout, 1968, p. 33-34).
This ‘first image’ analysis, however, is not sufficient to account fully for a country’s
foreign policy. It is necessary to employ all ‘three images’ (the individual, the state, and the
international system) in foreign policy analysis. In the case of North Korea, foreign policy
toward the United States is highly dependent on both the global political environment and the
psychological environment, which means the rationality of the state is embedded in the policy.
That is the reason why weak powers are less likely to challenge the great powers because
they do not want a war in the anarchic system of the world (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1983).
Weak powers, including North Korea, are more exposed to the unpredictability of
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international security and economic competition and adjust their domestic political
circumstances to the strategy that their foreign environment dictates (Snyder, 1991, p. 317318). Theoretically, in a neo-realist view, Stephen Walt (1987) argues that weak states are
likely to accommodate a Great Power, and bandwagon with it, when they do not have
external assistance (p. 222). Accommodating and aligning as a form of appeasement with a
Great Power – or a threatening power – could be the last resort for a weak state. On the other
hand, weak states or undeveloped countries do not always follow or comply with the
international capitalist system's norms and the roles defined by the system. Instead, some
weak states adopt a brinkmanship strategy – or an – isolation strategy to counter the threats of
a Great Power (Jervis, 1989, p.103). Lacking external assistance, North Korea has played
strategic brinkmanship vis-à-vis the U.S. since the end of the Cold War. This research will
combine the domestic and international system factors to delineate the differences in North
Korea’s diplomatic behavior toward the United States during the Cold War and the post-Cold
War eras.

1-3-1. The Rapprochement Approach
The term ‘rapprochement’ was used in relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the late 1960s. The term symbolizes the emergence of the new era between
the capitalist and the communist blocs in the Cold War context. In Europe, the comparable
term used by the German chancellor Willy Brandt was ‘Ostpolitik’. It signaled that West
Germany acknowledged East Germany's sovereignty (Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2014). Later,
President Lyndon Johnson announced the concept of a "free flow of ideas and people and
goods" between the U.S. and China, implying a process of ‘reconciliation’ in the late 1960s
(Panda, 1997, p. 43-44). Containing a hostile and aggressive China in Asia had been the
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United States' foreign policy stance since the Korean War. However, the climate of hostility
changed after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, which was aimed at reducing the
American military presence in Asia.
China also made its own decision to pursue reconciliation with the U.S. by inviting a
U.S. Ping-Pong team accompanied by American journalists to visit China in April 1971.
China’s Prime Minister Chou Enlai and U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger
played an essential role in this opening of relations between the two countries, which got
underway initially through people-to-people diplomacy (Panda, p. 50). This track two
diplomacy marked the beginning of a new era of peace that was the result of shared
geopolitical challenges. At the time, both the U.S. and China were embroiled in a
confrontation with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Vietnam War was heating up, and China
like other countries had to maneuver around the U.S.’s role as a ‘global policeman’. At the
same time, as was already noted, the relations of North Korea and the U.S. were directly
affected by the rapprochement underway between China and the U.S.
Kim Il Sung initially welcomed and supported the China-U.S. engagement. He
viewed the détente as a window of opportunity to normalize North Korea’s relations with
countries in the Western Bloc. Kim also was convinced that normalizing relations with Japan,
South Korea, and Western European countries was essential for achieving his goal of the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. This was a component of a larger strategic
objective that included the weakening of the alliance between South Korea and Japan and the
communization of South Korea (Hong, 2004, p. 35).
Kim visited Beijing a couple of times during Henry Kissinger’s visit to China to get a
reading on what was transpiring. He made a concerted effort to convince the Beijing
leadership to support his goal of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea along with
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the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea (UNCURK) (Hong, p. 37).
Besides these visits to Beijing, Kim adopted his own version of a quasi-people’s
diplomacy approach to the U.S. in which he was the stand-in for the North Korean people.
Journalists from The New York Times and The Washington Post were invited to Pyongyang
for his first-ever interviews with U.S. media outlets. Several Korean American scholars and a
Harvard University professor also were invited to visit the country. This was the juncture
when North Korea’s rapprochement approaches toward the U.S. were created and
implemented. In this research, ‘rapprochement’ defines North Korea’s variant of people’s
diplomacy toward the United States in the early 1970s. Included as well are North Korea’s
attempts to reach out to the U.S. Congress and the White House as components of a
comprehensive, concerted foreign policy initiative that was endorsed and led by Kim Il Sung
himself.

1-3-2. The Confrontational Approach
North Korea’s confrontational approach toward the United States emerged in the
post-Cold War era. Having been abandoned by its allies, North Korea had to protect its
national security by reinforcing its ‘self-reliant’ strategy in national defense. Also, by the end
of the Cold War, North Korea’s economy was on a declining trajectory while South Korea
already had surpassed the North in both the military and economic spheres (Kang, 2003). As
the North was growing continually weaker relative to the South, fears of external threats from
the ROK-U.S. alliance are alleged to have led the country to launch a full-scale nuclear
weapons program. Its objective was to maintain the balance of power on the Korean
peninsula and to secure the survival of the North Korean regime (Hwang, 2005).
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After the failure to reach an understanding with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) on the safeguards inspections in the early 1990s, North Korea shut down its
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in June 1994 and begun removing spent fuel rods, which
reportedly contained enough plutonium to make five or six bombs (Sigal, 1997). The UN
Security Council and the United States imposed economic sanctions, which North Korea
strongly denounced as a ‘declaration of war.’
A month earlier, in May 1994, the North Koreans had announced that they were
withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ordered the international
inspectors to leave the country (Perry, 2006). Meanwhile, during a rancorous North-South
negotiation, North Korea’s chief delegate suggested that Seoul would be turned into a ‘sea of
fire’ if severe economic sanctions were not lifted. This was a characteristic over-the-top
rhetorical intervention in the heat of the moment, but the Clinton administration took it
literally and ordered a review of a U.S. plan to conduct a preemptive surgical attack on North
Korea’s Yongbyon's facilities (Kim, 1995). The administration also sent additional troops to
South Korea in preparation for a potential second Korean war.
Just in the nick of time, however, Kim Il Sung announced that North Korea was
willing to freeze its nuclear facilities and resolve the growing tensions through diplomatic
negotiations with the U.S. As was explained briefly above, North Korea's confrontational
approaches to the U.S at this juncture entailed two interrelated behaviors: threatening to
withdraw from the NPT regime; and producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. As will be
explained later, these two behaviors indicate that the North Koreans were seeking to have
direct negotiations with the U.S.
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1-4. Organizations of the Dissertation
Chapter Two provides a literature review of North Korea’s approaches to the United
States and identifies the limitations of explicating independent variables. The first half of
Chapter Two is devoted to a literature review categorizing the diverse arguments of current
scholarship on North Korea’s approaches to the U.S. As noted previously, most scholars in
the field tend to focus on internal factors that they believe have determined the foreign policy
of North Korea. The internal factor analysis, however, fails to explain the rationale of the
foreign policy behind the nuclear brinkmanship of North Korea.
The second half of Chapter Two deals with the theoretical framework used in this
dissertation to demonstrate the complex factor internal and external factors that more
effectively explain the foreign policy behavior of North Korea. The theoretical framework is
an adaptation of “The Situational Imperative: A Predictive Model of Foreign Policy Behavior”
‒ published in 1989 by Valerie M. Hudson, Charles F. Hermann, and Eric Singer in 1989 ‒ to
the case of North Korea’s foreign policy. Methodologically, this study identifies external
factors as explanatory variables explaining the dependent variables of the foreign policy
decision-making process. This study uses this predictive model to critique previous analyses
of North Korea’s foreign policy and its relations with the United States.
Chapter Three is a case study of the détente between China and the United States in
the early 1970s. It explains how Pyongyang's perception of the U.S. changed its foreign
policy. The first half of Chapter Three traces the process of the détente and North Korea's
efforts to draw U.S. attention to its eight-point proposal through the good offices of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). North Korea expected the proposal, which included the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the dissolution of UNCURK, to be
discussed during the meetings between Premier Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger.
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The second half of Chapter Three explains North Korea's responses to international
developments in the early 1970s as they were reported in North Korea’s official newspapers.
The final section of Chapter Three highlights the results of the détente and North Korea’s
version of ‘people's diplomacy’.
Chapter Four explains the emergence of three rapprochement approaches toward the
U.S. The aforementioned ‘people’s diplomacy’, including the outreach to U.S. diplomats,
journalists, and scholars, was the beginning of the shift in North Korea’s foreign policy stance
toward the U.S. Also included were two letters to the U.S. Congress from North Korea’s
Supreme People’s Assembly. Additionally, in a more traditional form of track two diplomacy,
Pyongyang also reached out to civil society organizations in the United States to demonstrate
North Korea’s willingness to normalize relations with the U.S. The intentions behind these
diplomatic efforts are subject to diverse interpretations, but this study focuses on the
interpretations found in diplomatic communications by diplomats from East European
countries who had direct conversations with Kim Il Sung. The end of the chapter addresses
the failure of these three approaches and the implications for subsequent foreign policy
approaches.
Chapter Five explores the normalization of relations with South Korea by Russia and
China in the post-Cold War era. The first half of the chapter explains the process of the
normalization between China and South Korea and North Korea's response to it. Next, the
process of normalization between Russia and South Korea and North Korea’s responses are
explained. Pyongyang deemed these two developments to be critical for its survival. In
reaction to these developments, Pyongyang started to explore a potential nuclear weapons
program both to deter the U.S. and to create leverage for negotiations with the U.S.
This was the critical juncture that had a transformative impact on North Korea’s
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foreign policy. This is the subject of Chapter Six. The chapter begins with a discussion of the
origins of North Korea's nuclear program as a solution to the country’s energy needs, and its
participation in the NPT regime based on that rationale. Despite its initial commitment to
observe the norms and rules of the NPT, however, the two normalizations described above
drove North Korea to explore the development of a nuclear weapons program to ensure its
national security. From that point onward, the U.S. and the IAEA became laser-focused on
what they believed was a clandestine nuclear weapons program. While correctly assessing
North Korea’s behavior as confrontational, there was little to no awareness in the U.S. or
among U.S. allies that the behavior was aimed directly at compelling the U.S. government to
come to the negotiation table. The second half of Chapter Six traces how North Korea’s
confrontational behavior reached the crisis level in 1994 that ultimately led to the successful
negotiation of the Agreed Framework (aka, Geneva Agreement). Chapter Seven summarizes
this study's arguments and explores its implications for North Korea’s future foreign policy
towards the United States.
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Chapter Ⅱ: Systemic Analysis of Foreign Policy

2-1. Literature Review
Modelski (1972) defines foreign policy as a system of behavior that constantly seeks
to change the behavior of other countries and to coordinate their actions in the international
environment. Hermann (1972) also defines foreign policy as a formal system in which a
person who officially represents a country intentionally influences other international actors.
From this perspective, the foreign policy of North Korea encompassed two objectives in the
Cold War era. First, the country wanted to realize the unification of the Korean Peninsula
under communist rule. Second, the country wanted to be a major player in international
socialism, the global class struggle that unites all communist revolutions in the common
cause of replacing capitalism as a world system.
To achieve the first objective, North Korea had to deal with the U.S. troops deployed
in South Korea. Pyongyang was trying to induce a change in U.S. behavior that would lead to
the removal of its troops from the Korean peninsula. Guided by this objective, its foreign
policy toward the United States began on an antagonistic basis with its military forces
receiving support from China and the Soviet Union after the Korean War. Following the
China-U.S. détente, however, the policy underwent a transformation toward rapprochement.
In the post-Cold War era, mounting security concerns led Pyongyang to adopt a new, more
confrontational approach to the U.S.
The bulk of existing studies on North Korea’s foreign policy approaches toward the
United States have adopted the early 1990s as their starting point. As a result, these studies
are focused primarily on North Korea’s motivation in that timeframe for seeking security
guarantees and a deterrence of external threats. This review offers alternative explanations of
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North Korea’s diplomatic behaviors toward the U.S. by widening the timeframe. It also
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of previous explanations from the perspective of this
alternative starting point in analyzing North Korea’s approaches to the U.S.

2-1-1. The Diplomatic Factor
Coercion. The research on coercive diplomacy primarily focuses on North Korea’s
exploitation of nuclear provocations to initiate negotiations with the United States. This
explanation interprets North Korea’s nuclear program in the early 1990s as a coercive tool for
improving relations with the United States and the international community (Mack, 1991;
Kim, 1995; Wit, 2001; Moon and Bae, 2003).
Mack (1991) argues that North Korea saw the development of the nuclear program as
a useful bargaining chip to launch a low-level dialogue with the United States. To strengthen
its bargaining position in future dialogues, Pyongyang exploited the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards issues arising from activities in the reprocessing facility at
the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. In Mack’s view, by seeking to acquire
nuclear weapons, North Korea compelled the U.S. to pay attention to its concerns. The U.S.
had no choice since it officially became involved directly in the IAEA’s efforts to resolve the
challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime posed by North Korea’s nuclear
program.
This coercive behavior toward the U.S. reflected the logic of Pyongyang’s strategic
rationality. At the beginning of the 1990s, Pyongyang faced an economic crisis and the
shifting conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula. These were intimations of a
looming no-win situation for North Korea (p. 94). These difficulties gave North Korea an
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incentive to initiate a nuclear weapons program9. The nuclear program could offer a low-cost,
strategic equalizer to the conventional military superiority of South Korea, provide a
significant deterrent value for the country, and stymie South Korea’s aggressive efforts to
promote reform in the North. In the end, the long-range solution to North Korea’s looming
no-win situation was to engage the U.S. in a dialogue. Considering the U.S.’s deep concerns
about preventing WMD proliferation, North Korea may have perceived that its nuclear
program could be utilized to gain jiu jitsu-like leverage in any forthcoming dialogue.
Kim (1995) points out that Pyongyang’s priority in foreign policy in the early 1990s
was to prioritize direct bilateral confrontation or negotiations with the United States. By
exploiting its threat to withdraw from the NPT, reinforced by its eviction from Yongbyon of
the IAEA’s inspection team, North Korea finally coerced the U.S. into agreeing to hold highlevel U.S.-North Korea talks in New York City on June 11, 1993. One tangible outcome of
these talks was Pyongyang’s agreement to halt its withdrawal from the NPT temporarily.
Pyongyang also acceded to the IAEA’s request for special inspections, but with a caveat that
the inspection sites had to be limited. Accordingly, Kim’s assessment is that North Korea’s
diplomatic behavior demonstrated the use of brinkmanship and breakthrough tactics to
advance its interests (p. 19).
Indeed, ‘brinksmanship’ is a fair characterization of North Korea’s diplomatic tactics.
Pyongyang had begun removing nuclear fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor without
providing the required notice to IAEA inspectors after the first round of high-level U.S.-
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At this point in time, and even up to nearly a decade later, North Korea was disavowing any intention to develop nuclear
weapons. This disavowal from North Korea's perspective was not necessarily inconsistent with conducting
experimentation on nuclear weapons-related technologies as a hedging behavior. In the early 1990s, North Korea may
have perceived a strategic advantage in fostering ambiguity about whether its nuclear program was 'merely'
experimentation as a hedging behavior, a certifiable nuclear weapons program or a complete ruse. The dire consequences
of making a firm determination became clear in the 2002 head-on confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea over
North Korea's alleged HEU program.
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North Korea talks with Under Secretary Arnold Kanter in New York City in January 1992.10
In response, the IAEA Board Governors adopted a sanctions resolution that triggered
Pyongyang’s announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT.
This sequence of events is viewed as the starting point of the first North Korean
nuclear crisis of 1994. The escalation of tension was reaching the boiling point when former
U.S. president Jimmy Carter intervened decisively by travelling to Pyongyang for a face-toface meeting with Kim Il Sung. Due to Carter’s timely intervention, after months of difficult
negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, both sides finally reached a landmark
agreement in Geneva ‒ commonly known as the Agreed Framework ‒ on October 24, 1994.
North Korea’s brinkmanship in the form of the implicit threat of its nuclear program – aimed
potentially not only at Washington but also at Beijing and Moscow – signaled its willingness
to disrupt the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, if necessary, to obtain a favorable
bargaining position.
Wit (2001) argues that the motivations of North Korea’s engagement efforts were to
salvage its economy and legitimize its government. He suggests that the U.S. government had
no alternative but to become more invested in the success of the negotiations with North
Korea. If the negotiations failed to address Pyongyang’s concerns, North Korea could
continue to undermine the international nonproliferation regime and might even export
nuclear weapons materials or technology abroad (p. 79). The weapons and technology could
have been sold to countries such as Libya and Iran who were NPT members in good standing.
Instead of following up on its announced intention to withdraw from the NPT, North
Korea adhered to its commitments under the agreed Framework but expected reciprocal
measures by Washington and Seoul ‒ such as the lifting of economic sanctions. Wit also
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Wertz 2015.
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explains that the engagement policy was driven by the leader of North Korea at the time –
Kim Jong-il – who was trying to bolster his domestic political credibility and legitimacy. For
these domestic reasons, North Korea continued to pursue an offensive diplomacy to enhance
its relations with other regional powers, especially China and Russia (p. 83).
On the other hand, Moon and Bae (2003) point out that North Korea's fundamental
motivation for seeking to engage the United States stemmed from deeply rooted security
anxieties related perceptions of hostile neglect, isolation, and containment effectiveness.
Notably, the U.S.-South Korea annual Team Spirit military exercise reinforced North Korea's
external threat perception. Pyongyang's efforts to compensate for these security concerns
included the strengthening of its military-first politics and the pursuit of a nuclear program
that attracted the U.S.'s attention because of its WMD potential (p. 38).
Table 1. North Korea’s Coercive Diplomacy Situation
Influential Type

Coercive Types

Situational Classifications
Type A: Getting Economic Sanctions Lifted

Coercive Diplomacy
Coercion

(Defensive)

Type B: Ensuring the Regime’s Survival
Type C: Deterring Military Threats by the South

Coercive Diplomacy
(Offensive)

Type A: Withdrawal from the NPT
Type B: Refusal of IAEA Inspections

At the same time, North Korea signaled that it was seeking a normal relationship with
U.S. by proposing to exchange its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor for more proliferationresistant light-water reactor (LWR) power plants to solve the country’s energy shortages
(Merrill, 1993, p. 11). As these observations suggest, the explanation for North Korea’s
coercive diplomacy is related to its drive to overcome its security anxieties, to salvage its
economy, and to deter South Korea's military capabilities. Its strategy for achieving these
objectives was to open bilateral dialogues with the United States.
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Cooperation. North Korea's cooperative diplomacy was affected by the international
environment and the domestic economic crisis (Park, 1997; Cummings, 1997; Snyder, 2000;
Sigal, 2002; Harrison, 1994; Mansourov, 1994). This explanation focuses on external factors,
including the demise of socialism worldwide, South Korea's Nordpolitik policy, and the
Soviet Union's collapse. These external factors caused the country to be isolated and to suffer
from an economic crisis. As a solution to overcome its economic crisis, North Korea opted
for a cooperative diplomacy stance toward the United States.
Park (1997) noted that cooperative relations between North Korea and the United
States were initiated during the George H.W. Bush administration. This reflected the
administration’s newly implemented policy authorizing its diplomats to establish contacts
with North Korean officials. The policy also encouraged nongovernmental people-to-people
exchanges and allowed certain humanitarian exports between the two countries, such as
medicines and educational materials. For the sake of implementing this policy, the U.S. and
North Korea held direct talks in Beijing in December 1988 (p. 624). Park cites the first and
second high-level talk held in 1992 and 1993, respectively, and the Agreed Framework in
1994 as examples of active cooperation even though there were twists and turns in the
negotiations between the two countries. Moreover, in 1996, the two countries announced an
agreement on their first join search for the remains of U.S. soldiers missing in action (MIA)
from the Korean War (p. 625). As part of the agreement, North Korea handed over the first
set of remains recovered by the joint excavation team, and the U.S. government donated $6.2
million in food aid to Pyongyang in June 1996.
Park argues there were several reasons for North Korea to cooperate with the U.S. in
this period. For example, externally, North Korea faced the demise of socialism worldwide
and the resultant competitive advantage gained by its adversary, South Korea. Pyongyang
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recognized that Seoul’s successful Nordpolitik policy had gained recognition from North
Korea’s former allies, while Pyongyang was becoming more isolated in the international
community (p. 629). Internally, the biggest challenge facing the North was the economic
crisis. Food and energy shortages compelled North Korea to launch a campaign for assistance
from the Western countries in the international community for the first time in its history.
In a parallel analysis, Cummings (1997) explains that the fundamental reason for
Pyongyang’s cooperation with Washington was to get food aid, economic support, light-water
reactor (LWR) power plants, and help to deal with a strong South Korea. The harshest part
was the food crisis. North Korea was facing a time of trouble, including the possibility of the
end of the Kim dynasty as masses of people were starving. This crisis was terrible, and it
cried out for humanitarian aid of all types from around the world. In this sense, Cummings
observes that North Korea desperately needed to engage with the United States and to seek its
cooperation through dialogue.
Snyder (2000) argues that South Korea’s Nordpolitik policy gained it diplomatic
advantages and put the survival of North Korea at significant risk. Due to its relatively
disadvantaged position, North Korea’s ultimate objective in establishing high-level talks with
South Korea in the period of 1990-92 ‒ including the signing of the Basic Agreements
between the two Koreas ‒ was its need to lay the groundwork for improved relations with the
United States (p. 8). The primary purpose of North Korea’s cooperative approach to the U.S.
was to preserve its regime and to block South Korea’s attempts to bring about a regime
change by exploiting its enhanced diplomatic and economic leverage.
Snyder explains that the tactics of North Korea’s negotiations with both South Korea
and the United States did not seem to be cooperative, but effectively were such since the
bottom line driving North Korea’s negotiation behavior was its highly dependent condition
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stemming from its vulnerability in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. As a coping
mechanism, North Korea compensated for its vulnerability by acting out a strategy of ‘bluff
or bolster’ at the negotiating table (p. 9). Nevertheless, cooperation between the two sides
eventually became apparent when both sides’ demands matched and were followed up by
responsible actions in implementation of their agreements.
Sigal (2002) focuses on the character of the negotiation patterns to elucidate North
Korea’s cooperative behavior with the United States. The bottom line of Sigal’s argument is
that Pyongyang’s cooperative actions were manifested when the demand for an end of enmity
was accepted, and responsible reciprocation had to be activated between the two countries (p.
1). The Agreed Framework (1994) was an example of this cooperative mechanism because it
met the demands of both sides. North Korea agreed to freeze the operation and construction
of nuclear reactors suspected of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program. For its part,
the United States agreed to support the construction of two new light-water reactor power
plants (LWRs) for generating electrical power, provide an interim supply of heavy fuel oil,
and provide some relaxation of U.S. economic sanctions. As Sigal points out, North Korea’s
cooperative behavior was based on a tit-for-tat strategy to end enmity that involved
cooperating whenever Washington cooperated.
Harrison (1994) explains how the motivation of North Korea's approach to the
United States was deeply rooted in a "siege mentality" (Choi 2005, p. 90). This reflected a
belief among members of the North Korean leadership that the rest of the world had highly
hostile behavioral intentions toward them. Harrison observes that the siege mentality had
festered since the Korean War. Other factors accounting for it included the collapse of
communism in Soviet Union and its former satellites in Eastern and Central Europe and
Central Asia, and South Korea's growing capacities as an adversary ‒ all of which reinforced
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North Korea’s deepening sense of vulnerability.
South Korea, on the other hand, was preparing for a renewed Republic of Korea,
implying that Seoul expected to absorb the Northern half of the Korean peninsula. South
Korean leaders considered North Korea to be on the verge of a devastating economic and
political crisis that would undermine the regime's authority and power. Internally, according
to some analysts, North Korea faced an increasingly sharp policy conflict within the regime
over the issue of its nuclear program. On the one side, there were pragmatists with some
experience of the outside world who argued that a changing international environment
required major changes in North Korea’s policy (p. 18). This group supported an opening of
the economy to attract large scale inputs of capital and technology from South Korea, the
United States, and Japan. On the other side, a powerful ‘old guard’ centered in the armed
forces and a military-complex lent their support to the nuclear establishment.
In the end, the pragmatists prevailed in a meeting of the Worker's Party Central
Committee in 1991. They agreed to accept the IAEA's inspections and to seek the
normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States. Mansourov (1994) focuses on
the key institutions inside North Korea that were willing to cooperate with the United States
to ensure the survival of the country. Since the security environment around North Korea had
changed, strategic thinking in Pyongyang also was forced to change. As Mansourov explains,
the Institute of Peace and Disarmament (IPD) of North Korea urged the International
Department of the Worker’s Party to adopt a new strategy based on normalizing relations and
improving economic ties with the West. This policy advocated cooperation with the IAEA,
and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States (p. 4). The
IPD encouraged the International Department to engage South Korea in mutual
comprehensive security, political, economic, and cultural dialogues. In terms of the nuclear
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program, the IPD suggested that the Pyongyang leadership should state clearly that the
nuclear program was aimed at solving energy problems and cooperate with the IAEA to allay
international concerns about nuclear weapons-related activity.
The explanations for these cooperative motivations are fundamentally rooted in the
neo-realistic view that minor powers tend to cooperate or subordinate themselves to a Great
Power. In this sense, North Korea’s motivation to cooperate with the United States was based
on its anxiety about threats to the survival of its regime in the post-Cold War era. Domestic
and international constraints drove North Korea to explore and implement a policy of
cooperative diplomacy for the sake of survival.
Table 2. North Korea’s Cooperative Diplomacy Situation
Influential Type

Cooperative Types

Situational Classifications
Type A: The Demand for an End of Enmity

Cooperation

Cooperative Diplomacy
(Active)

Type B: The Expectation of Reciprocal Responses
Type C: The Scarcity of Food and Energy

Cooperative Diplomacy
(Passive)

Type A: The Collapse of the Soviet Union
Type B: South Korea’s Nordpolitik Policy

2-1-2. The Security Factor
Minimal Deterrence. The minimal deterrence analysis asserts that North Korea
seeks security guarantees by developing a nuclear weapons program, but simultaneously tries
to normalize relations with the U.S. and Japan for the sake of obtaining economic support and
ensuring regime survival (Shen, 2009; Howell, 2020; Rhee, 1992; Kang, 2003; Sohn, 2012).
In this case, military-first politics, including the nuclear program, play a crucial role in the
country's security matrix, and diplomatic relations with the United States supplement this
matrix by enhancing the legitimacy of the regime.
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Shen (2009) argues that the minimal deterrence strategy in the case of North Korea
entailed combining the development of nuclear weapons with improving its relations with the
United States. If Pyongyang’s attempts to normalize relations with the U.S. failed to succeed,
the country would make the pursuit of nuclear weapons a higher priority. Possessing nuclear
weapons would strengthen the country’s national security as well as deter the nuclear powers
surrounding North Korea. China and Russia have their own nuclear weapons, and South
Korea and Japan are protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Shen argues that the nuclear
program was initiated not only for security purposes but also for diplomacy purposes vis-avis the international community as well as the United States. North Korea believed that the
United States and NATO would not have launched military strikes against Iraq and
Yugoslavia if they had possessed nuclear weapons. According to this line of reasoning,
Pyongyang’s strategy for opening up to negotiations with the U.S. is premised on the
acquisition of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of its national security.
Howell (2020) explains three reasons why states seek to develop or acquire nuclear
weapons: 1) nuclear weapons provide security against external threats; 2) the decision to
nuclearize is influenced by interactions among domestic actors and state leaders; and 3)
nuclear weapons serve normative and symbolic functions as an affirmation of legitimacy
(p.1053). These reasons are based on the perceived value of nuclear weapons, which is linked
to deterrence and nuclear non-use. The conventional wisdom of rational deterrence theory
explains that nuclear deterrence can minimize the chances of bilateral conflict between two
nuclear-armed states (Sagan, 1996). In the case of North Korea, Howell argues that nuclear
weapons serve as a powerful and reliable war deterrent that contributes to regime survival
while also being a constituent part of the state’s identity (p.1054). North Korea's nuclear
weapons are embedded in its national ideology, namely, Juche. Embedding the nuclear
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doctrine within a national ideology serves to justify the cost of nuclear weapons and helps to
maintain domestic support for the nuclear program.
Howell introduces the concept of a nuclear ideology that encompasses the motivations
behind North Korea's adoption of a policy of developing and acquiring nuclear weapons. This
concept can be shaped by domestic politics and perceptions of the international environment
in the geopolitical region where North Korea is situated. Leaders in Pyongyang could justify
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by promulgating North Korea’s nuclear ideology as a
means of ensuring regime survival and minimizing external threats.
In a similar context, Rhee (1992) argues that North Korea was attempting to preserve
its own style of socialism by enhancing the Juche ideology. At the beginning of the 1990s,
North Korea’s economy had hit bottom and was at the point where people’s daily subsistence
was threatened. The food and energy shortages propelled the country to discard its selfimposed isolation and proactively reach out to other countries. In response to the economic
crisis, and as a step toward the normalization of relations, Pyongyang began pressing Japan
for a financial settlement of outstanding claims from its 40-year colonial occupation of Korea
from 1905 to 1945. North Korea also intensified its efforts to reach out to the United States
by offering to upgrade counselor-level meetings to the ambassadorial level (p. 61). However,
Japan and the United States were not receptive to these efforts by North Korea. Rhee assumes
that this is the point at which North Korea started to highlight nuclear issues to gain the
attention of the United States. Indeed, after giving notice under the Agreed Framework of the
nuclear power plants under construction at Shinpo on the east coast, South Korea, Japan, and
the United States warned North Korea to abandon the dream of having nuclear weapons (p.
62).
These three countries also demanded that Pyongyang sign a nuclear safeguard accord
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with the IAEA and accept international inspection of its nuclear-related facilities. North
Korea agreed to sign the safeguards accord on the condition of being able to inspect U.S.
military facilities in South Korea. Rhee's article suggests that North Korea was trying to
exploit nuclear issues to develop its relations with Japan and the United States to ensure the
regime's survival.
Kang (2003) makes the point that North Korea's security interests and goals are
crucial because the Korean War technically has not ended. The 1953 armistice has never been
replaced with a peace treaty. In this sense, North Korea must adopt means of deterrence and
defense against the military threat from South Korea and the United States. If the U.S. agreed
to provide security assurances or to sign a peace treaty with North Korea, the country would
not need to develop or acquire nuclear weapons (p. 495). However, Washington has been
unwilling to conclude a peace treaty or to normalize relations with Pyongyang. Instead, the
United States has labeled North Korea a terrorist state and even explored the possibility of
going to war. The U.S.’s National Security Strategy envisions preemptive strikes as
potentially the best policy for dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons. It is no surprise
that North Korea is concerned that it will undermine its deterrence posture if it gives up its
nuclear weapons program. Kang views North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as a
diplomatic tool for exchanging security guarantees and salvaging its economy through
negotiations with the United States.
Sohn (2012) explores ways in which minor powers can establish their position in the
world's unipolar system. In general, there are two options for minor powers to ensure their
survival. First, they can adopt a balance of power strategy with middle powers that do not
agree to comply with the norms and rules shaped by the Great Powers. Second, minor powers
can bandwagon with a Great Power by acceding to its norms and rules. Sohn argues that

３３

North Korea, as a minor power, had to adopt one of these two options in dealing with threats
from South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang implemented its military-first policy to
maintain a balance of power as a means of deterring South Korea's policy of 'unification by
absorption'. Therefore, Sohn concludes, Pyongyang concentrated on building strong military
forces armed with nuclear weapons to ensure its security while simultaneously trying to
attract the attention of the U.S. in confrontational ways both to gain support its economic
recovery and to enhance the legitimacy of its regime.
Suh (2003) explores the modus operandi and effects of North Korea's brinkmanship
diplomacy aimed at concluding a nonaggression treaty with the United States to assuage its
military and security threats. Brinkmanship means that benefits are maximized by one party
threatening the other ‒ or intentionally creating a crisis ‒ to induce the other party to make
concessions. The characteristics of brinkmanship are: 1) the existence of outside threats; 2)
expectations of concessions from other parties; and 3) a strong will to resist an external threat.
In the case of North Korea, there was a threat in the form of the military power of the U.S.,
the most powerful country in the post-Cold War era. North Korea believed in the probability
of drawing concessions from the United States by developing weapons of mass destruction
and resisting subjugation to international norms. If the U.S. refused to respond as desired,
aggressive, or threatening actions could be taken (p. 160). Suh argues that North Korea
focused its brinkmanship on the U.S. because the U.S. threatened its national security through
potential nuclear attacks and actual economic sanctions. Also, changes in the international
environment and its weak national power forced North Korea to adopt a brinkmanship
strategy.
Ironically, Pyongyang perceived the U.S. as a target for negotiations that could
comprehensively address its national interests. Normalizing relations with the U.S. could be a
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rational and efficient choice for acquiring security guarantees, maintaining national prestige,
and restoring the economy all at the same time.
Table 3. North Korea’s Minimal Deterrence Situation
Influential Type

Deterrence

Deterrence Types
Minimal Deterrence
(Defensive)

Situational Classifications
Type A: Asymmetry in Conventional Military
Forces
Type B: Nuclear States Surround North Korea
Type C: The Korean War Not Yet Ended

Minimal Deterrence
(Offensive)

Type A: Potential for Preemptive Strikes
Type B: The ROK-U.S. Joint Military Exercises
Type C: Economic Sanctions

2-1-3. Expansionist and Irrational Views
The expansionist and irrational views rely on the endemic enemy explanation of the
relations between North Korea and the United States. This explanation reflects two
fundamental points of contention in U.S.-North Korean relations: North Korea’s forceful
attempt to reunify the Korean peninsula in 1950, and the persistent demand by North Korea
for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Unlike the diplomacy and security
factors explanations, the expansionist and irrational views are radical because they posit that
North Korea always has wanted to achieve its goals by inciting a war with the United States.
This radical analysis focuses on elites in Pyongyang, especially Kim Il Sung's
perceptions of the United States and his unwavering commitment to the goal of the
reunification of the Korean peninsula right up until his death in July 1994. According to this
view, Kim was not satisfied with the status quo, and believed that the reunification had to be
achieved by military means, including the use of nuclear weapons (Kang, 1995). The
deployment of military forces along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the installation of heavy
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artillery pieces north of the DMZ aimed at Seoul, the development of long-range missiles,
and the production of nuclear–biological-chemical weapons are cited as evidence supporting
the expansionist argument. North Korea’s export of missiles ‒ and allegedly even its nuclear
technology ‒ to other countries or terrorist groups also is cited as evidence of its aggressive
behavior:
In the past decade North Korea has become the world’s principal purveyor of ballistic
missiles and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD
arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well.
These states’ pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat
to all nations. We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States
and our allies and friends (The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, 2002, p. 14).

Cha (2002) argues that North Korea's irrational behaviors derive from the regime's
opacity and the recklessness and unpredictability of its leadership. In his view, Pyongyang’s
leaders are likely to interpret the use of limited military force ‒ such as preemptive military
strikes ‒ as a rational course of action (p. 47). He assumes these preemptive military strikes
would be motivated by fear and a sense of vulnerability. These motivations are rooted in the
aggregate effects of negative economic growth, the yearly shortfalls foodstuffs, chronic
energy shortages, and the threat posed by an increasingly confident and militarily superior
South Korea.
Despite the economic crisis of the 1990s, North Korea spent 30 percent of its budget
on defense. For those like Cha who use the 'Securitization' Paradigm in their policy analysis,
such ‘irrational’ decision-making shows that North Korea had become a ‘mad’ or a ‘garrison’
state. Moreover, as one of the most militarized societies in the world, it would willingly
wage total war against its peace-loving neighbors (Smith, 2000). In this sense, for these
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analysts, Pyongyang is viewed as an untrustworthy party not fit for negotiations due to its
refusal to comply with international norms and rules regarding its nuclear program.
Indeed, Mazarr (1995) explains that the unpredictability of North Korea’s behavior
was manifested in the early 1990s. After traces of weapons-grade Plutonium were detected in
North Korea, the George H. W. Bush administration offered inducements for halting the
nuclear program (p. 95). The inducements included the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons from South Korea, suspension of the annual joint U.S.-ROK military exercise, and a
one-time diplomatic exchange with North Korea in New York in 1992. North Korea agreed to
accept the IAEA’s inspections in response to these inducements. Only a little over a year later,
however, North Korea rejected the IAEA’s request for ‘special inspections’ at its nuclear sites.
Pyongyang also refused to grant access to its covert nuclear facilities in other parts of the
country.
Countermeasures were imposed by the U.S. in response to what it considered to be
this unpredictable behavior by North Korea, including economic sanctions. These
countermeasures notwithstanding, after rejecting a request by the IAEA on February 9, 1993,
for permission to conduct ‘special inspections’ of two suspect facilities, North Korea declared
its intention to withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993 (p. 95). Pyongyang’s seemingly
unpredictable behavior caused a crisis atmosphere on the peninsula, and rumors of impending
war hung in the air.
Despite the perceptions of North Korea’s unpredictability, theoretically, and its
presumed ambition to possess nuclear weapons is hardly surprising. There are fundamental
motivations for states to develop nuclear weapons. Sagan (1996) explains that states will seek
to develop nuclear weapons when facing a significant military threat to their security that
cannot be met through alternative means. According to Sagan, nuclear weapons increase
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national security against foreign threats and advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic
interests (p. 55). Based on this theoretical perspective, North Korea might well have
concluded that nuclear weapons could stabilize its domestic politics and deter foreign threats.
Support for this theoretical perspective can be found in the work of a prominent group
of political scientists, including Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and William Riker. All of
them endorse the view that nuclear proliferation can bring about stability in international
relations (Sagan, 1994, p. 66). In the same context, some scholars argue that the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by Germany and Ukraine could deter Russian military interventions.
Similarly, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East could inject stability between the parties to
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this context of ‘proliferation optimism’, the possession of nuclear
weapons is an act of rationality for security’s sake that reduces the likelihood of a war or a
conflict. Contrary to this theoretical consensus, then, why do some scholars in the field of
U.S.-North Korea relations continue to think that Pyongyang’s leadership is irrational, and its
nuclear weapons program threatens the regime’s stability?
Cha (2004) argues that North Korea has violated a series of agreements, including
the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, and the 1992
Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In particular, he notes that
Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT is unprecedented compared with other nuclear states.
Its unprecedented action is further acerbated by its refusal to cooperate with the IAEA in
compliance with international norms and rules (p. 230). Moreover, he argues, North Korea is
alleged to possess one of the most massive stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons in
the world.11 At the same time, the regime militarily empowers itself while people in the
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country are starving. Additionally, North Korea has attacked South Korea across their shared
border, including the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island and the sinking of the South Korea
frigate Cheonan in 2010.
Cha cites these aggressive actions and belligerent behaviors as indications of North
Korea’s inveterate determination to continue developing nuclear weapons and missiles to
disturb regional stability. Many scholars in the field of regional security studies agree that
external constraints after the Cold War led to North Korea becoming isolated and at risk of
developing nuclear weapons for the sake of regime survival. However, questions remain
about when and how a leader acts rationally in the face of external threats and domestic chaos.
Kang (1995) believes that assumptions about the leader's attitudes and rationality are
necessary in explaining North Korean foreign policy. In that case, it must be accepted that a
different North Korean leader would have produced a different set of outcomes. Kang also
argues that in the face of declining Great Power support, a minor state must undertake selfhelp measures to secure its defense. North Korea was grabbling with an acute awareness of
its security vulnerability in the 1990s. Traditional allies were deserting the North, the country
had a stagnant economic infrastructure, and the South appeared to be increasingly threatening.
DPRK's Foreign Minister Kim Yong-Nam said that "the détente between the Soviet Union
and South Korea will leave us no other choice but to take measures to provide for ourselves
some weapons for which we have so far relied on the Soviet Union" (Kang, 1995, p. 267).

2-1-4. The Limitation of the Literature Review
This literature review has focused on works analyzing the motivations underlying
North Korea's approach to the United States. The literature reviewed can be categorized into
three categories: 1) the diplomatic approach involving coercion and cooperation, 2) the
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security approach based on minimal deterrence, and 3) expansionist and irrational behaviors
approach based on leadership characteristics.
In the diplomatic approach category, there are two groups of scholars focused on
coercion and cooperation explanations, respectively. The coercion explanation explores North
Korea's exploitation of international non-proliferation regimes such as the NPT and the IAEA
to open a dialogue with the United States. Coercive diplomatic behavior contains defensive
and offensive modalities. The defensive modality is driven by efforts get economic sanctions
lifted, to ensure the regime's survival, and to deter military threats from South Korea. On the
other hand, the offensive modality is carried out by threatening the NPT regime and rejecting
IAEA inspections when Pyongyang faced external constraints in its efforts to launch direct
dialogues with the United States.
Works focused on cooperation explore North Korea's efforts to normalize relations
with the United States, including efforts to end the state of War by obtaining security
guarantees or by reaching a peace agreement. Diplomatic cooperation with the U.S. includes
active and passive behaviors. The active behavior toward the United States is motivated by
the demand for an end of enmity, the expectation of reciprocal responses, and the scarcity of
food and energy. As for the passive behavior, major external shocks such as the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the adoption of the Nordpolitik policy by South Korea were the primary
drivers.
In the second category of the literature review, the scholars are focused on North
Korea's security stance toward the United States. They argue that Pyongyang had to seek
minimal deterrence because of the asymmetry of conventional forces on the Korean peninsula,
the nuclear states surrounding North Korea, and the ‘negative peace’12 of the existing
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armistice with the U.S. At the same time, North Korea is faced with the potential of a
preemptive strike by the U.S., the annual joint ROK-U.S. military exercises, and economic
sanctions. In response to this security environment, Pyongyang made the decision to develop
a nuclear weapons program.
In the last category of the literature review, some scholars describe North Korea as an
expansionist country because of its commitment to the unification of the Korean peninsula
and the country's seemingly irrational and unpredictable leaders.
As this review indicates, however, most of the relevant literature focuses only on
North Korea's attempts to normalize relations with the U.S. from the early 1990s after the
country had launched its nuclear program. This is because North Korea's relations with the
United States emerged as a major focus of research and analysis only after the end of the
Cold War when the nuclear program was the core issue. Most of these studies do not provide
an analysis of North Korea's earliest approaches toward the United States during the Cold
War ‒ when the nuclear program was not a factor ‒ or explore how these earliest approaches
are related to the confrontational approaches adopted in the post-Cold War era. Or, even when
these earliest approaches are examined, it is only to develop internal-factor explanations of
why Pyongyang began trying to engage Washington by means of a confrontational nuclear
weapons program. The internal-factor explanations ignore the impact of external factors on
Pyongyang’s diplomatic behavior. Due to these limitations of the time frame and analytical
constructs, therefore, the review has highlighted the failure of the literature dealing with U.S.North Korea relations to provide a comprehensive explanation of North Korea’s diplomatic
approaches toward the United States.
This research will explore the détente between China and the United States in the
early 1970s, and the normalization of relations with South Korea by the Soviet Union/Russia
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and China in the early 1990s, as the most important external factors that influenced North
Korea’s policy toward the United States. These two cases of détente provide an extensive and
comprehensive understanding of how North Korea's policy toward the U. S. changed over
time. It will examine how the policy was initially formed and implemented and how it
changed in intensity, types of approaches, and objectives in response to situational factors and
time frames.
Certain international environmental changes had to take place in the Asia-Pacific
region before North Korea's active engagement with the United States ‒ whether it be by
cooperative or offensive means ‒ could become a possibility. In this dissertation, the two
international environmental changes in the early 1970s and 1990s ‒ the ‘double détente
shocks’ North Korea experienced during these two momentous decades ‒ will be treated as
independent variables. I will explore how they affected North Korea's policy toward the U.S.
Guided by this perspective, my research builds on prior studies by utilizing an extended
timeframe and including external factors that previously have not been deeply analyzed.

2-2. Cases of U.S. Normalization with Hostile States
There are many cases in which the U.S. has normalized relations with its adversaries.
This study focuses on China and Vietnam to see what factors influenced the United States to
normalize relations with them while being unwilling to do the same with North Korea. I have
chosen China and Vietnam as test cases because they share social and political characteristics
as well as historical experiences with North Korea. These include a socialist one-party state
system, the experience of being at war at one time with the United States, a strategic
geopolitical location, and an East Asian cultural heritage. They also have experienced the
division of their national territories, and the U.S. was (or is, in North Korea’s case) the only
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country standing in the way of a resolution of the problem of their national division.
Nevertheless, there are unique features of the agendas and policies each of these countries
pursued in normalizing relations with the United States.

2-2-1. Normalization of U.S.-Vietnam Relations
After reunification, Vietnam's major diplomatic goal was to improve relations with
the United States for the sake of economic development. To achieve this goal, Vietnam called
on the U.S. to provide the post-war recovery assistance and economic aid that President
Richard M. Nixon had secretly promised after the Paris Agreement to end the war was signed
in 1973. The U.S. did not make good on its promises, however, because it viewed Vietnam as
an ally of the Soviet Union and was pessimistic about the prospects for improved relations.
Rather than pursuing relations with Vietnam, the United States focused its efforts instead on
developing its budding relations with China and the ASEAN countries13 (Hong, 1993, p.
228). Also, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Vietnam after 1975, froze the assets of
Vietnamese in the U.S., and made the recovery of the remains of U.S. MIAs from the
Vietnam War a condition for negotiations to normalize relations between the two countries
(LeBoutillier, 1989).
After replacing its leadership in the 1980s, the Communist Party of Vietnam began to
pursue economic development and international cooperation policies. Vietnam's
reconciliation policy toward the United States began officially in December 1984 when the
Communist Party's Central Committee adopted a ‘strategic foreign policy’. The main point of
the policy was to normalize Vietnam’s foreign relations by actively cooperating with U.S.
interests (Lee, 1998, p.38). In December 1986, at the 6th Congress of the Communist Party,
13
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the reformists began to push for a program of political and economic reforms known in
Vietnamese as doi moi (literally ‘restoration’). Through this reform policy, Vietnam
implemented policies that met U.S. demands, including allowing visas and travel for
Americans in 1986, enacting the Foreign Investment Act in 1987, and declaring a complete
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. Still, the United States did not lift its economic sanctions
on Vietnam. The U.S. also prevented international financial institutions, such as the IMF and
the World Bank, from supporting Vietnam and prohibited American companies from entering
Vietnam (Kim, 2000, p. 35).
Relations between the two countries gradually began to change in the late 1990s. The
United States welcomed Vietnam's reform policy and began to show interest in improving
relations. In December 1990, Richard Solomon, the then assistant secretary of state for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, declared that the United States was ready to begin formal talks on
normalizing relations with Vietnam. Vietnam held the 7th Congress of the Communist Party
in June 1991 and continued to implement policies that met the needs of the United States,
including expanding foreign economic relations, introducing state-led capitalism, and
completing its withdrawal from Cambodia.
Beginning in 1991, the two countries held five rounds of official talks. Members of
the U.S. Congress and business leaders began to call for the normalization of bilateral
relations. A major turning point was reached on October 23, 1991, when both the U.S. and
Vietnam along with seventeen other countries signed a peace treaty in Paris marking the
official end of the Cambodian–Vietnamese War. Subsequently, Vietnam cooperated with the
U.S. in making additional disclosures of relevant military information as well as in the
excavation of the remains of U.S. MIAs in Laos. In 1993, the Clinton administration lifted
economic sanctions, and finally declared normalization of relations with Vietnam on July 11,
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1995. This outcome was the result of Vietnam's consistent efforts over 20 years to normalize
relations with the U.S.

2-2-2. Asymmetric Interests in Improving Relations
What can be seen in this process of normalizing relations between the U.S. and
Vietnam is that Vietnam made unilateral efforts to improve relations, and the efforts gradually
became reciprocal as the U.S. responded in kind. Vietnam induced changes in the U.S. by
taking unilateral measures such as undertaking economic reforms, cooperating in the
recovery of the remains of missing U.S. soldiers, and withdrawing its troops from Cambodia
(Suh, 2008, p. 141). From the U.S. point of view, Vietnam's unilateral efforts suited its
interests. Subsequently, the U.S. has begun a collaboration with Vietnam to keep China in
check, secure the Vietnamese market, and find and repatriate the remains of missing U.S.
soldiers.
Another influential factor was the change in the international environment. In the late
1970s, when Vietnam began reaching out to the United States, relations between China, the
Soviet Union, and the United States were deteriorating. Vietnam was recognized by the
United States as a Soviet-backed country, so there was a limit on the development of relations
between the two countries. After the end of the Cold War, however, relations between the
United States, the Soviet Union, and China began to ease, and this reduction of tensions had a
major impact on the development of relations between Vietnam and the United States. In
particular, the Vietnamese Communist Party's policy of appeasing the United States changed
the U.S.’s perception of Vietnam. However, the interests of the two countries still diverged.
Through the normalization of relations, Vietnam was seeking to promote its economic
development by expanding its access to the U.S. market as well as its openness to the outside
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world in general. The United States was focused on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops
from Cambodia, keeping China in check, and resolving the issue of MIAs from the Vietnam
War. In this context, Vietnam responded with concessions and patience to the U.S. demands
while maintaining policy consistency. On the other hand, the U.S. put strong diplomatic and
economic pressure on Vietnam through its tough negotiation stance. To achieve its economic
development goal, Vietnam had to replace the Communist Party's leadership with reformists
and double down on its opening-up policy and engagement with the outside world. The U.S.
gradually acceded to normalization of relations as Vietnam's strategic value in Southeast Asia
became clear once Vietnam had met the major U.S. demands (p. 142).

2-2-3. Normalization of U.S.-China Relations
The development of relations between China and the United States during the Cold
War was grounded in the strategic interests of both countries. The two countries also fostered
a turn toward detente in Asia and had a significant impact on other East Asian countries. The
most significant factor in the normalization of relations between the two countries was their
shared interest in reducing the Soviet Union's influence on the progress of the Vietnam War
and to curtail its foreign policy behavior that challenged the interests of both China and the
U.S. In 1971, the then U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to
China. Then, in 1972, President Nixon met with Chinese President Mao Zedong, and the two
countries issued a joint statement in Shanghai. Despite major subsequent events, such as
Nixon’s resignation in the United States, and a power struggle in China following Mao
Zedong's death, neither of the two countries abandoned the policies designed to improve
relations. China pushed for economic development when Deng Xiaoping came to power and
continued the efforts to improve relations with the U.S.
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2-2-4. Symmetric Interests in Improving Relations
Improvements in relations between China and the United States began when the
Nixon administration sought reconciliation with China. National Security Adviser Kissinger
ordered a joint report on China's policy. The China Review Report included the status of
U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations, the nature and extent of the Chinese threat in Asia, the
interrelationship between U.S. policy toward China and other major countries, the new policy
toward China, and the consequences and risks (Kissinger, 1979, p. 168). The U.S. State
Department subsequently announced measures to ease some restrictions on trade and travel to
China. Travelers and expatriates in the United States could purchase Chinese products within
limits, and lawmakers, journalists, teachers, scholars, students, doctors, and American Red
Cross employees were free to travel to China (Lee, 1998, p. 9). China also began to respond
to U.S. efforts to improve relations by inviting U.S. table tennis teams to China. Later, a highlevel dialogue channel was opened between Washington and Beijing, eliminating the need for
diplomatic intermediaries, and restrictions on trade and travel were completely lifted.
The issues that the U.S. tried to resolve in improving relations with China were
ending the Vietnam War, easing the growing division of U.S. public opinion on the war,
responding to Soviet military aggression, and restoring the U.S. economy. An effective way
to handle these challenges effectively was to put pressure on the Soviet Union and Vietnam
through improved relations with China (Hersh, 1983, p.351). From the beginning of the
secret negotiations, China claimed that the top purpose of negotiations to improve relations
was the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Taiwan, and the agenda had to be limited to
Taiwan issues. China's primary purpose was to have all U.S. troops withdrawn from Taiwan
and the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the U.S. claimed that the agenda of the negotiations
was not limited to Taiwan but encompassed all pending issues, including the end of the
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Vietnam War.
The U.S.’s objective was to obtain cooperation from China in persuading North
Vietnam to abandon its armed struggle and to accept a negotiated settlement with Nguyen
Van Thieu of South Vietnam (Walters, 1978, p. 527). As for China’s objective, an agreement14
on the status of Taiwan was reached that included the following points: 1) the U.S.
acknowledges the “One China” policy and recognizes that Taiwan is a part of China; 2) The
U.S. does not support Taiwan's independence movement; 3) after the U.S.’s withdrawal from
Taiwan, Taiwan will not be under any foreign influence; 4) the U.S. supports a peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue and will not support Taiwan in military actions against China;
and 5) The U.S. seeks to normalize relations with China and will strive to achieve this
outcome (Brzezinski, 1983 p. 198).
After the Carter administration got underway in the United States, bilateral relations
developed further. In particular, the two countries shared symmetrical interests in terms of
cultural and economic ties between the two countries, increasing China's confidence in the
U.S.’s reliability and their shared response to Soviet expansionist activities in the region. If
the U.S. recognized China, pressure would be brought to bear on the Soviet Union, which
would make it more conciliatory. Eventually, the development of U.S.-China relations led to
a worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, though, U.S. National Security Adviser
Brzezinski's visit to Beijing in May 1978 led to the declaration in January 1979 of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Deng Xiaoping later visited
the United States as a state guest, which was the first time a Chinese leader had visited the
United States.
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2-2-5. Overall Assessments of the Two Cases
What can be found in common in the process of the normalization of U.S. relations
with China and Vietnam is that the U.S. government established principles for improving
relations and tried to carry them out resolutely. During this process, various negotiation cards
were played to adjust the speed and breadth of the negotiation processes. In the case of the
negotiations with China, the key negotiation card the U.S. played was its concessions on the
Taiwan issue. In the case of Vietnam, it was the easing of economic sanctions.
What President Nixon tried to gain initially from negotiations with China was a
promise to persuade North Vietnam to give up its military struggle and accept a negotiated
settlement with the South Vietnamese government to end the Vietnam War. On the other hand,
what China demanded from the United States was the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from
Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. leaders interpreted this demand as a negotiating
position rather than a requirement for the U.S. to sever relations with Taiwan. During the
negotiations, a strategically ambivalent compromise was reached in which the U.S. agreed to
a gradual reduction of its military facilities in Taiwan as soon as regional tensions eased. The
Carter's administration maintained this basic policy position on Taiwan established by the
Nixon administration but stipulated three conditions: China’s affirmation of its commitment
to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; a continuation of U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan;
and the maintenance of informal U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The U.S. also
decided in June 1978 that it would not rush to normalize relations with China and would
consider postponing negotiations if China did not meet these minimum conditions. The
Carter administration maintained this position until the end, and the negotiation process
proceeded as envisioned by the United States.
In the case of negotiations with Vietnam, the core deliverables from the U.S.
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perspective were Vietnam's cooperation in resolving the Cambodian issue peacefully,
obtaining the release the prisoners of war, and assisting in in the recovery of the remains of
U.S. MIAs. The U.S. prioritized the prisoners of war and missing in action issues but also
insisted on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and the establishment of a
neutral government in that country as a condition for improving relations. In addition, the U.S.
raised humanitarian issues, including the issue of the immigration of mixed-race Vietnamese
children to the U.S. and the release of South Vietnamese political prisoners in North Vietnam.
A fierce policy debate arose in the United States over how to engage Vietnam in the process
of the efforts to improve relations (Lee, 1998, p. 62). As a result of this debate, instead of
taking a flexible policy stance, the U.S. government insisted that the U.S. would not adopt a
conciliatory attitude toward Vietnam unless it met the prerequisites of the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and the signing of a Cambodian peace treaty. Looking at
the process of the improvement of relations between Vietnam and the U.S., it is clear there
was an asymmetric interest between the two countries, and the U.S.'s coercive stance
prevailed in the end. In other words, the U.S. agreed to normalize relations only after
obtaining step-by-step commitments from Vietnam to implement each of the U.S.’s
prerequisite conditions.
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2-3. Systemic Analysis of Foreign Policy
Foreign policy analysis (FPA) entails numerous paradigms and levels of analysis.
FPA is a subfield of international relations and refers to a complex, multilayered process,
consisting of the objectives that countries seek in their relations with other countries to
achieve their goals. Within the domestic context, foreign policy entails a sophisticated
communication process within the government’s executive and legislative branches that is
intertwined with perceptions and misperceptions, foreign ideologies, and the competing
ambitions of individual personalities (Kubalkova, 2001, pp. 17-18). FPA also deals with
conditions outside a state’s borders – as well as images, identities, and national roles relating
to external others – but is more keenly focused on domestic politics and the related decisionmaking process (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 191). In the broad sense, then, there are different ways of
analyzing foreign policy.
Breuning (2007) specifies that national attributes play an important role in shaping
foreign policy. A state’s capabilities in terms of its measurable assets ‒ including its
geographic scale, population, economy, and military strength ‒ will shape its role in
international politics. In this regard, states show four different patterns of foreign policy
behaviors that are characterized as consensus, compliance, counter dependence, and
compensation (p. 159). In the same vein, the inclusion of culture as an analytical variable has
become customary in mainstream international relations scholarship in the post-Cold War era.
A cultural analysis can highlight the connection between a national grand strategy and
a state’s behavior. Snyder (1977) explains that elites manipulate a "unique strategic culture"
as a broader embodiment of public opinion to socialize it into a typical pattern of strategic
thinking. In this sense, strategic culture forms a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior
patterns in the context of security threats and technological developments (Lanties, 2002, p.
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94).
On the other hand, an analysis based on different types of political systems also can
provide explanations of the dynamics shaping foreign policy. Political systems explanations
rely heavily on the theory that democracies do not wage war or engage in conflicts with each
other. The democratic peace theory posits that the effect of geographic proximity, economic
development, and alliance membership restrains the outbreak of conflicts between democratic
states (Chan, 1997, p. 62). Other explanations of what shapes the foreign policy of state rely
on an analysis of factors such as the type of democratic governance, elite group dynamics,
and varying economic situations.
From this theoretical perspective, democracies are likely to promote peace due to
three factors. First, public opinion constitutes a powerful force against belligerence. In
forging a consensus for declaring war, cautionary public reservations about commencing the
war could impact the behavior of states. Second, a spirit of commerce contributes to peace.
The involvement in foreign trade makes states more likely to weigh the prospective losses of
a war. Third, the creation of a pacific union among democracies restrains the outbreak of war.
Democracies share values, and common institutions provide norms of reciprocity and
expectation relating to a preference for nonviolent procedures (p. 75). However, Mansfield
and Snyder (2002) argue that weakened central governmental institutions could cause riskaverse foreign policy consequences in promoting democratic transitions. In other words,
policies to foster democratic transitions must be accompanied by efforts to maintain strong
centralized institutions that can withstand the insistent demands of political elites (p. 334). In
this respect, Elman (2000) argues that democratically elected leaders are likely to face
constraints in shaping foreign policy, while non-democratic leaders have more options to
implement their foreign policy. However, democracy has different subtype structures, and the
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foreign policy process has different forms.
Elman has laid out a typology of democracies such as coalitional parliamentary
democracy, presidential democracy, semi-presidential democracy, and Westminster
parliamentary democracy (p. 96). The bottom line of his argument is that if the executive has
power, it is more likely to implement a hardline foreign policy because the legislature is
unable to block the executive’s decisions. In this case, leaders can adopt belligerent foreign
policy without any consultations with the country’s legislature. On the other hand, if the
legislature has power, the executive’s foreign policy will be moderated and constrained.
One of the paramount explanations of foreign policy is the decision-making process in
responding to international imperatives. Leaders might respond, either by overreacting or
underreacting, depending on real pressures from the international system. If leaders believe
they are facing an international crisis, they will respond to it quickly with strategies designed
to deal with the crisis for the sake of national security, and all the state’s resources will be
concentrated on supporting the response. These premises are based on three conditions: 1)
information certainty; 2) goal maximization; and 3) the presence of a unitary actor. However,
these conditions can change when there is a threat of war present in the international system.
In this sense, decision-makers show different responses based on several other
conditions. First, uncertainty that implies an imperfect correspondence exists between
information and the environment. Second, there should be two or more values that are
embedded in a trade-off relationship which would return a great reward. Third, individuals
and organizational units disperse the power of deciding. Decision-makers could face a
dilemma when power is dispersed. Nevertheless, leaders or decision-makers often are
attentive to what will happen in the international system.
Power distributions in the international political system play a significant role in
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shaping foreign policy as external factors. Historically, power distribution has been
characterized by a system of bipolarity, multi-polarity, or unipolarity. These models of power
distribution are based on capabilities of economic innovation, military power including
maritime power, and the development of advanced technologies (Thompson, 2006, p. 3).
These characteristics of the world system permeate the formation of a state’s foreign policy.
In the review of FPA analysis explanations, systemic analysis seems the most suitable
for this research project. The international system during the Cold War was different from the
international system after the Cold War, and Pyongyang’s foreign policy had to be altered to
reflect this change. A state’s diplomatic behaviors can change, especially when it faces
international imperatives. In a similar vein, international events and power distribution
affected North Korea’s foreign policy toward the United States.

2-3-1. Situational Imperative Framework
The situational imperative framework for modeling foreign policy behavior provides
a clear structure for analyzing international events by highlighting each actor's role in any
given situation. This approach has three major advantages: 1) situations are observable; 2)
situations organize the external environment; and 3) situations offer necessary antecedents for
predicting action (Hudson, Herman, and Singer, 1989, p. 118). The situational imperative
framework constitutes a model for predicting "foreign policy behavior" based on the different
roles involved in dealing with a specific foreign problem.
The model assumes a minimum set of roles including an actor, a source, and a subject.
It also recognizes the subsidiary role of a facilitator, or potential facilitator, who supports one
or more role occupants. Each role has a unique function, but all roles interact with each other.
The model requires that one entity be designated as the foreign policy ‘actor’ whose
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perspective defines the problem. Other situationally involved entities ‒ either governments or
non-governmental entities ‒ play various roles defined by the actor’s perspective. Every
problem has a perceived ‘source’ or cause that the actor (rightly or wrongly) holds
responsible for its consequences. The actor’s policymakers may regard any human entities ‒
or even a natural event ‒ as a source of the problem at issue. A group of entities or persons
suffering due to the agency of the source are defined as ‘the subject’, which completes the
minimum set of roles. Besides these roles, the set also may include a ‘facilitator’ defined as
an entity the actor perceives to be aligned with itself or one of the other role occupants. The
facilitator (or potential facilitator) neither caused the problem nor suffers from it but is
currently assisting (or soon can assist) one of the role occupants. Finally, a facilitator for
someone the actor opposes would be an ‘aggravator’ from the actor’s perspective (pp. 118119).
The relationships among role occupants have dimensions that involve assessments of
the actor's motivation, autonomy, and power base. The model introduces three dimensions:
prior effect, salience, and relative capabilities. The prior effect dimension explains an entity's
expressed feeling toward another entity varying from extreme hostility to unequivocal
friendship. Salience, the second dimension, entails an assessment of the degree to which an
actor’s feeling toward another entity is manifested. If the realization of an actor’s goals or
well-being is contingent on the status, resources, or actions another entity, then the
relationship with that entity is salient. The last dimension of the relationship is relative
capabilities. If the actor's behavior is directed toward another entity, it is essential to consider
whether other entities have capabilities to neutralize the actor's retaliation.
An essential element in this model of foreign policy behavior is the types of
situations based on roles. It introduces four types of situations: confrontation; intervention;
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assistance; and collaboration. Each situation has different explanations of the relationships
between actor, salience, and subject. First, confrontation is likely to occur when the actor is
being affected by the problem or as the result of it. In this case, an entity that raises the
problem challenges the actor. Second, intervention is likely to occur when separate entities
are occupying the three fundamental roles. In this case, the actor ‒ as a third party ‒ must
decide whether to intervene when an external entity has created a problem for another
external entity. Third, the assistance situation is likely to happen when the actor has created
his own problem and seeks a solution from an outsider who might be able to help, by serving
as a potential facilitator, for example. Fourth, collaboration is likely to happen when the actor
and one or more other entities acknowledge themselves to be both the source and the subject
of the problem. Both are likely to negotiate and solve a problem by issuing a communiqué or
concluding a treaty.
A state’s foreign policy behavior is a way of influencing other entities as well as a
way of communicating with others. “As a form of communication foreign policy behavior
can be divided into the attributes of any communicative act ‒ who, does what, to whom, and
how” (p. 124). In the model, the actor (i.e., the ‘who’) is the entity defining the problem. The
attributes of communication can be explained by four behavior properties as follows: 1)
recipient designates the entity the actor addresses (i.e., ‘to whom’); 2) affect is the actor’s
manifest feelings of approval or disapproval (i.e., ‘does or expresses what’); 2) commitment
indicates the actor's resolve to seek a solution to a problem; and 4) instruments consist of the
skills and resources of statecraft that the actor deploys to solve a problem (i.e., ‘how’).
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Figure 1. The situational model seeks to explain what the actor’s behavior will be in response
to a problem using information on the actor’s relationship to the other entities occupying
roles in a type of situation defined by the problem (See Hudson’s article page 121).

2-3-2. Examining a Predictive Model
The model explained above can be used to analyze North Korea’s foreign policy
toward the United States. In this case, the actor is North Korea, and the source of the foreign
policy problem is the United States. The subject is North Korea and its people. The facilitator
may be either South Korea or China, but it is uncertain how deeply South Korea is engaged in
the relationship between the actor and the source of the problem. There is no potential
facilitator involved in this problem.
Confrontation situations are endemic in this situation. Having experienced the
Korean War, the United States’ prior relationship with North Korea was one of extreme
hostility. The nuclear program for defensive purposes, as a counter to the U.S. military assets
deployed in South Korea, is deemed by North Korea to be essential to the security of its
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people. The actor was initially responsive to the problem (i.e., the U.S.) by cooperating with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Their relative capabilities revealed a big
gap between the two countries. In this scenario, it is necessary to briefly review North
Korea’s nuclear program and its confrontational approach to the United States as a test case
for examining the predictive model. The predictive power of the model will be examined by
analyzing North Korea’s rapprochement approaches to the United States in the early 1970s.
The development of the nuclear program in North Korea was initiated by the
government in the 1960s. Kim Il Sung, the first leader of the country ordered a research
project to prospect for natural minerals, including uranium, and to use them for the
construction of a nuclear complex at Yongbyon (Cha, 2012). The first experimental reactor
was constructed with Soviet help which involved the technology for creating a 2-megawatt
nuclear reactor fueled by enriched uranium.
In 1973, the government established the department of nuclear physics and the
department of radiochemistry at Kim Il Sung University. It also established departments
specializing in nuclear materials, nuclear reactors, and nuclear engineering at Kimch’aek
University (The Nuclear Treaty Initiative, 2018). In addition to the acknowledged purpose of
creating nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with help from the Soviet Union, in the mid1970s, North Korea asked both the Soviet Union and China for assistance in setting up a
research project for the development of nuclear weapons. These requests were rebuffed by
both countries. Some allege North Korea also tried but failed to form a secret nuclear
program with South Korea. The consensus view is that North Korea secretly launched its own
indigenous nuclear weapons research program in 1979.
Under pressure from Moscow, in July 1977, North Korea had signed a
trilateral agreement with the IAEA and the USSR that brought the research reactor and its
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critical assembly in Yongbyon under the safeguards supervision of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). The Soviets were included in the agreement because they supplied
the reactor's fuel. North Korea also began to explore the acquisition of light water reactor
(LWR) technology in the early 1980s.
In December 1985, Pyongyang jointed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) in exchange for Soviet assistance in constructing four LWRs. Also in 1985,
the U.S. intelligence community revealed for the first time that it had detected high
explosives testing by North Korea. It further claimed it had evidence that North Korea was
building secret nuclear facilities in pursuit of a weapons program (The Nuclear Treaty
Initiative, 2018). This was the point at which the U.S. ‒ in the role of actor ‒ recognized
North Korea as the source of a problem it was confronting.
While North Korea had signed the NPT in 1985, it did not reach a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA until January 1992. It made good on its promises to sign the
safeguards agreement only after a joint denuclearization declaration was concluded between
North Korea and South Korea in early 1992. This joint declaration instituted a comprehensive
ban on all nuclear weapons-related activities on the Korean Peninsula. However, the two
sides were unable to reach any subsequent agreements on a bilateral North-South inspection
regime or other verification issues (Leventhal & Dolley, 1994).
The issue started to show up on the U.S.’s foreign policy radar screen after the The
Washington Post published satellite photos confirming the existence of plutonium
reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon in July 1990. The IAEA officials also suspected that the
North had begun to reprocess plutonium from spent fuel rods for use in a weapons-related
nuclear program. However, the North Korean government refused to permit an IAEA
inspection team to conduct an inspection of the suspected facilities at Yongbyon (Leventhal &
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Dolley, 1994).
Eventually, however, IAEA inspectors were permitted to take samples of the
equipment used to produce plutonium and of the waste storage tank pipe. Through that
inspection, the IAEA team discovered that the North had reprocessed plutonium on at least
three occasions in 1989, 1990, and 1991 which contradicted the DPRK’s initial report that
was submitted in 1992 (IAEA, 1997). The IAEA team asked that the North allow the team to
access two facilities it had not been permitted to inspect previously, but the authorities in the
North rejected this request on the grounds that the buildings were military installations.
Director General of IAEA, Hans Blix raised the ante by demanding that North Korea
submit to a “special inspection” and indicated it had just three months to comply with the
IAEA’s demand. In response, in 1993, Pyongyang declared its intention to withdraw from the
NPT. The board of IAEA for its part made the determination that the North had violated its
safeguards agreement. The IAEA report was submitted to the UN Security Council, and most
of its members agreed with the finding on the DPRK’s violation (Frontline, 2019).
As the tensions between North Korea and IAEA mounted, the U.S. stepped in and
proposed that the Security Council impose sanctions on North Korea in June of 1994 (IAEA,
1997). North Korea perceived these moves as a combined threat from the U.S., the United
Nations, and the IAEA. Furthermore, the annual U.S.-ROK joint military exercises were
being held during this period of escalating tensions, which led North Korea to warn Seoul
that it might be turned into a “sea of fire.” After the North Korean authorities restarted the
reprocessing of fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor without international inspectors to
observe the process, the U.S. government began planning for an attack on the nuclear facility
at Yongbyon (Cha, 2012).
Accordingly, the nuclear crisis of 1994 exemplifies the confrontation situation in the
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situational imperative model. The prior affect of the actor (i.e., North Korea) toward the
source (i.e., the United States) was negative. The two countries had fought each other in the
Korean War and the hostilities were halted only through an armistice agreement in 1953.
During the passive peace of the Cold War period, they had experienced several relatively
minor conflicts, including the Pueblo incident in 1968 and the Panmunjom Axe incident in
1976. Therefore, there had not been any official high-level rapprochement between the two
countries prior to the point when tension began to escalate at a frantic pace in 1994.
In terms of salience, the crisis was not directly felt by the source in terms of the
Americans residing far from the Korean peninsula on the U.S. mainland. It was highly salient,
however, to the American personnel manning the U.S. military bases in South Korea and
Japan as well as to the South Korean government and its people, who effectively were
hostage-like surrogate sources. As the well-being of these entities was highly relevant to the
United States, as long as they were at risk, the authorities in Washington could not easily
decide to attack North Korea. Initially, the U.S. government began advising its citizens to
leave South Korea, and people were emptying the shelves of grocery stores for a time in
South Korea for fear of an impending disaster (Cha, 2012). The U.S. government’s
assessment of the consequences of an attack on the nuclear facility at Yongbyon was that it
would set off a second Korean War that would have resulted in a devastating loss of Korean
and American lives and property in South Korea.
The U.S. had more relative capabilities compared with North Korea, which was
reflected in its military bases in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Guam. Also, by the
time of the crisis, the U.S-led alliance had grown stronger, whereas the Soviet Union had
collapsed, and China had normalized its relations with South Korea.
In terms of the facilitator and the potential facilitator, South Korea acted as a
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facilitator at the beginning of the 1990s by signing the agreement on a joint denuclearization
declaration with North Korea right after the withdrawal of the U.S. strategic nuclear assets.
Both Koreas agreed on no more testing, manufacturing, producing, receiving, possessing,
storing, and deploying of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. The agreement was not
implemented, however, due to the failure to reach a mutually acceptable inspection protocol
to verify compliance. In any event, subsequently, North Korea decided it needed to engage in
a direct, bilateral dialogue with the U.S. to solve the problem. Finally, while there was no
potential facilitator during this first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, China
became a potential facilitator at the beginning of the 2000s by initiating the six-party talks.
The nature of the prior affect of the actor (I.e., North Korea) in this event was
extremely negative. Its adversarial relationship with the United States threatened not only the
latter, as the source of the problem, but South Korea as well. While strongly influenced by
this prior affect, the actor still demonstrated only a moderate commitment. Tensions were
escalating when the source held the annual joint military exercise with the subject (i.e., South
Korea) in 1993, which was a threat to the actor’s security. However, neither party was
committed to attacking the other. Besides, the source contested the problem by resorting to its
diplomatic instruments. After North Korea had declared its intention to withdraw from the
NPT, the United States and the UN Security Council limited the response to the adoption of
economic sanctions.
The degree of salience influencing the actor’s affect in this event was highly
negative. The source was the traditional enemy for the actor. North Korea had begun the
reactor discharge campaign by the time the director of the IAEA, Hans Blix, reported to the
United Nations that North Korea was not in compliance with its obligations. Even as the
United States decided to impose sanctions, the authorities in Pyongyang were preparing to
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refuel its reactor to produce more weapons-grade plutonium and possibly to declare that the
country would pursue nuclear weapons.

Figure 2. Branch of North Korea’s Confrontation Decision Tree
1. Prior Affect with Source and Subject?

Positive/Positive Positive/Mixed Mixed/Mixed Mixed/Negative Negative/Negative
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Both

One

Neither
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Both
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Neither
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⚫
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In response, when the crisis had reached this level of intensity, the United States
began to give serious consideration to military options for taking out the Yongbyon facility.
This greatly escalated the risk of war on the Korean peninsula, but North Korea’s actions
continued to reflect a moderate commitment because of the high priority it placed on its
security. Nevertheless, the situation was at the brink of war because the actor’s relative
capabilities were lower than those of the source. Figure 2 is a schematic representation of
North Korea’s foreign policy behavior toward the United States in the confrontation situation
of the 1994 nuclear crisis.
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As a result of North Korea’s confrontational foreign policy behavior toward the
United States, as analyzed in accordance with the situational imperative model, the prior
affect was highly negative because both countries were traditional enemies to each other. The
actor’s behavioral attributes involved diplomatic instruments, moderate commitment levels,
and a high negative affect. These properties represented North Korea’s confrontational
approach to the United States in resolving its economic, national security, and the regime
survival imperatives by pursuing the development of diplomatic relations with Washington.

2-3-3. The North Korea’s Decision-making Process
North Korea's decision-making units can be explained by using the decision unit of
the predominant leader (Herman, 2001). The predominant leader who is vested with authority
either by the constitution, law, or general practice commits or withholds the sources of the
government’s foreign policy affairs (p. 58). In this sense, if the foreign policy mechanism is
organized by the one person located at the top of the government system, the decision unit
can be the predominant leader.
In the case of North Korea, structurally, the supreme leader makes final decisions on
foreign policies for the country. Kim Il Sung, the founder of the country was heavily
influenced by external factors such as the détente in 1972, the collapse of the Soviet Union in
the early 1990s, and the normalization of China's relations with South Korea in 1992. During
the June crisis in 1994, he kept a close eye on the IAEA-related issues and negotiations with
the United States. He had a keen understanding of the international environment.
Since there is little to no access to information about how the North Korean
government made its final decision for the June 1994 crisis, the only option is to examine its
foreign policy-making structure. Administratively, foreign policy is developed and
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implemented under the guidance of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The party’s
guidance is executed by the secretary for international affairs and the international
department of the Secretariat (Ministry of Unification, 2012). In the timeframe in question,
these entities were under the command and supervision of the supreme leader, Kim Il Sung.
In detail, the foreign policy-making structure provides two ways for making and
carrying out foreign policies: top-down and bottom-up. The top-down system entails the
supreme leader himself making key policy decisions. Once the leader has decided on a policy,
it is implemented by the relevant departments and agencies. On the other hand, the bottom-up
system allows working-level elites in the WPK, Cabinet, and the Korean People’s Army
(KPA) to create, evaluate, and discuss foreign policies. Later, policies formed through the
bottom-up system are reported to WPK secretaries and directors, the prime minister, the
minister of the People’s Armed Forces, and the minister of Foreign Affairs, to be
implemented after obtaining the supreme leader’s approval and endorsement (Ministry of
Unification, 2012).
Kim Il Sung, in his role as a predominant leader, was highly sensitive to international
and domestic environments for the sake of the regime’s survival in the post-Cold War era.
Internally, the economy was much weaker, and externally, the country had lost many of its
former supporters. The Soviet Union had collapsed, and China had normalized its relations
with South Korea. Again, North Korea was in a stalemated situation of facing a choice
between adopting the Western-style market system or choosing the path of self-help.
During the crisis in 1994, Kim kept his cards close to his chest and shared
information with only a few members of the central people’s committee. He was highly
dependent on the trusted older members of the committee who took part in the Korean War
and had long been his bodyguards (Mansourov, 1994, p. 11). He kept information to himself
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and never revealed to the public in North Korea how he and his cabinet had initiated a
confrontational approach to the United States and the international community.

2-4. Methodological issues
This research project employs a qualitative case-study approach involving a
methodology of process-tracing and historical explanation. A qualitative case study can
establish a causal effect between independent variables and dependent variables (George &
Benett, 2005). This type of method enables scholars to apply a substantially broadened range
of techniques to their comparative research with small-N analysis (Collier, 1993). It also
helps scholars find regularities through juxtapositions of historical cases and generates an
observed sequence of events (Goldstone, 1991). In addition, the process-tracing method can
investigate and explain the decision-making process through exploring initial conditions of
historical events and converting them into the outcomes of an analysis (Hwang, 2005, p. 44.).
In other words, process-tracing provides a theoretical explanation of the causal mechanism
between historical events as independent variables and the outcomes of a particular
phenomenon.
George and Benett (2005) define the characteristics of the process-tracing method as
obtaining “the outcome flows from the convergences of several conditions as independent
variables or causal chains” (p. 212). In this sense, process-tracing techniques can apply in
cases composed of a sequence of events. Some events start certain paths in the development
and steer the outcome in other directions. In this case, policymakers must consider when a
decision is likely to reduce the chances of achieving policy goals and subsequently resort to
making changes to have a second chance to achieve the desired policy goals (p. 213).
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2-4-1. The Casual Mechanism and Sources for Analysis
With these case study methods, this study focuses on North Korea’s foreign policy
behavior toward the United States in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. As noted in the
section on the objectives of this study, the main goal is to explain why North Korea had to
change its course of action after the détente between the U.S. and China in 1972. The détente
serves as an independent variable explaining North Korea’s foreign policy behaviors toward
the United States compared with its rapprochement approaches during the Cold War.
The investigation of specific events posits three principal roles, the relationships
between them, and the situations they confront during the formation of foreign policies. The
compositions of the roles are actor, source, and subject. The characteristics of the
relationships between them include the dimensions of prior affect, salience, relative
capabilities, facilitator, and potential facilitator. The situation is delineated as confrontation,
intervention, assistance, or collaboration.
Subsequently, North Korea’s behaviors had to be modified because of the détente
between the Soviet Union/Russia and South Korea and China and South Korea, which served
as independent variables following the end of the Cold War. Pyongyang faced both domestic
and international challenges because of these events. As independent variables, they explain
North Korea’s confrontational approaches to the U.S. as a departure from the initial
approaches during the Cold War.
In terms of the realist perspective in international relations theory, ‘abandonment’ is a
sense of betrayal that causes a state to change its foreign policy behavior. North Korea’s
leadership decided to develop a nuclear program to compensate for energy shortages and to
ensure its national security. The nuclear program, as the source, attracted the United States’
attention and served to buttress the confrontational approach in negotiations between
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Pyongyang and Washington. The behavioral attributes in the post-Cold War era inevitably
differed from the behavioral attributes during the Cold War.
This study's primary sources will be the Rodong Sinmun (‘Labor Daily’) and the
North Korean Central Agency (KCNA) Website. These two sources are important in
exploring how North Korea's foreign policy is reflected in its media outlets. Additionally,
other primary documentary sources for the study will be drawn from the archives of the
North Korea International Documentation Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The center
collects and translates all diplomatic documentation released by countries that once had
formal relations with North Korea. This documentation details conversations between Kim Il
Sung and diplomats from former communist countries around the world during the Cold War.
The conversations also convey Kim Il Sung's views on the issue of détente, which allows this
study to find a starting point in unearthing North Korea's decision to approach the U.S.
beginning in the 1970s. Archives from other institutions with documentary resources
pertaining to relations between North Korea and the United States also will be included in
this study.
This study is divided into two timeframes for the sake of analysis: 1) the first attempt
at détente will examine North Korea’s rapprochement approach to the U.S. from 1972 to
1976; and 2) the second attempt will examine North Korea’s confrontational approach over
the period from 1985 to 1994.
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Table 4. Two Cases and Causal Mechanism
Independent Variables
Cases and Time Frames

1. U.S.-China détente
(1971-1976)
2. Soviet Union/Russian and
China détente with South
Korea (1985-1994)

Dependent Variables

Roles

Roles
Relations

Type of Situations

Foreign Behavior Attributes

Actor

Prior Affect

Confrontation

Affect

Salient

Intervention

Commitment

Capabilities

Assistance

Instrument

Facilitator

Assistance Request

Recipient

Potential
Facilitator

Collaboration

Other

Source
Subject
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Chapter Ⅲ: The Impact of External Factors on North Korea’s Foreign
Policy
3-1. Case 1: The U.S.-China Détente
The process of rapprochement between China and the United States took a long time.
The two countries experienced a prolonged period of hostility because of the Korean War
(1950-1953). By the late 1960s, however, the perception of China in the U.S. had changed
considerably. Nixon said, “We must not forget China. We must always seek opportunities to
talk with China as we did with the USSR. We must not only watch for changes. We must seek
to make changes” (Panda, 1997). Subsequently, the Nixon administration took a series of
actions to ease barriers for U.S. citizens traveling to China, but this measure was limited to
travel by Congress members, journalists, and scholars.
After Nixon visited Guam in July 1969, the administration announced the reduction
of American military involvement in all of Asia. This indicated that the U.S.’s foreign policy
toward Asian countries, including China, had changed fundamentally. It also signaled an
openness to engagement with China. Known as the Guam Doctrine or Nixon Doctrine, the
new policy stated that the United States would no longer be a ‘global policeman’ and had
abandoned its policy of containing China (Panda, 1997, p. 47). The U.S. also announced the
removal of restrictions on participation by U.S. businesses in third-country trading of Chinese
goods and liberalized the customs regulations governing their importation.
Chinese leaders noted these unilateral decisions and policy pronouncements by the
U.S. Contacts between the U.S. ambassador and his Chinese counterpart in Warsaw had
begun sporadically in 1955 after the first Sino-American crisis over the Taiwan Strait in
1954-1955. These contacts continued until the early 1970s. The talks included discussions of
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a variety of issues, including a visit to Beijing by a U.S. official or a visit to Washington by a
Chinese envoy. The U.S. made it clear it had no interest in making common cause with the
Soviet Union against China (Warner, 2007).
Further progress in this budding relationship was halted by China, however, after the
U.S., along with the South Vietnamese armed forces, extended the Vietnam War into
Cambodia on 30 April 1970. In protest of this invasion, China canceled a meeting with the
U.S. that was scheduled for May 20, 1970. Mao Zedong even issued a call for the people of
the world to unite to defeat “the aggressors of American imperialism and its running-dogs”
(Warner, 2007, p. 766). These kinds of issues reflecting divergent interests continued to pose
complications for the U.S.’s efforts to initiate an official dialogue with Beijing. The U.S. tried
to create a new channel in Paris. It also asked for help from both the Romanians and the
Pakistanis. The Pakistanis played an essential role in conveying a message from President
Nixon and the National Security Advisor Harry Kissinger during a visit by Pakistan’s
president Yahya Khan to China in mid-November 1970 (p. 766). The message included an
offer by Nixon to dispatch a presidential envoy to Beijing.
The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai replied that a special envoy of President Nixon
would be welcomed by Beijing provided the U.S. was prepared to talk about Taiwan’s status.
U.S. forces were still occupying Taiwan at that point, and the Chinese wanted them
withdrawn. They also wanted the U.S. to drop its opposition to China’s accession to a seat on
the UN Security Council.
Both sides agreed to a discussion of the issue of Taiwan. In the instructions prepared
for the talks by the Chinese foreign ministry, there was a negotiating position by Zhou Enlai
that stated: "If the U.S. reiterates that the U.S. and Taiwan have a relationship based on a
treaty, [our position is that] the treaty is not recognized by the Chinese people" (Xia, 2006, p.
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12). In other words, the U.S. had to support the 'One-China policy' if it wished to engage with
Beijing (Panda, 1997, p. 49). Zhou also conveyed China’s position that both a special envoy
and President Nixon himself would be welcomed in Beijing if they were willing to discuss
the Taiwan issue. On the U.S. side, Henry Kissinger stressed that the talks should not be
limited solely to the Taiwan question but should encompass other steps as well toward
improved relations and a reduction of tensions.
This signaled that both countries had begun viewing each other in terms of
geopolitical strategy rather than in ideological terms. The United States had to deal with the
ongoing Vietnam War and did not want to get involved in a conflict with China. The no-win
situation of the U.S. in Vietnam undermined its superpower status. For its part, in 1968,
Beijing had become embroiled in a conflict with the Soviet Union over Qilixin Island, which
is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri River. Also, the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 made leaders in Beijing wary about the Soviet
Union’s intentions (Xia, 2006). Heavily armed conflicts between China and the Soviet Union
at the border increased, and a broader military confrontation seemed likely to happen.
Chinese leaders were convinced Moscow was intending to wage war against China.
As tensions with the Soviet Union increased, China had to adjust its foreign and security
policy strategies. Mao and Zhou concluded that ‘the U.S. card’ had to be played to halt the
Soviet’s aggression (Xia, 2006, p. 7). These events surrounding the two countries paved the
way for rapprochement. Chairman Mao began to take a positive view of the U.S., despite
opposition from a group led by Lin Biao. The U.S., for its part, realized that maintaining the
policy of containment would damage relations with China. Accordingly, the Nixon
administration began referring to China’s communist regime as the People’s Republic of
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China ‒ its official name ‒ in official documents for the first time.15
On April 21, 1971, Premier Zhou Enlai sent a message to National Security Advisor
Harry Kissinger about a high-level meeting in Beijing. The message was sent in response to
President Nixon's message to Premier Zhou and Mao, which had been delivered by President
Yahya of Pakistan. In his message, President Nixon indicated an interest in having a highlevel bilateral meeting, either in Beijing or in Washington. The message provided details on
the modalities, including the size of both side’s delegations, the duration of the meeting, the
agenda, and a clear understanding of the status and amenities.16 Premier Zhou Enlai agreed
to the U.S.’s proposal to discuss the establishment of relations by means of a high-level
meeting between the two countries. As he explained:
At present, contacts between peoples of China and the United States are being renewed.
However, as the relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored
fundamentally, a solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct
discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries. Therefore, the
Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special
envoy of the president of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of
State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions.17
Meanwhile, on the U.S. side, Kissinger and Nixon discussed the designation of a
special envoy to China but failed to reach a conclusion. They both agreed on the One-China
policy, China's UN membership, and other questions related to the status of Taiwan.18 Also,
both concurred that the Vietnam War could end in 1971, once relations were restored with
China, and the containment of China policy along with it. In a news conference on April 29,
1971, President Nixon announced the normalization of U.S. relations with mainland China as
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a long-range goal of his administration. He linked the achievement of this goal to progress in
trade and travel exchanges between the two countries.19
As a condition for making this progress, Nixon believed that a government-togovernment channel had to be established. Meanwhile, the Nixon administration encouraged
the continuation of the people-to-people dialogues and activities ‒ which were known as
‘people’s diplomacy’ ‒ that arranged visits by Americans to China. These exchanges included
visits by a table tennis team, students, reporters, and scholars. These could be only a series of
sporadic exchanges, however, until an official link was established between the two
governments.

3-1-1. Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China
Signaling his willingness to normalize relations between the United States and China,
President Nixon authorized a secret trip to China by Kissinger in 1971. The trip was
scheduled for an arrival in China early on July 9 and a departure on July 11. In his reply to
Zhou Enlai's message, Nixon concurred with the suggestion that high-level negotiations were
necessary to resolve the pending issues between the United States and China. Nixon also
indicated that he wanted to visit Beijing for direct conversations with China's leaders to
improve bilateral relations.
To establish a reliable channel for contacts with the leaders in Beijing in preparation
for his visit, Nixon proposed that a secret meeting be arranged between Kissinger and Zhou
or another appropriate high-level Chinese official.20 He added that Kissinger ‒ acting as his
special envoy ‒ was prepared to participate in a meeting on Chinese soil, at a location to be
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designated by China, preferably within convenient flying distance from Pakistan. Also,
Kissinger was charged with the responsibility to discuss the circumstances that would make a
visit by Nixon most useful. This included the agenda for the visit, its timing, and a
preliminary exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest.
Before heading to China, Henry Kissinger coordinated the logistics for the visit with
Joseph S. Farland, who was the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan in 1971. They discussed details
associated with the trip and reached some tentative decisions. On May 7, 1971, Kissinger and
Farland had a discussion of potential locations for the meeting between Kissinger and Zhou.
The options were for a location either in Pakistan or someplace in southern China that would
be easily accessible from Pakistan.
Ambassador Farland offered to prepare an itinerary for the secret visit, which would
include Kissinger being accompanied by President Yahya of Pakistan. He suggested that the
meeting with the Chinese leader’s delegation be divided into three separate sessions. He also
established a secure communication channel for the visit.21 Ambassador Farland was the
conduit for communications with the Pakistan government regarding the arrangements for
Kissinger’s diplomatic mission, including what kind of plane was to be used, and how many
Pakistanis would be made aware of Kissinger’s visit. As he was not a career foreign service
officer, Farland had no reservations about keeping U.S. official channels in the dark about the
planned secret visit.
U.S.’s Positions. President Nixon and Kissinger discussed a range of subjects that
might be vetted in the meeting that ultimately was held in Beijing. Nixon emphasized that
Kissinger should mention the issue of one China vs two Chinas only once during his
conversations with Chinese officials, rather than threading it throughout the conversation as
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Kissinger had proposed to do.22 This reflected Nixon’s position that Kissinger should convey
a more ‘enigmatic’ view on Taiwan to avoid indicating “a willingness to abandon much of
our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so.” In the same vein, Nixon also
instructed Kissinger to downplay the fact that Vice President Agnew and Secretary of
Defense Laird recently had canceled planned trips to Taiwan.
In this same vein, Nixon instructed Kissinger not to open the conversation with a
discussion of what the U.S. had done in Taiwan or the fact that the U.S. troops would not be
needed there forever. Rather, he said, the conversation should be focused on the Nixon
Doctrine. As the Nixon Doctrine states that the U.S. will help those nations who help
themselves, it follows that it would not be essential for the U.S. military presence to remain
in some areas.23 In any case, Nixon noted, the six thousand U.S. troops in Taiwan directly
related to the conduct of the War in Vietnam would not need to remain there after the War
ended.
On the issue of China’s position in the United Nations, Nixon instructed Kissinger to
inquire about the Chinese viewpoint.24 China had not addressed publicly its view on the role
it wished to play in the UN, and Nixon expected this issue to come up during his visit to
Beijing.
Japan was another important issue that concerned Nixon. He instructed Kissinger to
emphasize in his talks with the Chinese the serious threat Japan’s ambitions posed for the
region. He stated that the Chinese must recognize that several nations were concerned about
the future of Asia, particularly the role of Japan if the United States did not maintain a
presence in the region. He was concerned that Japan had the ability, resources, and know-how
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to rebuild its military quickly, which could result in a resurgent Japanese bellicosity with
considerable danger for all.25
Another important issue that concerned Nixon was the Soviet threat. Kissinger
suggested that this discussion would have to be treated carefully since the Chinese might
report what was said to the Soviets. Agreeing with this cautionary point, Nixon replied that
the proper way to handle the issue would be to refer to facts rather than the U.S.’s
interpretation of facts. For example, he suggested telling the Chinese that there were more
Soviet divisions on the Chinese border than there were arrayed against all the NATO pact
countries.
In sum, Nixon instructed Kissinger to build on three fears: 1) fears of what he (i.e.,
Nixon) might do in the event of a continued stalemate in the Vietnam War; 2) the fear of a
resurgent and militaristic Japan; and 3) the fear of the Soviet threat on China’s flank.
Similarly, Nixon emphasized the four deliverables he envisioned for a potential U.S.-China
summit: 1) the release of all U.S. POWs held in Indochina; 2) at least token shipments of U.S.
grain to Communist China; 3) some progress on bringing the Vietnam war to an end; and 4)
the establishment of a hotline between the two governments to guard against an accidental
nuclear war that should be codified in an agreement of some kind.26
China’s Positions. China also had positions on how to deal with the United States in
any forthcoming summit. Zhou Enlai stated the overall position that the summit should be
“an opportunity to improve Sino-American relations that will be beneficial for the struggle
against imperialistic expansion and hegemonism, beneficial to the maintenance of peace in
Asia as well as in the world, and beneficial to our country’s security and to our efforts to
unify the motherland in a peaceful way” (Xia, 2006, p. 18). Zhou and other senior members
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of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) discussed the specific terms of the negotiations in a
Politburo meeting held before Kissinger’s visit to Beijing. The terms consisted of eight
demands explicitly presented in a document titled “Report on Sino-American Talks” which
was attributed to Zhou in his role a premier.

These demands were:

1. All American armed forces and special military facilities should be withdrawn from
Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits region within a fixed period. This is the key question
in the restoration of relations between China and the United States. If no agreement
can be reached on this matter in advance, it is possible that Nixon’s visit will be
deferred.
2. Taiwan is China’s territory, and the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair. No
foreign intervention should be allowed. Vigilance toward the activities of Japanese
militarism in Taiwan is essential.
3. We will seek to liberate Taiwan through peaceful means, and efforts concerning
Taiwan’s affairs should be carried out conscientiously.
4. Efforts to create ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China and one Taiwan’ will be resolutely
opposed. If the United States wants to establish diplomatic relations with China, it
must recognize the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government
representing China.
5. if the above-mentioned three terms [1, 2, and 4] are not fully realized, it will not be
suitable for China and the United States to establish diplomatic relations, but a
liaison office can be established in each other’s capital.
6. We will not raise the question of [China’s membership in] the United Nations. If the
Americans bring up this question, we will tell them clearly that we will not accept the
arrangement of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China and one Taiwan’.
7. We will not raise the question of Sino-American trade. If the Americans bring up this
question, we may discuss it with them only after the principle of an American troop
withdrawal from Taiwan has been accepted.
8. The Chinese government maintains that U.S. military forces should be withdrawn
from the three countries of Indochina, from Korea, from Japan, and from Southeast
Asia to ensure peace in the Far East.27
These eight demands entailed three significant changes in China’s foreign policy
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toward the United States. One striking change was that a decoupling of Taiwan and the U.S.
was no longer a precondition for diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington.
Instead, from the Chinese leaders’ perspective, all that was needed was for the U.S. to
withdraw its troop from Taiwan. Another notable change was the declaration on the liberation
of Taiwan as an internal affair of the Chinese government that would be resolved by peaceful
means after the U.S. troops had been withdrawn from Taiwan. The final change was the
proposal to establish liaison offices in both countries, even if the issue of Taiwan was not
resolved. These changes indicated that China was committed to continue to engage in
negotiations with the United States (Xia, 2006, p. 19).
The Chinese government was aware that the Nixon administration would likely
concede to China’s requests because it faced domestic and international challenges, including
the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union’s growing influence in Europe. In this regard, leaders
in Beijing believed that approving Kissinger’s secret visit to China could offer an opportunity
for obtaining extensive concessions from the U.S. that would result in an easing of tensions in
the Far East region.
Conversations between Kissinger and Zhou. Kissinger’s visit to China on July
1972 was kept secret from the public and major media outlets in the United States. Even
within the Nixon administration, only a few people were aware of it. On the first day of the
visit, Kissinger proposed to cover seven topics in his meeting with Zhou: 1) the issue of
Taiwan; 2) the Indochina conflict and related tension; 3) relations with the Soviet Union and
Japan for the future peace of the world; 4) the situation in South Asia; 5) the establishment of
a secure channel of communications between the two countries; 6) issues of arms control; and
7) any other topics which the Chinese side would care to raise.28 I will discuss only the first
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three topics as they are the most relevant to North Korea’s foreign policy and its internal
affairs, which is the subject of this research.
Taiwan. Among all the topics listed above, both countries were agreed that the
Taiwan issue had to be resolved before it would be feasible to discuss other topics. Zhou
expected the U.S. to recognize that the People’s Republic of China was the sole legitimate
government of China, and that Taiwan had belonged to China for more than 1000 years as a
Chinese province.29 From China’s perspective, Taiwan eventually must be restored to the
motherland since it is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. Given Taiwan’s status as
Chinese territory, Zhou emphasized that the U.S. had to remove all its troops and dismantle
all its military installations in Taiwan and in the Taiwan Straits in the near future.
The importance of the issue to China was not only the threat posed by the presence of
foreign troops on Taiwan, or even the implicit denial of the One-China policy their
deployment represented, but also its implications for the diplomatic standing of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and its legitimacy in establishing relations with all other countries
in the world. In his reply to Zhou, Kissinger noted that the U.S. military presence in Taiwan
was composed of two elements: two-thirds of the military forces were related to activities
being carried out in other parts of Asia, specifically Indochina; and one-third was related to
the defense of Taiwan. The troops supporting the former mission would be removed as soon
as feasible after the end War in Vietnam.
As a good faith token of this intention, Kissinger called Zhou’s attention to the
curtailment of the Taiwan Straits Patrol, the recent withdrawal of a squadron of air tankers
from Taiwan, and the 20 % reduction in the size of the military advisory group.

In a related

vein, regarding the question of the political evolution between Taiwan and the PRC,
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Kissinger affirmed that the U.S. would not advocate for either a ‘two Chinas’ or a ‘one China,
one Taiwan’ solution.30 These clarifications by the U.S. side established a hopeful outlook
for the prospects that the two countries would reach an agreement on the eventual opening of
diplomatic relations.
The Vietnam War. The U.S. had a clear intention of ending the War in Vietnam as
soon as the conditions for doing so permitted. Kissinger said the U.S. would set a date for a
withdrawal from Vietnam provided a ceasefire could be negotiated in Indochina, all POWs
were repatriated, and all parties agreed to abide by the Geneva Accords.31 There were two
obstacles, however, the United States had to overcome: North Vietnam's demand for the
surrender of the existing government in Saigon; and its refusal to agree to a ceasefire
throughout Indochina prior to the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. The U.S.
side’s position was that the people of Indochina had a right to determine their own future
without military interventions.
As a corollary of this position, the U.S. believed the end of the war in Vietnam would
accelerate the improvement of relations between China and the United States.32 The Chinese
side agreed that the U.S. and other foreign troops had to withdraw from Vietnam and the
people of the three countries of Indochina should be left alone to determine their own future.
If the war did not cease, however, China would continue to support not only the people of
Vietnam, but also the people of Cambodia and Laos (Warner, 2007, p.771).
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The issue of the U.S. troops stationed in Korea and Japan. In his discussions with
Kissinger, Zhou stressed that U.S. troops in South Korea also should be withdrawn. While
China had withdrawn its troops voluntarily from North Korea in 1958, the United States did
not regard this as a significant move since the Chinese troops were deployed on the other side
of the Yalu River and could quickly return. Realistically, however, the Chinese troops could
not just cross the river since it would constitute interference in the internal affairs of North
Korea and an uninvited occupation of the Korean peninsula.
The restraining factor in this case was China’s adherence to the norms and rules
governing international relations while the U.S. was not willing to make the same
commitment. In short, Zhou merely reaffirmed the two points that were included in the
Geneva Accords that all foreign troops had to be withdrawn from the territories of other
countries, and the people of those countries must be allowed to settle their own affairs in a
way they see fit without outside interference.33
In his response to Zhou's statements about U.S. troops in South Korea, Kissinger
pointed out that any discussion of the deployment of these troops had to be part of a broader
discussion of the security situation in Northeast Asia in general. Any deal between Beijing
and Washington had to be treated as marking the transition from one phase of international
relations to another phase based on new security considerations. Kissinger also cautioned that
the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Korea had to be carried out on a gradual basis. Otherwise, if
it were done too quickly, there would be a catastrophic impact that produced the opposite
effect from the one intended.
If a relationship developed between China and the United States, Kissinger noted, it
was conceivable that American troops would be withdrawn from Korea before the end of the
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Nixon administration’s second term.34 This outcome hinged on the end of the Indochina war,
which would allow the South Korean troops deployed in Vietnam to return home. The
maintenance of a military presence in South Korea was not a permanent feature of the U.S.
foreign policy, he affirmed, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops was foreseeable during the
Nixon administration since it was taking on the challenging task of adjusting American
foreign policy to new realities.
At the same time, though, the administration first had to conclude a brutal and
challenging war in Vietnam. When that goal was met, the administration’s foreign
policymakers had established the principle that the defense of faraway countries could not be
primarily an American responsibility. That responsibility had to be their own in the first
instance, and the responsibility of other countries in the region in the second instance. The
U.S. would need to intervene primarily only when a super-power threatened to establish
hegemony over countries that could never be strong enough to resist this imposition on their
own (p. 41).35
Meanwhile, both sides were worried about a resurgent Japan, which potentially
might be tempted to rebuild its regular military forces. At that time, Japan had a strong
economic and social infrastructure, which gave it the capability to create a strong military
machine and use it for expansionist purposes if it so desired. In the face of this prospect, the
American forces in Japan were insignificant. They played no constraining role vis-a-vis the
potential power of Japan.
In fact, the U.S military presence in Japan created a paradox because it constituted a
restraint on the pursuit of aggressive policies. Japan was determined to rebuild its own
military machine if it felt forsaken by the U.S., however, and it might even consider
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developing nuclear weapons. This potential chain of events was feared by both China and the
U.S. Neither wanted to see Japan heavily re-armed. In this sense, both sides agreed that the
limited number of U.S. military bases in Japan were purely defensive in nature and served to
constrain Japan from pursuing rearmament.36
After having discussed various topics, both sides agreed on the substantive issues
that needed to be resolved, which included the withdrawal of U.S. troop from Taiwan,
Indochina, South Korea, and Japan. The U.S. concern that the withdrawal of its troops from
Japan would jeopardize regional stability was not fully shared the Chinese side. The Chinese
viewed the specter of Japanese re-militarization with less alarm. In that potential scenario,
they believed Japan would soon be vanquished by the balance of power established in the
region by the Soviet Union and an emerging China.
Ultimately, the historic meeting between Kissinger and Zhou concluded with an
agreement outlining the terms for Nixon's visit to Beijing in early 1972. This agreement was
codified in the following joint announcement:
Premier Zhou Enlai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9-11, 1971. Knowing of President
Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Republic of China, Premier Zhou Enlai,
on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, has extended an
invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972.
President Nixon has accepted this invitation with pleasure. The meeting between the
leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between
the two countries and to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides
(Announcement of two countries on July 11, 1971).37
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3-1-2. Nixon’s Visit to China
Following Kissinger successful visit to Beijing, both countries issued a statement on
July 15 announcing President Nixon's intention to visit Beijing. This announcement shocked
allies of both China and the United States. It indicated that the Sino-American relations
would change significantly from the previous condition of prolonged hostility to a new era of
rapprochement.
Both sides took the forthcoming summit very seriously. On the U.S. side, Nixon's
political risk was immense even though he believed the trip to China would be a historical
event. To ensure the success of his visit, Nixon decided to send Kissinger to Beijing for a
second time to discuss in detail the dates for the visit, the agenda of the meetings, the media
coverage, and security issues. For that purpose, contact was made through the so-called ‘Paris
Channel’. A joint statement was issued on October 5 stating that a delegation led by Kissinger
would visit Beijing on October 20 to make the necessary arrangements for President Nixon's
visit.
The discussions between Zhou and Kissinger in their second meeting covered Taiwan,
Indochina, and Japan, the same topics discussed during their first meetings in July. The focus
was on issues on which they had failed to reach tangible outcomes. One such issue that Zhou
wanted to discuss was the Korean peninsula which Zhou felt had not been sufficiently
discussed during the meeting in July. In addition to these topics with some loose ends that
needed to be tied up, Kissinger raised the issue of the many logistical details that needed to be
ironed out in preparation for the visit of President Nixon. These included protocol, security,
communications, and the press.38
On the policy front, the Taiwan issue once again was discussed in depth during the
38
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second meeting in Beijing. The Chinese side continued to probe the U.S. side for a
clarification of its position on Taiwan's status. The Chinese wanted to know whether the U.S.
viewed it as a province of mainland China or as an independent state allied with the U.S.
China emphasized that a peaceful settlement of the issue of Taiwan would be feasible if the
U.S. government expressed unambiguous support for the One-China policy. The Chinese side
insisted that the defense treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan was illegal and reiterated its
demand that the U.S. troops in Taiwan had to be withdrawn. This was stated as a precondition
for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. The Chinese side
also stated they could not send an ambassador to Washington if there was another accredited
Chinese ambassador there.39
Kissinger gave Zhou assurances that a peaceful resolution of the Chinese demands on
the Taiwan issue would be worked out. The Chinese voiced their government’s concerns
about Japanese influence on Taiwan as well, not only military but also political and economic
influence. Kissinger assured them that it would be relatively easy to prevent the projection of
a Japanese military presence in Taiwan while the U.S. troops remained there. He also tried to
modulate Chinese demands on this issue by noting that there are opponents to any change in
the U.S. support for Taiwan who could destroy the fragile relationship developing between
the U.S. and China. From Kissinger's perspective, progress in opening diplomatic relations
with China hinged on taking a step-by-step approach.
Regarding U.N. membership, the Chinese indicated they would not sit in the same
chamber as representatives of Taiwan. Kissinger followed Nixon’s instructions to solicit the
Chinese viewpoint on this issue. It was clear they would not share the seat in the U.N. with
Taiwan.
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Regarding the Indochina conflict, the Chinese government agreed that the
negotiations had to be carried out between Washington and Hanoi. Resolution of the
Indochina conflict, however, was not made a condition for Nixon’s visit to Beijing. Zhou
reiterated that the U.S. had to make peace with Hanoi directly.40 This peace could be
achieved if the U.S. troops were withdrawn from all the countries of Indochina, either by
negotiations with these countries or by a unilateral policy decision of the U.S.
Zhou suggested that both the U.S. and China might jointly withdraw from Indochina
in what would be a “glorious act” for both countries.41 What Zhou was suggesting would
amount to a withdrawal of U.S. and Chinese troops from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Kissinger acknowledged in turn that the U.S. government wanted to make peace with
Vietnam and did not pose a long-term threat to Vietnam's independence. Kissinger asked the
Chinese side to convey a message to its allies confirming the sincerity of the U.S.
commitment to the peace progress. By the end of the second meeting, both sides had agreed
on their mutual commitment to "genuinely pursue a peaceful settlement” of the Indochina
war.42
Unlike in the first meeting, Zhou devoted considerable time and passion to a
discussion of the subject of North Korea, which was the third item on the agenda. In the
1970s, the three principal ‘powder kegs’ in East Asia were Taiwan, Indochina, and Korea.
Zhou pointed out that the Korean Question43 had not been addressed seriously by the U.S.
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during the Geneva Conference in 1954, and as a result there still was no peace treaty ending
the Korean War. Also, North Korea was not permitted to participate in the annual U.N. debate
on the Korean Question, including in the deliberations of the U.N. Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).44
China’s foreign policy position on North Korea was clear cut. The U.S. military
forces had to be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, just as the Chinese forces had been
withdrawn in 1955. At the same time, the Chinese side brought up the issue of Japan’s likely
response to the end of a U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula. Kissinger assured
his Chinese interlocutors that the U.S. had the same policy for the Korean peninsula as for
Taiwan, indicating that the replacement of the U.S. forces with Japanese self-defense forces
was not an option the U.S. was considering as it was opposed to military expansion by
Japan.45
Continuing the same subject, Zhou handed Kissinger a document listing eight points
that had been drafted by the North Korean government and published in April 1971. This
document consisted of a series of demands as follows: withdrawing U.S. forces from the
Korean peninsula; ending U.S. military support for South Korea; granting North Korea an
equal status with South Korea; preventing a resurgence of Japanese influence in South Korea;
disbanding UNCURK; leaving the resolution of the Korean Question to the Koreans
themselves; and permitting North Korea to participate unconditionally in the annual UN
debate on the Korean Question.46
The last important topic discussed during the second meeting in Beijing was Japan's
Routledge, 1996, pp. xvi-xviii.
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role in Taiwan and Korea. Neither the U.S. nor China wanted to see the revival of an
expansionist Japan that might rearm and resume the outward thrust that it had shown in the
1930s and 1940s. Zhou expressed his views on the potential threat posed by a resurgent Japan
during his conversation with Kissinger with a colorful metaphor. As he put it, “Feathers have
grown on [Japan’s] wings, and it is about to take off.” He was alluding to the fact that the
economic expansion of Japan seemed likely to lead to military expansionism. Zhou also
opined that Japan’s economic assistance to other countries was intended to establish Japan’s
economic domination, rather than to provide development aid. Further, in his view, the Soviet
Union was encouraging Japan to be more aggressive because it was seeking Japanese
investment and markets for itself.
At the same time, though, Zhou stressed that China also was interested in improving
its relations with Japan if mutually acceptable agreements could be reached. Zhou defined the
fundamental element of such agreements as Japan’s recognition of the PRC's sovereignty
over Taiwan, its surrender of all ambitions related to both Taiwan and Korea, and its show of
respect for the PRC's independence and territorial integrity.47
Kissinger reiterated his view that the U.S. military presence in Japan serves to deter
its ambitions for military expansion and nuclear rearmament as well as puts a damper on its
nationalism. Issues related to the Soviet Union and South Asia were mentioned in the
conversation as well, but none of them were crucial to a study of North Korea’s foreign
policy. Therefore, it is not necessary to analyze both sides’ positions on these two issues.
Nixon’s visit to China was an extraordinary event symbolic of the thawing tensions
in the Cold War between the capitalist and communist blocs. Over the period of February 2128, 1972, President Richard Nixon ‒ the first U.S. President to visit China ‒ played an
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essential role in reestablishing diplomatic relations with China after decades of mutual
estrangement.
A historic handshake was exchanged between President Nixon and Premier Zhou
upon Nixon’s arrival in Beijing. His meeting with Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong
on the first day of his visit was another historical highlight. In the meeting, Mao stated his
personal view that the Taiwan issue was an internal Chinese affair of relatively minor
significance. This was his way of suggesting that the U.S. and China had better use their
energies to deal with the weightier issues of the current international situation (Panda, 1997, p.
55). In Mao’s view, for example, the Soviet Union was a significant threat to both China and
the United States.
In fact, it was the series of almost-daily extended conversations with Zhou Enlai that
provided the substance of Nixon’s breakthrough in U.S.-China relations.

At the welcoming

banquet for Nixon and his delegation, Zhou described the visit as “unprecedented in the
history of the relations between China and the United States” and an unparalleled opportunity
to promote the normalization of their relations. Zhou noted that the gate to friendly contact
had been opened and then added that it was not impossible to normalize relations.
In his response, Nixon made the (for him) extraordinary assertion the U.S. and China
“share common interests that transcended the ideological gulf” (p. 55). Significantly, he
added: “There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other;
neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world” (p. 56). These remarks were
signs that a new relationship was unfolding. In fact, it would be a new balance of power
reflecting the primacy of geopolitics as the two countries began to make a rational assessment
of their common interests.
In his remarks, Nixon also referred to the two most important issues for the Chinese
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government, namely, Taiwan and Vietnam. The former was the most crucial issue while the
latter was the most urgent issue. Regarding the Taiwan issue, Nixon articulated ‘five
principles’ that he had worked out together with Kissinger prior to his arrival in China. First,
there was only one China, and Taiwan was one of the provinces of China. Second, the United
States would not support any movement for the independence of Taiwan. Third, The U.S.
government would use its influence both to prevent Japan from attempting to regain control
of its formal colony of Taiwan once the U.S. military forces had been withdrawn, and to
discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwanese independence movement. Fourth, the U.S.
would support the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Fifth, the U.S. would seek the
normalization relations with the PRC (Warner, 2006, p. 776).
After a long battle of drafting the joint communiqué, the ‘Joint Statement Following
Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of China’ was issued on February 28,
1972. It has commonly become known as the Shanghai Communiqué. China and the United
States found it beneficial to seize the opportunity of Nixon’s visit to normalize relations as
well as to cooperate on other matters of interest to both sides. In the communiqué, both
parties provided their assessment of the current international situation, noted the significant
changes and great upheavals taking place, and expounded on their respective policy positions
and diplomatic stances.48 Notably, the U.S. stated its support for the right of the peoples of
Southeast Asia to shape their own futures in peace, free of military threats, and without being
the locus of great power rivalry. This was an indication of the Nixon administration’s sense of
urgency about ending the Vietnam War.
Regarding Vietnam, the U.S. emphasized repeatedly that its constant primary
objective had been a negotiated settlement. The communiqué also mentioned the eight-point
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proposal by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972. It
characterized this proposal as a basis for the attainment of a negotiated solution. If that
objective were to be unattainable, it stated that “the United States envisages the ultimate
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for
each country of Indochina." Regarding the Korean question, the U.S. declared it would
continue to maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea. The U.S. also
pledged to “support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and
increased communication in the Korean peninsula.” Regarding Japan, the communiqué
reaffirmed that the “United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan;
it will continue to develop the existing close bonds.” The U.S. side also welcomed the United
Nations Security Council resolution of December 21, 1971, on “the continuation of the
ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces within their
own territories.”
On the other hand, the Chinese side stated that “the people of all countries have the
right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose
foreign aggression, interference, control, and subversion.” Regarding Korean issue, the
Chinese side expressed its support for “the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of
Korea put forward by the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on April
12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the U.N commission for the Unification and
Rehabilitation of Korea.” It also affirmed opposition to “the revival and outward expansion of
Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent,
democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan.” Additionally, both sides declared the following
common principles:
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•

progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United
States is in the interests of all countries;

•

both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

•

neither should seek hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region and each is opposed to
efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

•

neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into
agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

On the Taiwan issue, both sides agreed that Taiwan is China's internal affair, and no
other country should interfere in this affair. The U.S. side acknowledged that Taiwan was part
of China and reaffirmed its commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. In this
sense, the U.S. government affirmed “the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military
installations from Taiwan" as its “ultimate objective.” Lastly, both countries agreed that
people-to-people contacts and exchanges in the fields of science, technology, culture, sports,
trade, and journalism would be mutually beneficial.

3-2. North Korea’s Responses to the Détente
When Henry Kissinger secretly visited China to meet Zhou Enlai in July 1971, a
North Korean delegation led by Kim Jung-rin, the secretary of the Workers' Party of
Korea (WPK), also was visiting China. Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea at the time,
had not been informed of Kissinger’s visit to China by a Chinese delegation visiting
Pyongyang to celebrate the “Week of Friendship.” Kim only learned of Kissinger’s visit after
Zhou Enlai traveled to Pyongyang on the 14th of July and briefed Kim on the meeting
between China and the United States. Pyongyang assessed the visit to be ‘a great victory’ for
the Chinese people and communist revolutionary people worldwide (Schaefer, 2004). Kim
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viewed the meeting as a sign of the decline of U.S. imperialism, and the at long last triumph
of the communist movement.
This claim about the visit signaling a decline of U.S. influence in the region in favor
of China, however, was an intentional misdirection aimed at the domestic audience in North
Korea. The U.S. continued to be considered by North Korea as its number one enemy, and
China’s move toward détente with the U.S. might well have been met with criticism by the
leadership in Pyongyang. Still, recognizing the implications of this development, Kim Il Sung
wanted to tamp down any potential criticism of China in North Korea.
Today, the American imperialist faces a serious political, economic, and military crisis at
home. By itself, Nixon's visit to China aims to improve relations with China to
temporarily ease tensions and buy time to catch one's breath. Nixon's visit to China is not
very strange. There are many cases where the Communists temporarily compromise with
the enemy to change the situation in favor of the revolution when looking back on the
history of the world's revolutionary struggle. In the past, the Soviet Union signed a peace
treaty with the enemy just before World War II, a nonaggression treaty with fascist
Germany, and a neutral treaty with the Japanese imperialists. Therefore, there is no
reason to criticize China, paying keen attention to Nixon's visit to China.49

The rapprochement between China and the United States allowed North Korea to
seize an opportunity to try and achieve its own goals, including the withdrawal of U.S. troops
in the South and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and
Rehabilitation of Korea. Leaders in Pyongyang observed that China was trying to solve the
issue of Taiwan with the United States. Accordingly, they figured they also should try to
resolve their pending issues with the U.S. by using Beijing as a channel.
During his first trip to China, Kissinger’s talks with Zhou Enlai were suspended
briefly one evening because Zhou had to attend a dinner in honor of the North Korean foreign
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minister. Afterwards, Zhou came back for several more hours of talks with Kissinger.50 The
visit to Beijing by the North Korean foreign minister was a sign that the North Korean
government was already exploiting the détente between the PRC and the U.S. as an
opportunity to resolve some of its own problems. Kissinger’s report to President Nixon after
his second trip to China notes that Zhou delivered to Kissinger the eight-point list of demands
published by North Korea in early 1971. These were the demands noted previously, including
the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military support for South Korea, granting to North Korea
equal status with South Korea, preventing the resurgence of Japanese influence in South
Korea, the disbanding of UNCURK, allowing Koreans to resolve the Korean Question by
themselves, and permitting North Korea to participate without conditions in the annual UN
debate on this issue.51
The Korean peninsula issue was one of the Chinese government’s top priorities as it
was linked with the concept of three principal ‘powder kegs’ in East Asia. Along with Taiwan,
Indochina, and Korea constituted one of the most urgent issues facing China’s foreign policy.
Zhou told President Nixon during their meeting that China agreed with North Korea that the
time had come for the UNCURK to be disbanded. “That would be a good thing.” Nixon
replied. “You raised that with Dr. Kissinger, and we are looking into it.” In the final act of this
first step toward détente with the U.S., the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué, the
Chinese side took official notice of North Korea’s demands.
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3-3. The Result of the Détente and Foreign Policy Variations
The North Korean government welcomed the Shanghai communiqué because it
included its eight-point list of demands that had been conveyed by the Chinese government to
the United States. The official North Korean newspaper of the Central Committee of the
Workers’ Party of Korea published the details of the communiqué, noting in particular:
China stated that all countries, large or small, should be equal. A strong nation should not
despise a weak nation. China will never become a great power and will oppose any
hegemony and power politics. The Chinese side firmly supports the struggle of all
oppressed peoples for freedom and liberation. It has declared that all countries have the
right to choose their own social system according to the will of their people. Countries
have a right to defend their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against
foreign invasion, interference, and control. Therefore, all foreign armies should withdraw
to their own countries.52
The contents of the Shanghai communiqué conveyed what the North Koreans had
been trying to achieve since the communist government was established in 1948. The issue of
greatest concern was the military presence of a foreign power on the Korean peninsula.
Historically, especially from the late 19th century, the perception of foreign powers in Korea
was highly negative ‒ ‘foreign devils’ was a common expression ‒ which was a reaction to
Western and Japanese imperialism. The history of gunboat diplomacy, unequal treaties, and
international settlements that ignored and trampled on the wishes of the Korean people had
planted the seeds of a deep Korean mistrust and hatred of foreigners (Hong, 2011, p. 100).
Furthermore, foreign invasions and the tragedy of these experiences made the Korean people
constantly concerned about foreign dominance and security issues.
The Korean War and the division of the nation served to make the perception of
foreigners even more problematic. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were complicit in the
52
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division of Korea along the 38th parallel, but Kim Il Sung was much more wary of the
influence and intentions of the U.S. He viewed the U.S. to be an imperialist power seeking to
‘colonize’ Korea in a manner like what he felt had happened during the U.S. occupation of
postwar Japan. In his view, ‘American imperialists’ had to be expelled from the Korean
peninsula, by whatever means necessary, to achieve an independent and unified Korea.53
(Kim, 1964, p. 270, 326).
Prior to the détente between China and the United States, North Korea was focused
on unifying the Korean peninsula by expelling the U.S. forces based in South Korea through
military might with the support of China and the Soviet Union. By the 1970s, however, the
leadership in Beijing were strongly opposed to North Korea’s plan for the unification of the
Korean peninsula by military force. Pyongyang's antagonism toward the U.S. had started to
change after the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine and this trend was reinforced
significantly by Nixon's visit to China. This ‘drift’ toward a more moderate policy stance is
signaled in the following article in North Korea’s leading newspaper:
Many countries should respect each other's favor and be willing to compete peacefully so
that their actions can become the ultimate judge. No country should always claim to be
accurate, and each country should be willing to review its attitude for the common good.
The United States stressed that Indochina's people should be allowed to decide their
destiny without outside interference. The Unites States has declared an unwavering
commitment to resolve the Indochina conflict through a negotiated settlement. If a
negotiated settlement is not achievable, the United States has held out the prospect of an
eventual withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the region in line with the goal of fostering
the self-determination of each country in Indochina.54
This was a welcomed change of attitude by the U.S. from North Korea's point of
view. North Korea had communicated its longstanding demand for the withdrawal of U.S.
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troops from the Korean peninsula even before the release of the Shanghai Communiqué. For
North Korea, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula was a pressing issue
that had to be resolved by any means possible. While nothing had been said about the specific
means and methods for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina, or elsewhere, the U.S.
position on the withdrawal of its troops reflected in the communiqué raised Pyongyang’s
expectations of being able to resolve this issue with the U.S. through diplomatic negotiations.
The reference to the “inviolability of other countries” in the communiqué captured
Pyongyang’s attention because it seemed to reinforce the viability of these expectations. The
acceptance of this language by the U.S. implied that it not only prepared to bring an end to
the Vietnam War but also had no intention of instigating another war in Asia. This seemingly
dramatic change in the U.S.’s stance suggested to the North Koreans that its “non intervention of foreign governments and peaceful coexistence” foreign policy objective could
be realized through the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States and other
countries. This was signaled in another part of the newspaper article cited above:

There are fundamental differences between China and the United States in their social
systems and foreign policies. Nonetheless, both countries have agreed that countries,
regardless of their social systems, should establish relations based on the principles of
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of other countries, nonintervention by foreign governments, equality, reciprocity, and peaceful coexistence.55
The principle of reciprocity, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful
coexistence in the communiqué issued by China and the United States became embedded in
North Korea’s self-reliant foreign policy after the U.S.-China detente. This dramatic change
in the international system was seen as having created an opportunity for North Korea’s
rapprochement to the U.S.
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Applying the predictive model to the U.S.-China détente enables us to explain how
North Korea’s foreign policy changed toward the United States. The background of U.S.China détente was the security dilemma facing both sides. Both countries were caught up in
the war in Vietnam and faced a perceived threat as well from the Soviet Union to their
security. Geopolitically, China was contained on its southern flank of the U.S. alliance ‒
including India, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea ‒ and by the Soviet Union
on its northern flank. This containment situation led the Chinese government to play ‘the U.S.
card’. On the other hand, the U.S. government needed to bring the Vietnam War to an end and
to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union as well as with China. These geopolitical factors and
domestic security dilemmas made détente between the U.S. and China a rationale choice.
As an actor in this unfolding geopolitical drama, Pyongyang started to adjust its
policy in the wake of the Sino-American reconciliation and the changing international
environment. After observing the peaceful transition of the international situation, the
leadership in Pyongyang deemed peaceful means to be the only feasible option for the
achievement of Korean reunification. Neither China nor the United States wanted to get
involved in any confrontations between the two Koreas.
From the North Korean perspective, however, goal of reunification could be realized
only if revolutionary activities would grow apace across the entire Korean peninsula, and the
withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea was a precondition for this national
transformation. Realizing that the détente offered a unique opportunity, Kim Il Sung sent his
vice prime minister to China to call attention to the eight-point list of demands for the
peaceful unification of Korea and to ask the Chinese government to relay it to the U.S.
government. At the same time, Kim Il Sung announced that he would meet any party,
including the Democratic Republic Party, and all social organizations and individual
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personages in South Korea to improve inter-Korean relations.
China was trying to ease Pyongyang’s apprehension about a U.S-China deal on
Korean issues and to enhance its military cooperation with Pyongyang. As Kissinger later
explained to Nixon that: “The Chinese are no doubt well prepared to pay this kind of a price
to shift Kim Il Sung into a less belligerent stance on the peninsula.”56 During Kissinger’s
second visit to China, which was public rather than secret, Zhou ranked the Korean issue as
third on the agenda, giving it a higher priority than in July. He supported Pyongyang’s
demands that the U.S. troops be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula and that Pyongyang be
permitted to participate unconditionally in the annual UN debate on the Korean Question.
While Zhou faithfully handed over North Korea’s eight-point list to Kissinger, the list
was rejected since they were presented as unilateral demands. Kissinger indicated he could
not accept a document listing a series of actions the United States ‘must’ take that at the same
time included language defaming its South Korean ally by calling it a ‘puppet’. Moreover, the
U.S. had no interest in recognizing North Korea as a legitimate state duly occupying the
Korean peninsula.
For its part, China insisted that the two Koreas should be treated as having equal
status and that the issue of reunification should be left to the future.57 Although the issue of
Korea was discussed intensively by both sides, it proved to be impossible to reach a
consensus on the withdrawal of the U.S. troops deployed in South Korea or on the issue of
the reunification of the Korean peninsula. The demand that the UNCURK be disbanded,
however, was determined to be feasible by the two sides. All the same, China maintained its
support for North Korea's eight-point list of demands while calling for the disbanding of
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UNCURK. This showed that China wanted to placate North Korea but was in no hurry to
facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. At the same time, the U.S.
continued to affirm its commitment to South Korea and support for reducing tensions by
increasing communications between North Korea and South Korea.
As previously noted, there was a North Korean delegation in Beijing during
President Nixon’s visit to China in February of 1972. Some sources claim that Kim Il Sung
also secretly visited Beijing but did not have a chance to meet with the U.S. delegation. It is
said that the Chinese government kept the North Korean delegation apart from the Nixon
delegation. Still, Kim Il Sung was pleased with the outcome of Nixon’s visit to China,
particularly because of China’s support for North Korea’s policy positions in the text of the
Shanghai Communiqué. While North Korea appreciated China’s efforts to promote Korean
reunification, it also was disappointed with China for not pressing hard enough on North
Korea’s demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops in South Korea. In addition, the North
Koreans felt a sense of betrayal when China supported the U.S. position to postpone the
discussion of the abolition of the UNCURK in the UN.
Reflecting on this mixed outcome, Pyongyang came to the realization that it needed
to take matters in its own hands. Thus, it concluded it was necessary to make “a visible move
to begin trade with the U.S.” accompanying by an effort to initiate “official or informal
government-to-government contacts with the U.S.” Taking such steps also could help North
Korea to enhance its diplomatic and trade relations with third world countries and to expand
its membership in international organizations (Xia and Shen, 2014, p. 1102).
The intervention situation in the theoretical model discussed in Chapter 2 is relevant
to explain North Korea's response to the new realities created by the U.S.-China detente. In
terms of roles and their interrelationships, the prior affect as a motivation of North Korea’s
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(the actor) approach to China (subject) was positive. The two countries had maintained
friendly and warm relations. As for the United States (source), however, North Korea
perceived it as its number one enemy. It viewed the U.S. as an illegitimate interloper that had
to be expelled from the Korean peninsula.
Pyongyang had to decide how to intervene in a cooperation situation between the U.S.
and China. The degree of salience in terms of autonomy between China and North Korea was
high because of their interdependent economic relationship and military/diplomatic ties. Still,
North Korea refrained from taking substantial action because the U.S. had been its enemy
since the Korean War. In this sense, North Korea's prior affect to both countries was
positive/mixed, and the relative capabilities were low compared to the dynamic between
China and the U.S. Following the model, North Korea's expected behavioral attributes
involved an exclusive use of diplomatic instruments, a minimal level of commitment, a low
negative affect, and an effort addressed to the subject.

１０２

1. Prior Affect with Source and Subject?

Positive/Positive Positive/Mixed Mixed/Mixed Mixed/Negative Negative/Negative

2. Are Entities Salient to the Actor?
Both

One

Neither

3. Are Actor’s Relative Capabilities Greater?
Both

One

Neither

4. Likely Behavior Attributes
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫

Low Positive Affect
Minimal Commitment
Diplomatic Instrument
Subject was Recipient

Figure 3. Branch of the intervention decision tree when North Korea intervenes in the
détente between China and the United States in the cooperation mode
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Chapter Ⅳ: North Korea’s Policy toward the United States:
Rapprochement Approach, 1972-1976
4-1. Motivations for the Rapprochement Approach
In order to improve Korea-U.S. relations, the U.S. government must stop meddling in
Korea’s internal affairs. It must not encourage our country’s division but must help its
reunification. In order not to hamper our country’s reunification, the United States must
first withdraw its troops from south Korea and refrain from threatening our security.
Then, we think the relations between our country and the United States will be improved
soon.58
The guiding principles of North Korea's foreign policy in the 1970s were selfreliance, friendship, and peace. This ideological construct was adopted by the Supreme
People's Assembly in December 1972. These principles allowed the North Korean
government to expand the scope of its foreign relations to include not only communist
countries, but also countries in the Western bloc. The global trend toward an easing Cold War
tensions, as exemplified by the U.S.-China detente, and the economic difficulties facing the
country, galvanized North Korea to pursue diplomatic relations with capitalist countries for
the first time. It also sought to launch an inter-Korean dialogue to make it evident that the
North's foreign policy had changed (Kim, 2015).
Unlike the past when it was focused on reunification by military might, North Korea
began showing a serious interest in the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula in the
aftermath of the détente between China and the United States. This was crystalized in the
South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. Following this historic agreement, Kim Il
Sung had to make concerted efforts to get military leaders on board for the party's new line in
favor of peaceful reunification.
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Following a plenary session to persuade the military, which had a vested interest in
promoting reunification of the Korean peninsula by military force, the Workers' Party of
Korea held a special meeting to discuss military issues that lasted for several days in
September 1973. In the meeting, Kim Il Sung delivered a speech that emphasized the
importance of the country's reunification and urgency of ending the national division. Kim Il
Sung’s concerted efforts to convince the military and the public of the need for a recalibration
of the country’s foreign policy show just how much the imperatives of the international
situation and domestic political constraints had complicated foreign policy decision-making
for Pyongyang’s leaders.
On the other hand, the Chinese government’s unsuccessful efforts to advance North
Korea’s eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea during its détente
negotiations with the United States had convinced Pyongyang of the need for an independent
démarche toward the U.S. Pyongyang’s eight-point program was raised by Zhou Enlai during
his second meeting with Henry Kissinger in October of 1971. During their discussions,
however, only two of the issues raised by North Korea were discussed: the withdrawal of the
U.S. military forces from South Korea; and the disbanding of the UNCURK.
The first issue already had been addressed partially by the U.S government’s
unilateral decision to reduce its troop levels in South Korea in accordance with the Nixon
Doctrine even before the détente got underway in 1969. It also had decided on a further
reduction of 20,000 troops by the end of February in 1972. Given this background,
Kissinger’s response to Zhou on the issue of the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South
Korea simply affirm that “our [i.e., the U.S.] military presence in South Korea is not a
permanent feature of our foreign policy” (Xia and Shen, 2014, p. 1091). Kissinger
subsequently briefed President Nixon on North Korea’s position on the deployment of U.S.
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troops in South Korea in the report on his second visit to Beijing.
During the conversations between Nixon and Zhou in February of 1972, however,
only the second issue of the disbanding of the UNCURK was discussed. The Shanghai
Communiqué summarizing the outcome of the U.S.-China détente negotiations duly included
North Korea's position on the UNCURK in a perfunctory way but made no mention of the
withdrawal of U.S. troops. China did not overtly push Washington to accept North Korea’s
eight-point program during the détente negotiations. In addition, China concurred with the
U.S. decision to defer the discussion of the UNCURK until the next UN annual meeting.

4-2. Emergence of Rapprochement Approaches

4-2-1. People’s Diplomacy Approach
Pyongyang decided to launch a ‘people's diplomacy’ approach toward the U.S.
because of its dissatisfaction with Beijing’s failure during the détente negotiations with
Washington to be a strong advocate for Pyongyang’s interests. This approach involved
extending invitations to Americans – including Korean Americans – to visit Pyongyang.
The invitees included scholars, politicians, and journalists. The North Korean leaders were
signaling their interest in initiating civilian exchanges between the two countries by
welcoming, for the first time, visits to North Korea by U.S. citizens. The U.S. government
effectively reciprocated by permitting U.S. citizens to visit North Korea, albeit within a
limited scope.
North Korea was attempting through these civilian exchanges to build greater
support within the United States for its effort to open an official channel with the U.S.
government. The leaders in Pyongyang wanted to elicit the help of Americans who shared
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their stance on anti-imperialism to make the American public aware of their government’s
misguided policy toward North Korea. As Kim Il Sung put it: "We hate the U.S. government's
imperialist policy, but we want the American people to be our good friends."59 This reflected
the implementation of a policy that made a distinction between the U.S. government and the
American people (Lee, 1996, p. 554). With this orientation, of course, the North Korean
government’s invitations primarily went to American scholars and delegations associated
with anti-imperialist organizations in the early 1970s.
Table 5. U.S. Civilian Exchanges with North Korea in the Early 1970s
Name of the Visitor/Delegation
Black Panther Party
Communist Party USA
Socialist Party of Puerto Rico
U.S. Liberation Alliance
American-Korean Friendship Information Center
U.S. National Legal Workers' Union
Ko Byung-Chul, University of Illinois
Ji Chang-bo, Long Island University
Harrison Salisbury, The New York Times
Selig Harrison, The Washington Post
Jerome A. Cohen, Harvard University
Puerto Rico's International Student Union
Kim Young-jin, George Washington University
American-Korean Friendship Information Center
Jerome A. Cohen, Harvard University
Noh Kwang Wook, Dentist, Musician
Cho Young-hwan, University of Arizona
Nam Chang-woo, University of Michigan
Suh Dae-sook, University of Hawaii
Socialist Party of Puerto Rico
Kim Young-jin, George Washington University

Dates of the Visit
July 1970
October 1970
May 1971
June 1971
August 1971
October 1971
April 1972
April 1972
May 1972
June 1972
July 1972
August 1972
May 1973
June 1973
July 1973
August 1973
March 1974
March 1974
April 1974
June 1975
August 1975

Source: South Korean diplomatic mission, diary of U.S.-North Korea relations 1968-1982,
classification number: 725.1.US, registration number: 9917; The Institute of Far East Studies, North
Korean Dictionary (Seoul: Institute of Far East Studies, 1980), p. 236.
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4-2-1-1. Korean Americans and Journalists
North Korea's outreach to the Korean diaspora began in February 1964 when the 8th
Plenary Session of the 4th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) adopted
a policy titled ‘Three Kinds of Revolutionary Forces.’ The three kinds of revolutionary forces
targeted by this policy were: 1) the revolutionary forces of North Korea (political, economic,
and military); 2) the revolutionary forces of south Korea (building an underground party in
South Korea, forming a united front, destroying conservative forces); and 3) international
revolutionary forces (anti-American, anti-South Korean, united front).60
Among these three kinds of forces, the policy related to the Korean diaspora
movement was encompassed in the international revolutionary force category, which implied
that overseas Koreans should be actively utilized as a part of the efforts to create international
conditions favorable to facilitating the communist unification of the Korean Peninsula. In
short, outreach to the Korean diaspora was included in the overall efforts to strengthen ties
with the people of socialist countries, Third World countries, and capitalist countries. By
strengthening international revolutionary forces, international communist forces worldwide
would be supported, and the revolutionary capacity of overseas Koreans would be enhanced
as well. As Kim Il Sung explained:
The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea considers it a sacred
duty to protect our 600,000 Korean compatriots in Japan and all other Korean citizens
overseas, and [to] defend their national rights. We will continue to fight doggedly against
any unjustified acts of infringing on the national rights of the Korean citizens overseas,
humiliating and persecuting them., and will always resolutely support and encourage our
overseas compatriots in their just struggle.61
Under the banner of promoting international revolutionary force, North Korea started
60
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to reach out to Korean Americans in the early 1970s. North Korea's policy vis-a-vis overseas
Koreans was expanded worldwide following the U.S.-China detente. The North Korean
government believed Korean Americans could play a crucial role as mediators in its efforts to
normalize relations with Washington by facilitating civilian exchanges between North Korea
and the United States. Kim Il Sung personally invited Korean American scholars to
Pyongyang to foster solidarity with Korean immigrants in the U.S. and to gain their support
for the unification of the Korean peninsula and the withdrawal of the U.S. military forces in
South Korea. In October 1970, during his conversation with a delegation of the Communist
Party USA, Kim Il Sung stressed the role that he envisioned Korean Americans playing as
supporters of the unification policy of North Korea:
It is said that more than 800,000 Koreans are residing in the United States. If they are
given full information about our Party's policy for national reunification, they will extend
active support for our country’s reunification. We are not now working with our
compatriots in the United States as efficiently with those in Japan. We hope that the
Communist Party of the United States of America will help us by exerting a positive
influence on the Koreans residing in America, so that they will support our cause and
commit themselves to the struggle for national reunification.62

With the goal of expanding its influence in the United States, North Korea contacted
a representative of the American-Korean Friendship Information Center (AKFIC) in New
York. The objective was to gain the support of the American people for its unification policy,
including the end of the Korean War through the conclusion of a peace agreement with the
United States (Kim, 2017, p.152). Additionally, North Korea also organized the Committee
for Solidarity with People of South Korea in California and the United Front for Democracy
of North Korea in New York as Korean American organizations, and a research group on Kim
Il Sung's ideology. In the same vein, North Korea invited two leading American journalists to
62
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visit Pyongyang, one from the New York Times and one from the Washington Post in May and
June of 1972, respectively.
In an interview with Selig Harrison from the Washington Post on June 21, 1972, Kim
Il Sung emphasized the importance of a peace agreement:
When a peace agreement is concluded, U.S. troops must get out of south Korea. After its
conclusion, the danger of war will be removed from our country, and, consequently, there
will be no more excuse for them to remain in south Korea. We maintain that after the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from south Korea the armed forces of the north and south
should be reduced to 100,000 or less on either side. When this is done as a result of the
conclusion of the peace agreement, our country’s peaceful reunification will be more
firmly guaranteed.63

It was an unusual move for North Korea, which at the time was trying to resolve the
issue of Korean unification through China, to invite a Washington Post reporter to Pyongyang
for an interview with Kim Il Sung. It is even more striking that Kim took a conciliatory
stance toward the U.S. in the interview while still calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from South Korea. There was a new perception at the time that the U.S. government ‒ due to
the Nixon Doctrine-induced changes in the international environment ‒ might accept North
Korea’s request if it were couched in a conciliatory tone.
Kim Il Sung had begun to recognize the United States, which previously he had
regarded only as a hostile country, as a country that might be willing to sign a peace treaty, to
negotiate a reduction of its military forces in South Korea, and to foster Korean reunification.
Still, he made a distinction between American imperialists ‒ referring to those responsible for
making U.S. foreign policy, in particular a small group of people ‒ and Americans in general
whom he believed were open to an offer of friendship with North Korea. He elaborated on
this point during the interview with Sig Harrison:
63
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We Korean people separate the American people from the U.S. imperialists. The Korean
people are still promoting friendship with the American people, and they will do so in the
future. You asked about a visit by our journalists to the United States. We are not against
this. If the situation is right, we shall not object to sending our journalists to the United
States and to their meeting its officials. You asked whether our country would establish
trade and economic relations with the United States if U.S. troops withdraw from south
Korea and tension is removed from the Korean peninsula. In that event, we shall not
object to establishing trade and economic relations with the United States; we would
welcome this. …We will show good will to anybody who does the same. But we cannot
show kindness to those who are going to invade us, can we?64

Of course, Kim Il Sung stressed that the withdrawal of U.S. troops was a prerequisite
for building the good relations with the U.S. government that he believed most Americans
supported. This position can be interpreted as a strategic ploy by Kim Il Sung to stir up public
opinion in the U.S. An anti-war sentiment was prevalent in the U.S. at the time, due to the
Vietnam War, and it was reasonable for him to expect to gain the American people's support
for easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, which had not expressed a
willingness to talk with the U.S. for the nearly two decades since the Korean War ended,
suddenly, was suggesting the possibility of developing trade and economic ties with the U.S.
Properly understood from North Korea’s perspective, it was an approach based on juche-style,
self-reliant diplomacy.

4-2-2. AKFIC and Congress
The AKFIC was established by members of the Communist Party in the United
States as well as university professors supportive of the DPRK position in 1971. They
cooperated with the North Korean government to support the withdrawal of the U.S. troops
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from South Korea and the Unification of the Korean Peninsula under Kim Il Sung’s regime.65
The organization repeatedly alerted the American public of the potential that another war
would erupt in East Asia if the U.S. government did not end its military and financial support
for the South Korean government (Gauthier, 2015, p. 152).
The AKFIC was part of North Korea’s rapprochement approaches in the 1970s. In
1972, besides Kim Il Sung’s unprecedented interviews with Harrison Salisbury and Selig
Harrison, from 1973-1976, the North Korean government purchased full-page advertisements
in the New York Times to convey the message that the removal of the U.S. troops from Korea
could rapidly improve U.S.-DPRK relations (Gauthier, p.153). At the center of this public
relations effort, as supporters of the anti-war movement in the U.S., members of the AKFIC
shared a common purpose with Pyongyang and supported its opposition to the continued
presence of the U.S. troops in South Korea. As an anti-imperialist organization, the AKFIC
opposed the U.S. government's foreign policy in East Asia. Its declared mission was to
educate the American public about North Korea by publishing a periodic journal named
Korea Focus and hosting public forums and college lectures.
On the other hand, the organization showed a different attitude toward the South
Korean government ruled by Park Chung-hee. They criticized Park Chun-hee’s regime as a
corrupted dictatorship, while asserting that “hundreds of millions” of our tax dollars are
“being poured into the war machine of the Park Chung-hee dictatorship.”66 In addition,
according to the members of the organization, “a new holocaust” could emerge from the
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economic and military aid being given to South Korea by the U.S. government (Gauthier,
2015). Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam in January 1973, the
organization launched a peace movement with a broader aim. It stated its objective of this
movement as follows: “We believe that millions of peace-loving American people, who
played a role in securing peace in Vietnam, will continue to fight against the pressure of
imperialist arms in all of Asia, especially Korea” (Korea Focus, 1973).
Members of the AKFIC also helped the North Korean government lobby the U.S.
House of Representatives on the issue of Korean reunification. In this connection, on April 6,
1973, North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly sent an unprecedented letter to the U.S.
Congress that called for U.S.-North Korea negotiations and an end to the presence of foreign
troops on the Korean peninsula.67
A few members of the U.S. Congress responded to the letter from Pyongyang. Mike
Mansfield, Senate Majority Leader, commented that "33,000 Americans never returned from
the hills and valleys of Korea, where many died in an unnecessary conflict with vast Chinese
armies north of the 38th Parallel. The 40,000-plus U.S. troops in Korea are largely an
irrelevant luxury 20 years after the end of the Korean War."68
In a similar vein, William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations,
argued that South Korea was able to keep "a modern army of 650,000 men with 4% of its
national products." This suggested that U.S. military aid might not be necessary to defend
against North Korea's aggression.69 He emphasized that U.S. aid to recipient countries was
not given for the purpose of reducing tensions and territorial aggression. Frank Church, a
senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued for the withdrawal of U.S.
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troops from Asia, including Korea and the airbases in Thailand.70
However, these responses did not represent the majority view in the legislative
branch of the United States. Officially, the U.S. Congress declined to respond to the letter
from North Korea. Frustrated with the lack of a response, the AKFIC launched a letterwriting campaign demanding that the U.S.

Congress take action to stop the White House’s

military and economic support for South Korea. In its campaign, AKFIC claimed that “U.S.
troops armed with destructive atomic weapons remain entrenched in South Korea, violating
the will and sovereignty of the Korean people.”71
After failing to receive a response from the U.S. Congress to its first letter,
Pyongyang sent another letter on March 25, 1974. This second letter conveyed four
propositions:
1. A non-aggression agreement with a provision that there be no United States
interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people.
2. A discontinuance of armament escalation and the introduction of new weapons,
combat equipment, and war supplies into the Korean peninsula on both sides.
3. Withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea as soon as possible.
4. A guarantee that Korea will not become a military or operational base for any
country.72
Again, there was no response to North Korea’s letter by U.S. Congress. There were
possibilities that the Congress perceived North Korea’s letter which contained the peace
treaty as a strategy to “harm the U.S. and South Korea relations.”73 The AKFIC wrote to
every U.S. senator and representative to reiterate its arguments. In this second letter-writing
campaign, the organization stressed that the failure of the U.S. Congress to reply to North
Korea’s letters was “shockingly discourteous” and “an incomprehensible refusal to explore a
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welcome opportunity to create a meaningful state of peace in a most critical area of Asia.”74
Leaders of AKFIC called on the readers of Korea Focus to give a copy of the second
letter to the U.S. Congress to their relatives, neighbors, friends, fellow passengers on subways,
buses, railroads, or planes. They encouraged the readers to deliver a copy as well to “the local
trade union, community organization, religious congregations, and other people’s
organizations, urging them to express their sentiments and desire for peace by supporting the
main theme of the letter”75 from North Korea.
Despite the AKFIC’s efforts at lobbying the U.S. Congress to react and negotiate
with North Korea on its demands, neither the White House nor the U.S. Congress decided to
reach out to the North Korean government. The U.S. anti-war movement and the American
public had little interest in the issue of American imperialism in Korea, the withdrawal of the
U.S. troops, and Korea's reunification. The DPRK's efforts to gain American public support
through the AKFIC failed. The organization faced severe financial problems and had to close
its doors permanently in 1976.

4-2-3. Korean American Organizations
After having sent two letters to the U.S. Congress requesting the negotiation of a
peace treaty and failing to get any reply, North Korea doubled down on its ties with Korean
Americans by supporting a variety of progressive organizations. These Korean American
community organizations were formed voluntarily. The North Korean government did not
play a specific role in their activities. Members of all the Korean American progressive
organizations were opposed to the Park Chung-hee dictatorship and supported the goal of a

74

American-Korean Friendship And Information Center 1974.

75

Department of State, 1972.

１１５

self-reliant peaceful unification stated in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique.
The same goal of self-reliant peaceful reunification was North Korea’s motivation in
approaching its progressive compatriots residing in the United States. The number of Korean
immigrants in the U.S. had been increasing since the early 1970s, and many politicians,
professors, and journalists were playing critical roles in the Korean American community.
They were more interested in the political situation in South Korea than in American politics
and took a critical stance on the Park Chung-hee regime (Kelly, 2016, p. 94). North Korea
was well aware of this situation and sought to find ways for overseas Koreans worldwide,
including in the United States, to help unify the Korean Peninsula and force the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from South Korea.
Table 6. Progressive Korean-American Organizations
Name of the Organization
Korean-American Promotion
Committee for the Peaceful
Reunification of the Motherland
The Council of National
Unification Promotion for the
Restoration of Democracy in the
South. (U.S. Headquarters)

Korean-American Veterans

Korean-American Women's
Fellowship Council

Founding Date

Membership

Activities/Objectives

June 1972

―

―

November 1974

February 1974

January 1975

Compatriots of all
classes living in the
Americas

The realization of
democracy in Korea

Establishing a democratic government and
realizing independent
South Korean Military reunification, based on
Service Workers Living the July 4 South-North
in the United States
Joint Communique,
and promoting friendly
ties with allies.

Korean-American
women from many
states (esp. Washington,
New York, Los Angeles,
and Philadelphia)

Support for the prodemocracy movement
of the South Korean
people through active
participation in the
struggle for the
reunification of the
motherland
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Korean-American Association
Democratic Korea Promotion

Korean-American Association of
Democratic People

Korean-American Democratic
Society Construction Council

The United Movement for
Democracy in Korea

Los Angeles National Unification Promotion Association

Korean American Democratic
Association

Association of Democracies
(North American Headquarters)

October 1975

February 1975

January 1977

January 1977

May 1977

June 1977

August 1978

―

Compatriots in New
York, Los Angeles, New
Jersey, Philadelphia, and
Washington

Compatriots in
Washington

―

Compatriots in
Los Angeles

Ten Korean American
Organizations and
Individuals

Korean Americans in the
United States

―
Active participation in
internal and external
movements aimed at
building a new society.
and in the struggle for
the reunification of the
motherland.
A coalition of compatriots in all walks of
life under the values of
democratic patriotism,
and the realization of
peaceful reunification
of the motherland.

―
To support the July 4
South-North Joint
Communique, oppose
Two Koreas and the
dictatorship in the
South, support the
establishment of a
regime with unification of the motherland
as its top priority.
The democratization
of South Korea and the
realization of the
independent reunification of the motherland,
the union of all democratic forces, and the
strengthening of
solidarity with
foreigners.
Participation in antidictatorship and prodemocratic movements, including the
people's movement in
South Korea for democracy and the reunifycation of Korea.

Source: Korean Central News Agency, “The year of the Korean Central News Agency, 1983.”
Pyongyang: Korean Central News Agency, 1983, pp. 429-430.
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4-3. Goals of Rapprochement Approach and Limitations
4-3-1. Goals of Rapprochement Approach
At the third meeting of the Fifth Supreme People's Assembly on March 25, 1974,
North Korea resolved to negotiate directly with the United States to ease tensions on the
Korean Peninsula and promote peace. The proposal was to replace the armistice agreement
with a peace treaty. The proposal included: a non-aggression pact; non-interference in
domestic affairs; suspension of the military buildup and arms race; suspension of the
introduction of military materials into Korea; prohibition on the continuing operation of the
United Nations Forces Command; and the withdrawal of foreign forces in Korea.
In response to the North's proposal for a peace treaty, the U.S. suggested direct talks
between the two Koreas and declared its willingness to recognize North Korea and develop
diplomatic relations if China and the Soviet Union reciprocated by recognizing South Korea.
North Korea rejected the U.S.’s suggestion, however, because the four-party talks and crossrecognition proposal were perceived to signify the permanent division of the Korean
peninsula (Kim, 2001, pp. 91-103).
Table 7. North Korea’s Approach to the United States after the Détente
Passive behaviors
ㆍInviting Journalists,
Scholars, and
Korean Americans
ㆍUtilizing AKFIC and
Korean American
Organizations
ㆍSending Two Letters to
Congress

Restrictive suggestions

Conditions

ㆍA Peace Treaty

ㆍA non-aggression pact

ㆍThe Reduction of Military
Forces

ㆍThe withdrawal of the
U.S. Troops

ㆍThe Abolition of the
UNCURK

ㆍNon-interference in
internal affairs

ㆍThe Improvement of
People’s Diplomacy

ㆍSuspension of the
provision of military
materials to South Korea
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Despite the North's proposal for a peace treaty, the U.S. policy on the Korean
peninsula was a stabilization policy based on maintaining the status quo. To acknowledge the
existence of the two Koreas and ease military tensions on the Korean peninsula were the
bottom lines of the policy. The issue of easing tensions on the Korean peninsula had broader
implications for the U.S. In its own geopolitical interests, the U.S. was focused on preventing
the Korean peninsula from becoming a stumbling block in the U.S.'s pursuit of detente with
the Soviet Union and China. In this respect, given this linkage to the far more consequential
issue of the detente between the superpowers, inter-Korean dialogue was located at the very
bottom of the U.S.’s foreign policy priorities. Simultaneously, the United States advocated a
‘Koreanization’ policy based on an assumption that any inter-Korean dialogue had to be a
"show of Koreans."76
However, the Koreanization policy was not intended to leave all issues of U.S.
interest subject to the sole determination of the Korean people, including the status of the
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), the
United Nations Command (UNC), and the establishment of a peace regime. The U.S.
government had promised South Korea that it would carry out all its obligations under the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. Only a month after Dr. Kissinger’s talks
with Premier Zhou in Beijing, the State Department was able to confirm to the U.S. embassy
in Seoul that there would be no impact on “its assurances thus far made through various
policy declarations and joint statements regarding the defense and security of the Republic of
Korea.”77
In addition, the U.S. reaffirmed its intention to support the principles and objectives
of the United Nations in Korea and the efforts of the United Nations to achieve the
76
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establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. Similarly, it reaffirmed its
adherence to the joint policy declaration, which was signed on July 27, 1953, by the sixteen
nations which supported South Korea with troops during the Korean war.78 Internally, the
United States tried to maintain or strengthen the alliance with South Korea while externally
blocking the Korean peninsula from emerging as a conflict between the superpowers. In fact,
the U.S. intentionally postponed discussions on Korean issues at the U.N. in the name of
inter-Korean dialogue from 1971 to 1972 (Hong, 2004, p. 40).

4-3-2. The U.S. policy toward North Korea
U.S. policy toward North Korea was bound to be linked to both the challenges of the
inter-Korean dialogue and the advantages stemming from the détente with China. Under
these circumstances, there was a mismatch between the peace treaty demanded by North
Korea and the imperatives of U.S. policy.
Discussions on relations with North Korea started within the U.S. government in
March 1972, when the inter-Korean dialogue got underway and North Korea began to signal
its desire to improve relations with the U.S. by inviting American journalists and scholars for
visits to Pyongyang. At a press conference on March 7, 1972, Secretary of State William P.
Rogers announced that "The U.S. government is aware of the signs that North Korea wants to
improve relations with the U.S., and the Nixon administration in general wants to improve
relations with all countries, and this could include North Korea" (Hong, 2004, p. 40).
Thus, the U.S. Department of State began in-depth discussions on policies toward
North Korea in early 1972. The U.S. policy toward North Korea consisted of small issues that
suited the status quo, rather than big changes such as the détente North Korea had in mind.
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As an initial measure, the policy sanctioned a limited use of North Korea's official
name. It proposed that North Korea's official name be used only for low-level documents and
diplomatic letters to avoid any impression of equivalence with South Korea. A second
measure was the inclusion of North Korea on the list of countries no longer subject to travel
restrictions for Americans. At that time, there were restrictions printed in U.S. passports that
barred travel by Americans to Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. While the restrictions
remained in place for Cuba and Vietnam, the State Department determined that the restriction
on travel to North Korea could be lifted if the situation on the Korean peninsula permitted.
The third measure was approval for visits to North Korea by U.S. journalists, but North
Korean journalists were still not permitted to enter the U.S. The fourth measure addressed
trade sanctions against North Korea.
As it did in the case of China, the State Department argued for a gradual relief of
trade sanctions with North Korea. The proposals for a removal of travel restrictions and a
relief of trade sanctions on North Korea, however, were never implemented. The only change
was Secretary of State Rogers’ use of the acronym "DPRK" for the first time during his
speech at the 17th SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) conference.
In early 1973, the U.S. government moved forward with more in-depth discussions
on its policy toward the Korean peninsula in general and North Korea in particular. A study
conducted by the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific79 explored the
potential for detente on the Korean peninsula and proposed options for re-orienting U.S.
policy in the region.
The study listed the minimum criteria for the kind of outcome on the Korean
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peninsula that would be acceptable to the U.S. These criteria were: a stable inter-Korean
relationship at reduced levels of tension; a stable framework for peaceful competition among
the major powers; political stability and an opportunity for economic growth in South Korea;
adequate military security for South Korea, including access by the U.S. military; protection
for U.S. financial and commercial interests in South Korea; and a role for North Korea
consistent with stability in the area.80
Given these criteria, the Interdepartmental Group discussed four options for U.S.
policy toward the Korean peninsula. First, South Korea might be allowed to take the lead in
pursuit of an inter-Korean accommodation. The U.S. side would only take initiatives that
were acceptable to and agreed by South Korea. If the détente in the region were threatened by
events in Korea, however, the U.S. government would consider exercising more active
influence on Seoul or taking appropriate actions with the major powers.
Second, the U.S. government might retard the pace of inter-Korean accommodation
if North Korea were judged to be not interested in pursuing détente, or if China or the Soviet
Union were not interested in cooperating in the normalization of relations in the area.
Third, the U.S. government could encourage an inter-Korean accommodation by
playing a concerted role on its own initiative, separate from South Korea’s actions. The
degree of its active engagement would vary with specific circumstances.
Fourth, assuming an active great power role is essential to the development of
relations between the two Koreas, the U.S. government could negotiate with the major
powers in the region. The U.S. government would have to be prepared to judge initiatives and
responses based on their impact both on great power relationships and on South Korea.81
In terms of the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the U.S. government
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reaffirmed its commitment to maintain the deployment of its troops there and to provide
continuing military assistance. This military assistance to South Korea would serve to deter
North Korea’s aggression and defend against the nuclear capabilities of China, according to
an analysis in the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum.82
In addition, the Interdepartmental Group proposed options for dealing with several
other issues including arms control measures, North Korea's participation in the UN debate,
the status of the United Nations Command in South Korea, and the dissolution of UNCURK.
On Arms control, it was suggested that a series of steps could be taken if it is determined that
arms limitation proposals would facilitate North-South accommodation. On North Korea's
participation in the UN debate, the preferred option was to seek a postponement of the debate
since the U.S. would not prevail if the issue were put up for a vote by the UN General
Assembly. As for the UNCURK, whether it continued in its present form or was dissolved
was judged by the group to be of no great consequence as it was considered non-essential to
the U.S. military presence in the ROK. Finally, on the issue of UNCURK, the best option was
determined to be for the U.S. to remove it from Korea since preserving its role would be
another losing proposition for the U.S. in the UN General Assembly.
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Table 8. The U.S. Policy Options Toward North Korea in the 1970s
Conditions

Options

ㆍStatus quo of the two Koreas

ㆍ South Korea should lead any accommodation between the two Koreas

ㆍImprovement of relations with the major
powers

ㆍThe U.S. government would retard the
pace of change if North Korea lost interest
in détente, or if China or the Soviet Union
were not prepared to normalize relations
with South Korea

ㆍContinuation of security guarantees to
ensure South Korea’s stability
ㆍContinuation of the deployment of U.S.
troops in South Korea

ㆍThe U.S. government would encourage a
growing accommodation between the two
Koreas
ㆍThe U.S. would step in if China or the
Soviet Union intervened in Korean affairs

4-3-3. Limitation the Rapprochement Approach
Regarding contacts with North Korea, the U.S. government decided to maintain the
policy of refusing all official contacts with Pyongyang in support of South Korea’s position.
Given the growing accommodation between the two Koreas, Washington had to consider
South Korea’s position, which was associated with the issue of cross-approval by China and
the Soviets.
In this sense, what should be noted here is that the U.S. policy toward North Korea
was intertwined with the state of inter-Korean relations and relations with the neighboring
powers. In other words, the bottom line for U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula was the
two-Korea policy that translated into preserving the status quo on the Korean peninsula. The
U.S. government judged that pursuing bilateral relations with North Korea was not in its
interest. In the final analysis, The U.S. policy toward North Korea was of lower priority than
the relations between the major powers and inter-Korean relations, which obviated any need
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for direct dialogue with Pyongyang. The U.S. side faced domestic and international issues
derived from the Vietnam War and preferred to promote ‘Koreanization’ in the form of South
Korea-led inter-Korean relations.
Contrary to its support for a one-China policy, then, the United States opted for a
strategy that maintained the two-Korea policy. This approach entailed a continuing
deployment of U.S. troops in South Korea while promoting relations with China and the
Soviet Union and other powers in the region. It was not on the cards for the U.S. to respond
to North Korea’s demand for direct talks and negotiations with the United States to resolve
pending Korean issues.
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Chapter Ⅴ: The Impact of External Factors on North Korea’s Foreign
Policy
5-1. Case 2-A: The USSR-ROK Normalization
We could not, for obsolete ideological reasons, continue opposing the establishment
of normal relations with his country, which showed an exceptional dynamism and had
become a force to be reckoned with, both in the Asia-Pacific region and in the wider
world (Gorbachev, 1996)
Diplomatic relations were established between Imperial Russia and Chosŏn Korea in
1884. These relations were severed in 1910 after Japan had defeated Imperial Russia and
annexed Chosŏn Korea as its colony. After Japan’s defeat by the U.S. in the Pacific War
theater of WW II, the Soviet Union entered Korean history as the successor regime of
Imperial Russia by joining the United States in dividing and occupying the Korean peninsula
in 1945. ‘Russia-Korea’ diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1948, after separate
governments were formed in the south and the north of the Korean peninsula straddling the
38th parallel. Due to the exigencies of the Cold War, however, the Soviet Union extended
diplomatic recognition exclusively to North Korea.83
Differences in their social systems and ideologies, complicated by their history of
being on the opposing sides during the Korean War fostered deep hostility between South
Korea and the Soviet Union. Still, even during the Cold War, President Park Chung-hee
(1972-1979) and President Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988) made efforts to forge political ties
and promote economic cooperation between the two countries separated by the ideological
standoff between capitalism and communism. A very limited amount of trade through third
countries, with almost no direct contacts, was the only concrete outcome of their efforts.
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Beginning in the early 1960s, both South Korea and North Korea began trolling for
diplomatic partners across the Cold War ideological divide. By the early 1970s, they had
achieved virtual parity in diplomatic recognition within the international community (Gills,
1996, pp. 188-189). Very soon afterwards, however, the pendulum began swinging decisively
in South Korea’s favor due to the complex geopolitics of development and other even more
obscure factors (Gray and Lee, 2021).
Relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union began to change dramatically in
the late 1980s, as they both began to actively woo each other. In short order, over a ten-month
period in 1990-91, their economic and diplomatic relations began to unfold at warp speed.
President Roh Tae Woo and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met for three summit
meetings in less than ten months ‒ San Francisco in June 1990, Moscow in December 1990,
and Cheju Island in April 1991. In the interim, South Korea and the Soviet Union established
diplomatic relations on September 30, 1990. Subsequently, the collapse of the Soviet Union
followed by its emergence as the Russian Federation signaled a turning point, not only in
South Korea-Russia relations but also in the history of the World.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the
Soviet Union was yet another significant factor in the evolution of North Korea’s policy
toward the United States. As the collapse of the Soviet Union had cleared the way, the United
States became the sole superpower in the international system. This meant that the
international environment and its system were changed, and countries had to adapt their
foreign policy accordingly. Countries in the East Bloc began to establish relations with
countries in the West Bloc. They also replaced their socialist economic system with a
capitalist economic system.
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This transformative process was set in motion by the program of economic, political,
and social restructuring ‒ perestroika (“structural reforms”) and glasnost (“openness”) ‒
promulgated by the Soviet Union’s leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986. Gorbachev also
signaled an intention to normalize relations with East Asia countries, both in a speech in
Vladivostok in July 1986 and a speech in Krasnoyarsk in 1988. In these two speeches,
Gorbachev sent a clear message that the Soviet Union was part of the Asia-Pacific region and
shared important interests with its countries.
Subsequently, the Far East became a central focus of the Soviet Union’s foreign
policy. This new policy was focused on two aims: first, to reduce the security threats posed
by the U.S., China, and Japan; and second, to integrate the Soviet Far East into the
international economic relations of the Asia-Pacific region (Ahn, 1991). To achieve these two
aims, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan and Vietnam,
to normalize relations with China and Japan, and to expand its economic ties with countries
in the Asia-Pacific region. The world watched in disbelief ‒ and growing admiration or
dismay depending on individual perspectives ‒ as the Soviet forces withdrew from
Afghanistan, democratic governments overturned communist regimes in Eastern Europe,
Germany underwent its unification process, the Warsaw Pact withered away, and the Cold
War ended abruptly.

5-1-1. Emergence of Diplomatic Relations
The Soviet Union began to realize that South Korea’s economic development
experienced rapid growth by establishing economic, scientific, technological, monetary, and
financial ties with foreign countries (Fedorovsky, 1989). The most compelling reason for the
Soviet Union to consider making South Korea one of its partners was its high regard for
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South Korea’s economic development and latent power for further growth. Furthermore, the
success of the Seoul Olympics (1988), the democratization of South Korean society (1987),
and the Nordpolitik (‘Northern Policy’) enunciated by President Roh Tae-woo in July 1988
influenced the Soviet Union’s favorable impression of South Korea. Geopolitically, the
emergence of the growing internationalization of economic ties in the Asia-Pacific region was
another reason for the Soviet Union (and China) to normalize relations with South Korea and
Japan, respectively (p. 98).
South Korea's Nordpolitik was viewed by Moscow as an opportunity for economic
cooperation with Seoul (Bowers, 1992, p. 24). In his inauguration speech on February 25,
1988, President Roh Tae Woo pledged to pursue an engagement policy toward communist
and socialist countries.84 On July 7, he promulgated "A Special Declaration in the Interest of
National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity" stating that "the world is entering an age of
reconciliation and cooperation transcending ideologies and political systems."85 The
declaration was an indication that the South Korean government was willing to establish
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries.
Simultaneously, Seoul offered to cooperate with North Korea to improve its relations with the
United States and Japan for the sake of the peace and prosperity of the Korean peninsula
(Kim, 1997, p. 642).86
Moscow responded to South Korea’s Northern Policy two months later. Gorbachev
suggested the possibility and desirability of economic cooperation between the USSR and
South Korea. In Gorbachev’s speech at Krasnoyarsk, he stressed that his government was
84
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willing to take a significant step to create a new atmosphere in Northeast Asia. In a similar
vein, President Roh announced that South Korea also was willing to take positive steps to
improve its relations with both the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as well as East European nations. He also suggested that “a consultative
conference for peace” be convened with representatives from the U.S., the USSR, the PRC,
and Japan as well as North and South Korea to explore the construction of a solid foundation
for lasting peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia (Kim, 1997, p. 643). Moscow welcomed
the South Korean government’s proposal as “the creation of a mechanism of consultation,
given the consent of all the interested parties, for discussing this range of problems that could
play a positive role in strengthening a climate of confidence and dialogue in the region”
(Mikheev, 1989, p. 675).
Upon both countries' efforts to improve relations, the Soviet Union declared its
intention to participate in the Seoul Olympics in 1988 as a step toward the development of
sporting, cultural, economic, and official relations with South Korea. The Soviets took care to
separate politics from economics in these efforts to improve relations with South Korea to
avoid antagonizing Pyongyang. In its own thinking, though, Moscow was coming around to
the view that there are two Koreas in the Asia-Pacific region (Mikheev, 1991, p. 32).
After the Soviet Union’s participation in the Seoul Olympics, its direct contacts with
South Korea increased in frequency, and Moscow began to send signals of its interest in
developing a political relationship with Seoul. Meanwhile, following Gorbachev's expression
of interest in developing economic relations with South Korea, the USSR began to permit
visits between South Korean businesspeople and Soviet trade officials.
The most important figure87 to visit Moscow in January 1989 was Chung Ju-young,
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the founder of Hyundai Group, South Korea’s leading business conglomerate (chaebol) at the
time. During his visit to Moscow, Chung and Vladislav Malkevich, chairman of the Soviet
Chamber of Commerce, reached an agreement to establish a USSR-South Korea cooperation
committee. In late 1989, Chung visited the USSR again to follow up on his group’s
commitments to build factories to produce consumer goods, process fishery products, build
hotels in Khabarovsk, and to transform some of the Soviet Union’s military industries into
civilian enterprises (Kim, 1997, p. 644). From the Soviet side, Vladimir Golanov, deputy
chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, visited Seoul and met Lee Sun-ki, president of the
Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA), to discuss the establishment of reciprocal
trade offices in both countries following Chung’s visit to Moscow.
The Hyundai Group was a key player in building economic cooperation between the
Soviet Union and South Korea. The group signed an agreement on logging and wood
processing with Edward F. Grabovskiy, general director of the Forestry Office of the
Maritime Provinces of Siberia. As a result of establishing direct shipping routes and regular
commercial flights, the USSR-South Korea trade rose to $600 million in 1989 and was
projected to reach at least $1 billion in 1990 (p. 644).
This successful economic cooperation disposed the two countries to move toward the
establishment of full diplomatic relations. Both sides agreed to open ‘consular sections’
within their respective semi-official trade offices in Seoul and Moscow. Diplomats were put
in charge of the operation of these semi-official consular offices. In January 1990,
Ambassador Gong Roh-myung, a senior career diplomat who formerly had served as consul
general in New York City and ambassador to Brazil, was assigned to run this new consular
office in Moscow.

relations ‒ most notably Kim Young-sam. See Seung-ho Joo 2000, 95.

１３１

For its part, in August 1990, the Soviet Union sent Loengrim Yefimovich Eremenko,
a 60-year-old diplomat known as a Korea specialist, to man its consular office in Seoul.
Meanwhile, Gorbachev and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo exchanged letters through
presidential envoys and Georgy Kim, an ethnic Korean and deputy director of the Soviet
Institute of Oriental Studies. In their letters, both leaders expressed their willingness to
improve diplomatic relations. From the South Korean side, Kim Yong-sam, the leader of the
ruling Reunification Democratic Party, visited the Soviet Union with an 11-member
delegation in June 1989. The visit was at the invitation of Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the
Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) (Ahn, 1991, p. 820).88
Kim Young-sam met Gorbachev during a second visit to Moscow over the period of March
20-27, 1990, and they reached an agreement to expedite the normalization of bilateral
relations. By then Kim had become co-leader of the newly organized ruling Democratic
Liberal Party (DLP). This meeting with Gorbachev enabled Kim Young-sam to report to
President Roh Tae Woo that the Soviet leader was looking forward to normalizing relations
between the two countries (Anh, 2012, p. 30).

5-1-2. The San Francisco Summit
President Roh was informed by former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz that
Gorbachev would visit the United States for a summit meeting with President George
H. W. Bush in early June of 1990. Gorbachev’s itinerary included a side trip to Palo Alto for a
meeting with Shultz at Stanford University. This involved a brief stopover in San Francisco
following the summit. Roh immediately launched a diplomatic operation to arrange a Roh-
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Gorbachev meeting in San Francisco that was named “Five percent” since initially that
seemed to be the probability of success (Kim, 1997, p. 646).
After learning that the president of South Korea hoped to meet with him in the
United States, however, Gorbachev sent Anatolii Dobrynin ‒ his diplomatic adviser and a
former ambassador to the United States ‒ to Seoul for the Eighth Annual Plenary Meeting of
the Inter-Action Council (IAC). This annual meeting of former world leaders was held in
Seoul from May 23-26. Dobrynin was dispatched in the dual capacity of the Soviet Union’s
representative for the IAC meeting and an emissary to plan for the Roh-Gorbachev meeting
in San Francisco. In a secret meeting with President Roh, Dobrynin conveyed Gorbachev’s
willingness to meet with Roh in San Francisco following his meetings with the leaders in the
Bush administration.
Encouraged by this unexpectedly positive response from Moscow on the proposed
meeting, Roh sent an envoy to Washington to meet with two critical officials in the bush
administration, Brent Scowcroft the National Security Advisor, and Richard Solomon, the
assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific. During his meetings with these
officials, the envoy confirmed that the Bush administration was willing to support South
Korean-Soviet summitry (p. 646).
Following an official announcement by both Seoul and Moscow, the summit was
held in San Francisco at the Hotel Fairmont on June 4, 1990. The summit was a truly historic
event since the Soviet Union became the first major power to grant de facto recognition to
both Koreas (Ahn, 1991, p. 824). It also was the first time that the heads of state of the Soviet
Union and South Korea, which had been ideological and military adversaries since the
division of the Korean peninsula after World War II, had met to speak with one another.89
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Roh said that “The cold-war ice on the Korean peninsula has now begun to crack.”
Gorbachev added that “the meeting signified that progress has already been made along those
lines.”90 This shared perspective indicated that the international environment in Northeast
Asia had begun to change. Roh stressed this point saying, “the waves of reform now
reshaping the world have started rushing toward Northeast Asia as well. I am confident that
the cultivation of Republic of Korea-Soviet Union relations will contribute not only to the
common prosperity of both countries but also to peace in Asia, especially on the Korean
peninsula.”91
Both sides shared a common view on a variety of issues. As a starter, they agreed to
expand exchanges and cooperation in diplomacy, commerce, science and technology, and
culture. They also confirmed their conviction that the construction of a permanent peace on
the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia depended on bringing the long period of hostility
to an end and starting new relations. Roh affirmed that his government did not want to further
isolate North Korea or incite it to take a hostile stance toward neighboring countries. In
response, Gorbachev promised to try and urge North Korea to open up to the outside world
and to establish friendly and cooperative relationships with other members of the
international community. Lastly, both leaders agreed on the need for a new order of
reconciliation and cooperation among the world's nations and made a joint commitment to
help promote the openness and reconciliation needed to enhance regional peace and stability
and to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula (Kim, 1997, p. 648).
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5-1-3. Normalization of USSR-ROK Relations
Following the June summit in San Francisco, a high-ranking delegation of South
Korea government officials led by Kim Chong-in and Kim Chong-hui arrived in Moscow on
August 2. During a brief two-day visit, the delegation met with 13 Soviet officials led by Yuri
Maslyukov, first deputy premier and head of the State Planning Agency (Kim, 1997, p. 649).
In this high-level meeting between the two countries, the South Korean side indicated that the
establishment of diplomatic relations was a precondition for providing economic assistance to
the Soviet Union. The Soviets counter-proposed that economic cooperation was a prerequisite
for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Elaborating on their position, the South Korean
officials explained that their government could not make an offer of economic assistance to
the Soviets without the prior establishment of diplomatic relations since the South Korean
legislature would not approve it. The Soviets realized that they had no alternative agreed to
establish diplomatic relations. As a result, the first-ever, government-to-government
negotiation between South Korea and the USSR reached wide-ranging accords. Besides
agreeing on industrial, scientific, and technological cooperation, the two sides agreed to hold
a second round of official talks in Seoul in October (p. 650).
On September 30, 1990, at the first-ever official foreign ministerial meeting of the
two countries in the United Nations headquarters, South Korea and the Soviet Union finally
normalized diplomatic relations. The normalization of their relations was a watershed event
foreshadowing the impending end of the Cold War precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The foreign ministers of the two countries signed the joint communiqué announcing
the opening of their embassies in Seoul and Moscow. The communiqué further stated that
“the two countries were convinced that the ongoing efforts would contribute to stability and
peace on the Korean peninsula and will push ahead with diplomatic relations on the premise
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that it would never affect relations between each of them and third countries” (Kim, 1997, p.
650).
The South Korean foreign minister Choi Ho-Jung announced in a joint press
conference that both countries had agreed in principle to arrange an exchange of visits by
their heads of state at the earliest opportunity (p. 650). Regarding membership in the United
Nations, the Soviet Union agreed to support the simultaneous admission of both North Korea
and South Korea to membership in the UN.
Subsequently, in December 1990, President Roh Tae Woo visited Moscow for a
summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, marking a first for a South Korean president. Roh
and Gorbachev issued a joint statement known as the Moscow Declaration articulating the
principle that "through consultation between the two nations and concerned parties in the
Asia and Pacific region, peaceful and constructive cooperation should be encouraged" (p.
650). In the following month, both countries signed an economic cooperation agreement in
which South Korea pledged to provide the Soviet Union with $3 billion in loans over three
years, a third of which would be in cash. The remainders of the loan credits were to be used
to purchase South Korean consumer and capital goods. Moscow’s policy shift in in extending
diplomatic recognition to South Korea was designed to consolidate the economic gains of
their unfolding cooperation and to entice Japan and other countries to get on board for a more
active participation in the Soviet Union’s Siberian development efforts (p. 817).
In this connection, Gorbachev floated a proposal for a five-power collective security
system in Asia consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and India. As
the Soviet Union at this point was desperately in need of financial aid, he also proposed “the
formation of a system for multilateral economic cooperation among the countries bordering
Japan, trying to elicit the support of Japanese corporations and businessmen” (Ahn, 1991, p.
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816). In April 1991, during a visit to Japan to meet with corporate leaders and Prime Minister
Toshiki Kaifu, Gorbachev failed to get the needed financial aid commitments. On his way
back to Moscow, however, Gorbachev had a more productive meeting on Cheju Island with
President Roh Tae Woo during a brief stopover in South Korea. During this third summit
meeting in less than ten months, which epitomized the rapid acceleration of their relationship,
Gorbachev and Roh agreed to “negotiate a mutual cooperation treaty and to multiply trade
tenfold over the next five years in an effort to assist the Soviet Union's faltering economy.”92
In this meeting with Roh, Gorbachev also promised to continue to support South
Korea's entry into the United Nations even though North Korea had rejected the proposal for
a joint entry by the North and South as separate nations. Pyongyang adamantly opposed the
Soviet Union’s proposal for membership in the UN as two separate nations because it
believed such a move would perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula (p. 651).
Enjoying the economic benefits of the change in its relations with South Korea, Moscow
essentially was committed to a “Two Korea” policy and had begun to decouple the Korean
issue from its global rivalry with Washington.

5-2. North Korea’s Responses to the Normalization
The Soviet Union's foreign policy changes toward the Korean peninsula had major
implications for its relations with the DPRK. As early as 1991, an economist in the Russian
Academy of Sciences noted that the emerging discontinuities between the social processes in
the USSR and the DPRK could have "irreversible consequences for the entire complex of
relations since the USSR remains the major economic partner of the DPRK” (Mikheev, 1991,
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p. 39). As the USSR's economic reform became ever more radical, it became the political and
administrative catalysts in the weakening of relations between the two countries.
North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for 60 percent of its trade and
foreign credits. In particular, the writer noted, Pyongyang would face an economic crisis if
the supply of Soviet oil and metallurgical and energy equipment were stopped. Previously,
Moscow and Pyongyang maintained a special relationship due to their shared commitment to
the unity of the “socialist goal” that had drawn both countries together since the Korean War.
In the 1990s, however, the new political thinking (perestroika) in the USSR, the emerging
political pluralism, growing Soviet-U.S. interactions, and Soviet-South Korea normalization
were erecting an almost insurmountable wall in Soviet-North Korea relations (Mikheev, 1991,
p. 39).
Furthermore, the economic and political relationships of the two countries faced
additional challenges stemming from the command system of administration and distributive
socialism in North Korea and the outdated perceptions about technology and industrial
assistance programs between the two countries (p. 40). Overcoming these challenges required
changes in the USSR’s relations with North Korea. These changes included: the reduction of
ineffective economic assistance and military cooperation; an orientation toward effectiveness
in economic cooperation; an expansion of educational cooperation to expose North Korean
intellectuals to a new understanding of ways to renovate the DPRK’s administrative system;
and attempts to invite the DPRK leadership to engage in a political dialogue with the USSR
and other interested countries to lessen North Korea’s political isolation (p. 42).

Of course,

from the USSR’s perspective, the fruit of these proposed changes would be impossible to
attain without drastic economic reforms in the DPRK.
For its part, Pyongyang responded to these signals from Moscow with a bitter
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denunciation that was published in the Rodong Sinmum, under the headline, "Diplomatic
relations sold and bought with dollars." Citing past promises from Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze not to recognize South Korea, the article declared that "the Soviet Union sold
off the dignity and honor of a socialist power and the interests and faith of an ally for $ 2.3
billion" (Ahn, 2012, p. 32).
Before the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea was
formalized, the North Korean government actively tried to block Moscow's efforts to improve
relations with South Korea. Recalling his first meeting at the Kremlin with Kim II Sung in
October 1986, Gorbachev noted: "Kim attempted to explain the Korean situation and East
Asia's international relations in anachronistic Leninist terms, claiming that South Korea is a
colony of the American imperialists. Kim tried to persuade me not to move toward the crossrecognition of the Korean Peninsula." When he asked Kim for an explanation of crossrecognition, Gorbachev said he immediately defined it as "the notorious international scheme
initiated by the American imperialists who are attempting to freeze the Korean division." In
more pragmatic terms, Kim also acknowledged that cross-recognition would entail the Soviet
Union and China establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea in exchange for the
United States and Japan doing the same with North Korea.
Gorbachev responded to this pragmatic explanation of cross-recognition by saying:
"Sounds nice. That's reasonable. Then why don't you accept it?" Kim Il Sung was taken aback
that Gorbachev would advise him to consider favorable the idea that the two Koreas would be
treated as separate nations, and as such, be eligible to be admitted separately to the United
Nations. He retorted that such a course of action would perpetuate the Korean national
division, which he characterized as "another international scheme of the western
imperialists." Concluding that Kim was mired in an "incurable, outmoded paradigm of
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dogmatism," Gorbachev advised him to reform his party and state. Summing up the meeting,
Gorbachev recalled that "Kim disappointed me, and I disappointed Kim" (Kim, 1997, p.642).
Once Moscow established diplomatic ties with Seoul, Pyongyang-Moscow relations
were transformed from an alliance based on the ideological and strategic bonds cemented
during the Cold War into being simply the transactional relations of neighboring states (Ahn,
1991, p. 818). On the other hand, North Korea’s reaction to this new geopolitical reality was
becoming negative and emotional to the highest degree. Once the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Moscow and Seoul had been decided, the Kremlin sent his foreign minister
Eduard Shevardnadze to Pyongyang as an envoy to try and assuage Kim Il Sung’s anger and
sense of betrayal. Kim refused to meet with Shevardnadze, a breach of protocol he had never
experienced previously in his foreign service career. Even Kim Yong-nam, who as the
DPRK’s foreign minister was his counterpart, had to break away from his meeting with
Shevardnadze several times. After meeting with Kim Il Sung during one of these breaks, Kim
Yong-nam handed Shevardnadze a written memorandum that contained North Korea’s
decision to readjust its position with the Soviet Union. North Korea’s bottom line on the
changed position of the Soviet Union in the memorandum was summarized by Aleksandr
Kapto, the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang, as follows:
First, Moscow’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea is a serious
violation of the promises given by the Kremlin to North Korea at different times.
Concrete facts were mentioned. Thus, Gorbachev, during the Korean-Soviet talks in
October 1986, said: “We will under no circumstances change our principled position with
regard to South Korea.” Shevardnadze during the talks in December 1986 during his visit
to the DPRK said: “I confirm that there is no intention to establish political, diplomatic
and state relations with South Korea.” Moreover, in order to disperse the doubts of the
North Korean interlocutors, he confirmed the official opinion with a personal argument,
having stated: I give a Communist’s word. And the published communiqué clearly
pointed out that “the Soviet Union has no intention to officially recognize South Korea,
[and] establish political and diplomatic relations with it.”
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Second, as the North Korean minister stated, the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the USSR and South Korea by itself leads to the cancellation of the KoreanSoviet treaty of alliance, which was signed in July 1961. It was directly stated that the
Soviet side systematically violated the Korean-Soviet treaty of alliance.93
The North Korean government concluded that the Soviet Union had violated the third
article of the Treaty. Prior to establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, according to
the treaty, the Soviets should have discussed all the important international problems with
North Korea, including peace, security, and the national interests of both countries.
Addressing this issue in his capacity as the foreign minister of North Korea, Kim Yong-nam
declared that the Soviet Union effectively had cancelled the treaty. Faced with U.S. nuclear
program in South Korea without the support of the Korean-Soviet treaty of alliance, North
Korea declared its determination to develop its own nuclear weapons and to withdraw from
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
In response to this grave development, Pyongyang stated its official position on the
status of its alliance with the Soviet Union as follows:
[T]he Soviet side in September 1988 declared an important change with regard to South
Korea without any consultation with the DPRK ahead of time. Further, fundamental
change of the policy of the Soviet Union towards North Korea – the holding of SovietSouth Korean talks at the highest level in San Francisco – was also not accompanied by
consultations with the DPRK. The conclusion: the Soviet Union does not pay attention to
the Korean-Soviet treaty of alliance, and therefore the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the USSR and South Korea by itself annuls the Treaty of Alliance
between the DPRK and the USSR. …We will have to look for ways to resolve many
questions on our own.94
The North Korean government asserted that the cancellation of the North KoreanSoviet treaty of alliance would intensify the nuclear arms race, sharpen tensions on the
Korean Peninsula to the utmost extent, and result in unexpected consequences for the East
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Asia region. Simultaneously, the North Koreans wanted the Soviets to understand that
severing ties between Pyongyang and Moscow was part of Seoul’s larger strategic intentions
for the Korean peninsula. North Koreans believed that this strategy was aimed at isolating
and weakening the DPRK in political, economic, and military terms in the name of fostering
a “peaceful transition.”
The South Korean government’s intention in developing diplomatic ties with
Moscow clearly was to urge Pyongyang to abandon its socialist regime and open its doors to
the outside world. During the Soviet-South Korean talks at the highest level in San Francisco,
the South Korean President Roh Tae Woo specifically asked the Soviet side for help in
getting North Korea to open its doors.95 From the North Korean perspective, however, the
opening of its doors depended on the United States treating it in the same way as the Soviet
Union had treated South Korea in establishing diplomatic relations.
In the absence of a U.S.-DPRK dialogue and the emergence of the Soviet-South
Korea rapprochement, Pyongyang had to change its foreign policy. Ambassador Aleksandr
Kapto later recalled how Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam stressed this inevitability in his
conversation with Shevardnadze:
[As] Moscow was discarding Korean-Soviet allied relations “like worn-out shoes,”
the DPRK will have to introduce serious corrections in its foreign policy. As
countermeasures, [Kim] cited DPRK’s intention to recognize the independence of
Soviet republics, which were then declaring their “state sovereignty,” and establish
appropriate diplomatic relations with them. The argument was: because you created a
precedent for “recognizing reality” of the split of “two Koreas,” there will not be any
reason to reproach those who “recognize” the “reality” of the split of the USSR.
Under such conditions, he stated, we will have to search out ways so that the Asians
become the masters of Asia and would live independently, having taken the initiative
in their hands. On the basis of this point of view, we will take a new approach to the
coordination of questions that occur in relations with Japan.96
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The rapprochement between the USSR and South Korea, which was a sign of the
rapid change underway in the international environment of the Asia-Pacific region, led North
Korea to be even more determined to find its own way of surviving by making radical
changes in its foreign policy.97

Pyongyang experienced the pangs of betrayal by its major

allied country when the Soviet Union effectively made their treaty of the alliance with North
Korea null and void. Once the shock had passed, however, Pyongyang resolved to seek an
alternative option to guarantee its national security. Initially, they resolved to free themselves
of dependence on military aid from Moscow, and to launch new diplomatic initiatives toward
Japan and the breakaway regions within the Soviet Union to maintain regime legitimacy.

5-3. Case 2-B: The Normalization between China and South Korea
China decided to take the path of reform and openness (改革開放) in a guided way
during the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party held in December 1978 (Lee, 2011, p. 535). By contrast, North Korea was doubling
down on the status quo in this period under the slogan of “all for one and one for all” which
alluded to the empowerment of the supreme leader for the sake of the country’s solidarity. To
reinforce this paradigm of the state, during the 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in
October 1980, Kim Jong-il was appointed a member of the Politburo and officially
designated as his father’s successor. Thus, in an unparalleled development in the annals of
communist states, a hereditary succession structure was established that remains intact today.
97
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The two countries obviously had taken very different paths.
After the death of Mao Zedong and his premier Zhou Eunlai, the leadership in the
CCP changed entirely, and China adopted a market economy (Kim, 1993). Economic
development became the nation's top goal as the new leadership sought to overcome the
economic difficulties caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Simultaneously, in an
only partially successful effort to enforce political reform, the government removed the
ringleaders of the Cultural Revolution and reestablished a collective leadership system.
Overall, these changes were viewed as a great achievement that promoted stability and
national development through drastic economic reforms. Shortly thereafter, China began
expanding its diplomatic relations by appropriately utilizing its counterparts in accordance
with its national interests, whether it was the Soviet Union or the United States, and by
pursuing economic cooperation rather than fostering political conflicts.
By contrast, the rise of Kim Jong-il in the Worker's Party of Korea as Kim Il Sung's
designated heir served to enhance the North Korea’s centrally planned economy.
Simultaneously, Pyongyang strengthened the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and
implemented various policies aimed at buttressing internal solidarity. In October 1980,
Diplomatically, Pyongyang attempted to make good on its intention to improve relations with
Japan while actively engaging in friendly diplomacy with countries in Eastern Europe and
Africa. Meanwhile, inter-Korean relations worsened due to two terrorist incidents attributed
to North Korean agents, the Rangoon bombing incident (1983) and the mid-air explosion of
Korean Air Flight 858 (1987). On the other hand, South Korea achieved remarkable
economic growth during this period and acquired greater stature by successfully hosting the
1988 Seoul Olympics.
In the context of North Korea-China relations, the first sign of a divergence in
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‘survival strategies’ was Beijing’s adoption of Western market economy principles on a
gradual basis beginning in the late 1970s. When the Soviet Union initiated its “restructuring”
(perestroika) reforms in the mid-80s, which also entailed efforts to foster market forces, the
foundation of the region's alliances began to collapse precipitously. As the Soviet Union and
China both began to push policies aimed at reforming and opening up their economies, the
international environment of the Asia-Pacific region changed drastically. Each country began
to establish national development policy goals more compatible with the unfolding post-Cold
war era. Under these circumstances, North Korea was at a crossroads: it could join the Soviet
Union and China, which were undergoing reform and opening, or insist on preserving
“Socialism of Our Style” based on the Juche principle. It chose the latter course.
In the early 1990s, after Germany's unification and the dismantling of the Eastern bloc,
North Korea’s independent path in pursuit of a Korean-style socialist economy increasingly
isolated it the former communist countries that were once its trading partners but now were
switching to a market economy. The biggest motivation for North Korea's decision to follow
its own path was the impact of the normalization of relations with South Korea ‒ first by the
Soviet Union, and then by China ‒ which were perceived by North Korea as a transformative
development in the international environment of the Asia-Pacific region.

5-3-1. Emergence of China-South Korea Diplomatic Relations
South Korea began trying to improve its relations with communist countries as early
as 1971,98 but its efforts took off in earnest in the late 1980s. Relations between China and
South Korea began to come into focus at this time in line with the changing international
situation. The first opportunity for exploring the possibility of relations between the China
98
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and South Korea occurred due to a serendipitous event. On May 5, 1983, a Chinese civil
aircraft in distress made an emergency landing at Camp Page, an airfield used by U.S.
military helicopters in South Korea (Lee, 2019, p. 124). China urgently requested direct
contact with South Korea, and South Korea responded with the assistance of the U.S. and
Japan. As a result, on May 8, three days after the incident, the head of the Chinese Civil
Aviation Administration, Sun Tou, visited Seoul with a delegation and signed a nine-point
diplomatic memorandum with Deputy Foreign Minister Gong Ro-myung. This was the first
time in the history of South Korea’s diplomacy that the official names of the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of Korea were used reciprocally in an official document
(p. 125).
In addition, China actively sought to arrange exchanges between South Korea and
China in nonpolitical areas such as sports, culture, and tourism ahead of the deadline for the
applications to host the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing in late September 1983. Several
exchanges occurred early in the following year: in February, Korean players visited China for
the first time to participate in the Davis Cup tennis tournament; in March, China allowed
Koreans to visit relatives in China; and in April, Chinese basketball teams visited Korea for
the first time.
Another incident that facilitated discussions about diplomatic relations between
South Korea and China was the Chinese torpedo boat incident that took place on March 22,
1985. The boat belonging to China's North Sea Fleet had departed from Qingdao on March
21 and was found drifting in the Yellow Sea the following morning by a South Korean fishing
vessel. The boat had developed engine trouble after an apparent mutiny by crew members
who wished to defect, according to South Korean reports.
The South Korean vessel towed the high-speed torpedo boat to a South Korean island
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located off the coast of South Jeolla Province, around 120 miles southwest of Seoul. An
official from the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency visited the Korean
Consulate General in Hong Kong and asked the South Korean government to repatriate the
torpedo boat. In the interim, however, three Chinese Navy ships had entered South Korean
waters illegally on March 23 in search of the torpedo boat and were embroiled in a standoff
with the South Korean Navy that included "warning demonstrations of force" by South
Korean warplanes as well as ships. China apparently assumed that it could not expect South
Korea's cooperation in recovering its torpedo boat and surviving personnel in the absence of
diplomatic relations (Lee, 2019, p. 126).
After consulting with both the U.S. and Japanese embassies in Seoul, the South
Korean government delivered its demand to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that the Chinese
naval vessels withdraw from South Korea’s territorial waters. The Chinese government
complied and withdrew its warships only three hours after they had entered South Korea’s
territorial waters. Following negotiations between China and South Korea, the surviving crew
members were repatriated to China along with the torpedo boat. As a final touch, a strong
protest note addressed to the Chinese foreign minister was delivered to the Xinhua News
Agency via the South Korean Consulate General in Hong Kong. The note demanded an
apology and a reprimand of those responsible for similar intrusions into Korean territorial
waters. In turn, China's Foreign Ministry admitted that three of its naval vessels had violated
South Korean territorial waters due to carelessness during the search for the missing torpedo
boat. On March 26, the Chinese government delivered a memorandum to the South Korean
government through the South Korean Consulate General in Hong Kong, officially
apologizing for the intrusion of its warships into South Korean territorial waters (p. 127).
In this atmosphere of growing détente, the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988
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Seoul Olympics were held without mishaps (Chong, 2012, p. 277). During an interview with
foreign guests between May and September 1988, Deng Xiaoping said, "China has no bad
intent in developing relations with South Korea" (Yoo, 2005, p. 157). As China was planning
to host the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing, Deng thought it was important to learn more about
South Korea's successful experiences in managing international competitions.
After the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea also began arranging sports exchanges
with countries that had been part of the socialist bloc even before it had established
diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in September 1990. The Roh Tae-woo administration’s
Nordpolitik adopted in July 1988 was the first foreign policy initiative of the South Korean
government that systematically facilitated better relations with Russia, China and Eastern
European socialist countries while simultaneously seeking to transform inter-Korean relations
(Cheon, 2004). China also was trying at this time to improve its relations with South Korea,
but its legacy relations with North Korea going back to the Korean War continued to impose
constraints. From the Roh Tae-woo administration’s perspective, developing diplomatic ties
with China was an integral component of its Northern Policy. Meanwhile, China also was
seeking to overcome the obstacles it faced in developing diplomatic relations with South
Korea. Above all, as China’s international isolation had deepened after the Tiananmen Square
incident in 1989, breaking out of the strictures of diplomatic isolation became a high priority
as China focused on its plans to host the 1990 Summer Asian Games in Beijing. But the
North Korean ‘factor’ remained a major obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between South Korea and China.
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5-3-2. Steps Toward the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

Discussions on the establishment of a trade mission to promote economic ties
between China and South Korea began in January 1989 and concluded in late November
1990. Seoul officially opened its Beijing Trade Representative Office on January 27, 1991,
and Beijing established the Seoul Representative Office of the China International Merchants
Association on April 9. Although these offices took the form of commercial rather than
diplomatic representation, in effect, they served as embassies. At the time, an indirect
approach to diplomatic relations was the only feasible option since China permitted
international-oriented contacts only because it wanted to join APEC (Lee, 2019, p. 131).
After an initial unofficial meeting of their foreign ministers during a subcommittee
meeting of the U.N. Security Council on October 2, 1991, the two sides recognized the need
for diplomatic ties to facilitate negotiations on a trade agreement. South Korea extended an
invitation to Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Chi-Chen's to attend the upcoming APEC
meeting, which was scheduled to be held in Seoul on October 12, 1991. Chen accepted the
invitation and paid a courtesy call on President Roh Tae-woo during a separate meeting at the
Blue House. In their meeting, President Roh Tae-woo informed Chen of South Korea’s
interest in establishing diplomatic relations with China (Kim, 2013, pp. 68-69). During a
meeting two days later with his South Korean counterpart, Lee Sang-ok, Chen made it clear
that China still faced obstacles to the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea,
but he confirmed that this was a goal he hoped could be realized as soon as possible.
At that time, the principle governing policy toward South Korea in the Chinese
Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Trade Ministry was as follows: ‘Make enemies friends’ (化
敵爲友). In applying this principle, exchanges were to begin with the private sector, and only
later involve the government. No matter how much work was done, there should be little ‒ or,
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better yet, ‒ no talk at all about it. The efforts were to proceed on a step-by-step basis and be
revealed only little-by-little as the goal was being reached. The Chinese negotiators were
keenly aware that they needed to keep an eye on North Korea's attitude and assess its
reactions to the development of relations between South Korea and China (Lee, 2019, p. 131).

5-3-3 Impact of the Conclusion of the North-South Basic Agreements
China’s concern about North Korea’s attitude was alleviated somewhat by the most
significant breakthrough in inter-Korean relations since the Korean War (Park & Yoon, 2018,
p.12). The breakthrough entailed the conclusion of two treaties between North Korea and
South Korea that are referred to informally as the ‘Basic Agreements’. The first is the
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, which was
signed by the leaders of the two Koreas on December 13, 1991. The second is the Joint
Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
which was signed on January 20, 1992.

Both agreements came into force on February 19,

1992.
The breakthrough was announced officially on March 20, 1993, in a letter to the
secretary-general of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament co-signed by the permanent
representatives of North Korea and South Korea. The letter requested that “both texts [be]
issued as one official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all
delegations, including those of the member States and States with observer status.”99
Typically, the conclusion of these agreements was met with skepticism among
foreign policy experts, especially in the United States, who by that time were already laser99
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focused on what they assumed to be Pyongyang's clandestine nuclear weapons program. This
assessment was clearly articulated in a front-page article in the New York Times on December
13, 1991, by David Sanger. He summarized the positive aspects of the agreement including
the renunciation of the use armed force against each other, the reestablishment of regular
communication between the two countries ‒ including telephone lines, mail, some economic
exchanges ‒ and the reunion of families separated since the Korean War. He also noted that
the agreement committed the countries to rebuilding railway and road links across the
Demilitarized Zone, which underscored why both sides described the accord as the first step
toward the inevitable reunification of the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, he
emphasized that agreement failed “to deal with some of the most potentially dangerous issues
dividing North and South, including Pyongyang's race to develop an arsenal of nuclear
weapons.”100

5-3-4 Normalization of China-South Korea Relations
Whether coincidental or not, the first indications of an unofficial date for the
establishment of diplomatic relations came from China on December 31, 1991. The
motivation for improving relations with Seoul grew even stronger after Deng Xiaoping’s
‘southern tour’ (南巡講話) in early 1992. The purpose of the tour was to ensure the future of
the economic reforms Deng had fought for during the 11th Central Committee meeting of the
Chinese Communist Party in December 1978 (Lee, 2019, p. 122). When asked about the date
100
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for the establishment of diplomatic relations during talks with the Yugoslav ambassador to
China, the Chinese vice foreign minister said, "I'd like to have a diplomatic relationship by
the end of the year (1992) ...I am concerned about how to persuade North Korea" (p. 132).
After confirming China's willingness to establish diplomatic ties, South Korea officially
conveyed its consent and formed a task force on April 24, 1992. In line with the Blue House's
policy, Kim Chong-hwi, senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security,
was appointed the chief delegate and Kwon Byung-hyun, ambassador to China, was
designated as his deputy.101
The first round of preliminary talks was held in Beijing from May 14 to 15. The
agenda included South Korea’s severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the transfer of
Taiwan’s diplomatic property in South Korea including the embassy building, a community
association building, and the Chinese school building to China, and a disavowal of diplomatic
relations with Taiwan in the future.102 China's interest was to maintain the ‘One China’
principle, and in this regard, it was important to confirm South Korea's position on the
‘Taiwan issue’. China considered the first round of preliminary talks a kind of mutual
meeting, but the diplomatic negotiations gained momentum as South Korea agreed to
maintain the One China principle. Relations with Taiwan became problematic subsequently
as South Korea remained committed to this principle (Kim, 2013, p. 186).
The second round of preliminary talks was held on June 2-3 at Diaoyutai No. 11 in
Beijing. The Korean delegation for this round replaced the previous negotiating team. The
two governments were determined to achieve their objective and their respective teams
shared a consensus on major issues. This made it possible to iron out their differences. For
example, South Korea proposed the language in the U.N. Charter (respect for sovereignty,
101
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non-aggression of territory, equality of reciprocity) as the principle guiding their diplomatic
relations, and China countered with a request that principle be based instead on the "five
principles of peaceful coexistence" formulation of its government (Lee, 2019, p. 135). South
Korea agreed to accept China’s proposal because there was no reason to oppose peaceful
coexistence.
At South Korea's request, the third round of preliminary talks was held at the Walker
Hill Hotel’s VIP mansion in Seoul from June 21-22. After this meeting, the chief negotiators
for both sides agreed to sign a joint statement and a memorandum of understanding in Beijing
in mid-July, followed by a formal signing before the ASEAN expanded foreign ministers'
meeting in late July. China later proposed that talks be held in late July in Beijing in which
the heads of state of the two countries would make their own announcements within ten days
of the official signing. This reflected China's political judgment that having the signature of
its foreign minister, rather than the head of state, on the joint statement could somewhat ease
North Korea's opposition.
Subsequently, on July 29, a South Korean delegation held talks with Xu Dunxin,
China’s vice foreign minister, in Diaoyutai No. 12 and decided to announce August 24 as the
date for the signing of the formal agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The
day before the signing of this agreement, the foreign ministers of both countries held a
meeting in Beijing to discuss inter-Korean relations, the North Korean nuclear issue,
President Roh Tae-woo's visit to China, the signing of a government-affiliated agreement, and
the establishment of an embassy and consulate general.103 At 9 a.m. on August 24 (10 a.m.
Korean time), the two countries declared the normalization of diplomatic relations and the
news was relayed live to the world.
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5-4. North Korea’s Response to the Normalization
Through its normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea, China
effectively began the process of recognizing the existence of two governments on the Korean
peninsula. In beginning this process, China was able to enhance its influence in the region. It
was important to China’s strategic interests to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula and to
build a peaceful environment in Northeast Asia.104 On the other hand, the North Korean
government was trying mightily to stop China’s efforts to improve relations with South Korea.
Kim Il Sung visited Shenyang, China prior to the opening of the trade offices and the Beijing
Asian Games in the fall of 1990. In a meeting there with General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Kim
voiced his concern that "South Korea-China relations are going too fast." The North Korean
embassy in Beijing must have updated Pyongyang on the ongoing development of diplomatic
relations between China and South Korea. North Korea's stance was to try and retard the
development of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China. Kim Il Sung addressed
this issue when Yang Sang-kun, China’s Prime Minister, visited Pyongyang to celebrate
Kim’s 80th birthday. Kim Il Sung told him: "I hope that the improvement of South KoreaChina relations will come after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the
normalization of our diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan" (Lee, 2019, p.
141).
China officially notified North Korea on July 15, 1992, of its intention to establish
diplomatic relations with South Korea (Kim, 2013, p. 189). After arriving in Pyongyang and
meeting with Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam, Chen Chi-chun and his delegation boarded a
helicopter for a 40-minute flight to meet Kim Il Sung at his villa. Chen Chi-chun delivered a
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message from Jiang Zemin to Kim Il Sung that read: "The period of diplomatic relations
between South Korea and China has matured. We ask for North Korea's understanding and
support." Kim Il Sung responded with visible disappointment and ended the meeting with the
Chinese delegation by saying: "If your government has made up its mind to do so, we will
overcome any difficulties it causes us." However, later, Kim Il Sung said: "Since China has
already established diplomatic ties with our enemy, South Korea, we should also establish
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China's enemy" (Lee, 2019, p. 142). As a further slight,
North Korea voted for Sydney in the1993 competition between China and Australia to host
the 2000 Summer Olympics. China failed to win its bid to host the Olympics. The Chinese
government, which had made an all-out effort to host the Olympics, lost the bid by two votes
North Korea’s vote was one of them.
Furthermore, just before China established diplomatic relations with South Korea,
North Korea published a lengthy editorial entitled: "Let us continue to shine the dignity and
honor of the people with a strong self-reliance spirit."105 Then, a day after the establishment
of relations was announced, a column appeared in Rodong Shinmun emphasizing that "We
must faithfully implement the inter-Korean basic agreements to improve our relationship with
the United States.”106 Although North Korea did not officially criticize China at the time for
establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, a change in the perception of China
slowly began to emerge from that point. The distinctive features of North Korea's stance
toward China reveal differences between the revolutionary generation, who fought for the
socialist revolution, and the generation that led the reform and opening up for economic
development. Criticism of China in North Korea has been spearheaded by the latter as shown
in the following:
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Opportunists and betrayers of socialism disparaged the working-class leaders,
blasphemed the sacred revolutionary struggle and outstanding achievements of the
generation of revolutionaries, demolished socialism, and returned to capitalism. This is
the vilest counter-revolutionary crime of betraying the revolution by submitting to
imperialist pressure and the most immoral act of betraying even rudimentary human
morality.107
North Korea cast these aspersions on the younger leaders in China who supported the
reform and opening measures as their efforts were perceived to be undermining the struggles
and achievements of China's senior leaders who had led the socialist revolution. The vitriol
also reflected North Korea's heightened threat perception of the U.S. due to the loss of both
of its former patrons ‒ first the Soviet Union and now China ‒ just as the Cold War was
coming to an end. In terms of the timing, Pyongyang considered China’s establishment of
diplomatic relations with South Korea just as the U.S. was becoming the world’s sole
superpower as a particularly egregious act of betrayal.
Moreover, following its establishment of diplomatic ties with South Korea, China
began to demand that its trade with North Korea be conducted in accordance with the rules of
a capitalist market economy. This demand by China to handle its trade relations with North
Korea differently than previously was viewed by North Korea as "an act of submission to the
imperialists" It was roundly denounced as follows:

After rising to power, they cried out ‘reform’ and ‘reorganize’, rejecting socialism
entirely and introducing a capitalist political-style economic system. By transplanting the
bourgeois multi-party system, the communist party became a general party, and Westernstyle elections were introduced, paving the way for reactionaries to publicly oppose
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socialist policies. It introduced a market economy and destroyed the unified economic
management system of the country. They flattered the imperialists while talking about ‘a
new way of thinking’.108
Initially, North Korea had not expressed its dissatisfaction with Deng Xiaoping's
reform and opening policy. After the establishment of South Korea-China diplomatic
relations, however, it criticized China openly for adopting a market economy system.
Although both countries legally maintained their alliance ties, the reality of the situation
made it clear that China was no longer an ally of North Korea since it was pursuing a reform
and opening policy and had established diplomatic ties with South Korea (Albright, 2003).
This reality was reflected in the following commentary carried in the Rodong Sinmun:

They are living a prodigal life using the dollars they acquired from their petty betrayal
with the propaganda banner of the superiority of capitalism at the forefront. In the end,
the country is ruined, and the people fall under the rule and control of the imperialists as
victims of the dollar. Truly, it is not coincidental that the countries where capitalism has
returned today are referred to as ‘empires sold to the dollar’. Complying with the
imperialists' unscrupulous demands, the socialist traitors introduced the capitalist
economic system to the full by advocating the ‘diversification of property’ and the
‘superiority’ of a market economy. Thus, the socialist planned economy based on a
powerful centralized system was inevitably destroyed, and the market economy took
over the whole country, creating anarchy, and the economy fell into stagnation and
chaos.109
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A series of changes, including China's reform and opening, its diplomatic ties with
South Korea, and the leadership changes in both countries, made it impossible to maintain the
relationship of dependence between North Korea and China that had prevailed during the
Cold War. As a result, North Korea was faced with a crisis in its regime due to its isolation
from the international community and internal economic difficulties.
To curb the asymmetric military threats from the U.S. and South Korea in the face of
this crisis, North Korea began developing a nuclear program. The international community
perceived China as an actor with the capacity to change North Korea's behavior. This was a
misperception, however, due to Pyongyang's distrust of China and its capacity to guarantee
the survival of its regime. North Korea's distrust of China was due to the conflicts between
the interests of North Korea and China that emerged initially during the U.S.-China détente
period and later were further acerbated by the establishment of diplomatic relations between
China and South Korea. Given its distrust in China, North Korea came to the realization that
it needed to engage in direct talks with the United States. It decided to utilize its nuclear
program as a bargaining chip in this diplomatic ploy.

5-5. Result of the Normalizations and Foreign Policy Variations
The normalization of the Soviet Union’s relations with South Korea changed North
Korea's perceptions of Moscow. The North Korean government's disappointment with the
Soviets was expressed publicly in the country's leading newspaper. Headlines read:
"Diplomatic relations sold and bought with dollars," and "The Soviet Union sold off the
dignity and honor of a socialist power and the interests and faith of an ally for $2.3 billion"
(Ahn, 2012, p. 32). North Korea’s perceptions of the Soviet Union reflecting disappointment
and a sense of betrayal stemmed from the emergence of the issue of cross-recognition of the
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two Koreas and the implications of this issue for the permanent division of the Korean
Peninsula.
To forestall this outcome, Kim Il Sung put all his efforts into blocking the Soviets'
intention of improving relations with South Korea. This was the focus of his conversation
with Gorbachev in October 1986. From Gorbachev’s point of view, Kim was stuck in the
same outmoded ideological rut from which he was desperately trying to free the Soviet Union.
For Kim, however, it was more a matter of ‘nationalist realism’ than of socialist idealism. In
the end, Gorbachev’s assessment that the conversation results in mutual disappointment but
for a different reason than he had imagine. Gorbachev did not have the experience to
empathize with Kim Il Sung’s conviction seemingly rational proposal like ‘joint recognition’
could be viewed as a "notorious international scheme initiated by the American imperialists
who are attempting to freeze the Korean division" (Kim, 1997, p. 642).
The North Korean government realigned its stance toward Moscow after it
recognized Seoul. In his meeting with the Kremlin’s envoy Eduard Shevardnadze, the DPRK
Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam handed over a memorandum written by Kim Il Sung
explaining North Korea’s decision to realign its position. Specifically, the memorandum
emphasized that Moscow’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea was a
severe violation of the promises the Kremlin had made to North Korea at various times, and
the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea by itself is tantamount to the
cancelation of the Korea-Soviet treaty of alliance signed in July 1961. In short, it directly
accused the Soviet Union of fundamentally violating the Korea-Soviet treaty of alliance.110
Pyongyang outlined "serious corrections in its foreign policy" in response, including
an intention to recognize the independence of the former Soviet republics. At the time, the
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Soviet republics were declaring their state sovereignty in opposition to Moscow's ‘new
thinking policy’ and Pyongyang was determined to make common cause with them as a
punitive measure directed at Moscow. Relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union
deteriorated even further after the aborted coup occurred in the Soviet Union in August 1991.
North Korea had supported the conservative, hardliners who had mounted the coup (Kim,
2004, p. 89).
North Korea also announced its intention to take a new approach in its relations with
Japan. Specifically, Pyongyang declared that it would develop its relations with Japan
separately from its allied relations with the USSR and support Japan's demands for the return
of the ‘northern territories’.111
These became empty threats, however, when Boris Yeltsin was inaugurated as
president of Russia in December 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During his first
visit to South Korea in November 1992, President Yeltsin announced that he was prepared to
reconsider the military alliance treaty signed by the Soviet Union with North Korea. He also
confirmed confidentially that Moscow had already suspended the supply of offensive
weapons to Pyongyang (Kim, 2004, p. 90).
Eventually, Yeltsin went even further by declaring outright that the alliance treaty
with North Korea existed only on paper. Mikhail Poltoranin, Yeltsin’s aide, also spoke out
against Japan's proposed payment of compensation to North Korea to settle claims stemming
from its colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula. Citing North Korea’s undemocratic
style of governance, he said the payment would serve only to extend the life of its tyrannical
regime. On the nuclear issue, Russia also supported the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula and inter-Korean inspections while affirming that it would stop providing nuclear
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materials and technology to North Korea (Yang, 2001, p. 294). Furthermore, after introducing
democracy and transitioning to a market economy system, Russia started demanding payment
in hard currencies in its trade deals with North Korea. As a result, the bilateral trade volume
plunged, and Russian lending to North Korea also was virtually suspended these new
financial conditions caused the economy of North Korea to shrink. As examples of the impact
of these changes, Russia's supply of oil to North Korea fell by more than 90% compared to
the period prior to 1991, and its overall trade volume dropped by more than 80% compared to
the previous year (Yoo, 2003, p. 22).
Still, the most significant change in bilateral relations during this period was the
dismantlement of the North Korea-Russia military alliance treaty.

As provided by Article 6

that regulated the expiration of the treaty, until 1991, North Korea and Russia had renewed it
every ten years. In 1991, however, the treaty was automatically extended for five years since
there was no specific action taken by the parties. Recognizing that maintaining a military
alliance with North Korea was an obstacle to the development of its relations with South
Korea, in January 1992, Russia made an offer to North Korea to revise the alliance treaty.
Pointing out that the current treaty was legally valid until September 1996, however, North
Korea rejected this offer. As a result, in September 1995, Russia notified North Korea of its
intention to nullify the treaty. This notification followed the provision in Article 6 of the
treaty requiring a year’s prior notice in case of cancellation. Accordingly, the military alliance
between North Korea and Russia ended in September 1996.
The normalization of China and South Korea was another factor that changed North
Korea's perceptions of its allies and foreign policy. The bilateral relations between
Pyongyang and Beijing transitioned from the previous allied status to normal state relations
after China normalized its relations with South Korea. (Lee, 2011, p.126). As mentioned
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above, from the perspective of the North Korean government, the normalization of ChinaSouth Korea relations thwarted North Korea's consistent opposition to the proposal for crossrecognition. North Korea felt at odds with China because of this policy divergence, and even
labeled China’s position on it ‘a modern revisionist anti-socialist tactic’. While North KoreaChina relations no longer had the character of an alliance, gradually they seemed to be
recovering to a certain extent. Still, the alliance between the two countries had degenerated
after the South Korea-China normalization.
Amid the cooling of political and diplomatic relations between North Korea and
China, economic relations also changed from an ideological-oriented to a reciprocal
cooperation basis (Kim, 2004, p. 96). After 1992, China began to shift its trade with North
Korea from the barter system to the cash payment system (Lee & Kim, 2005, p. 417). This
change was another major factor that drove the North Korean economy into a corner.
In late April 1994, North Korea took the additional step of demanding the withdrawal
of the Chinese delegation from the Panmunjom Military Armistice Commission and
unilaterally establishing the "North Korean People's Army Panmunjom Representative." In
the end, the Chinese government accepted North Korea's demand while making its position
clear that the armistice agreement was still valid until a new peace regime was established in
the Asia-Pacific region. This was an example of North Korea’s determination to defend its
regime in accordance with Kim Il Sung’s exhortation: "Let us continue to shine the dignity
and honor of the people with a strong spirit of self-reliance."
The confrontation situation applies in the case of the normalization of relations
between China and South Korea. This contrasts with the case of the China-U.S. détente,
which was discussed in Chapter 3. North Korea’s (actor) prior affects toward the Soviet
Union and China (sources) shifted from positive to negative, as shown in Figure 1. Entities
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salient to the actor have also shifted from one to two and affected the actor's well-being. The
relative capabilities remain unchanged, but a difference in prior affect leads to a different
outcome. Pyongyang had to decide to confront external constraints, including its old allies,
and deal directly with the United States to address its issues. Consequently, North Korea's
expected behavioral attributes involved exclusive use of diplomatic instruments (military), a
minimal level of commitment, a high negative affect, and an effort addressed to the subject.
1. Prior Affect with Source and Subject?

Positive/Positive Positive/Mixed Mixed/Mixed Mixed/Negative Negative/Negative

2. Are Entities Salient to the Actor?
Both

One

Neither

3. Are Actor’s Relative Capabilities Greater?
Both

One

Neither

4. Likely Behavior Attributes
⚫
⚫
⚫
⚫

High Negative Affect
Minimal Commitment
Diplomatic Instrument
Subject was Recipient

Figure 4. The Branch of the confrontation decision tree when North Korea confronted
China and the Soviet Union’s normalization with South Korea.
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Chapter Ⅵ: North Korea’s Policy Toward the United States:
Confrontational Approach, 1991-1994

6-1. Motivations of the Confrontational Approach

6-1-1. External Environments
The motivations for North Korea's confrontational approach to the U.S. were rooted
in the external environment. The establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea by
the Soviet Union and China in October1990 and August 1992, respectively, constituted a
momentous change in the international environment that made North Korea re-think its
approach to the United States. The adoption of a capitalist market economy by these two
longstanding allies served as an additional motivation.
While China remained nominally communist, unlike the Soviet Union, North Korea
perceived its program of economic reforms as portending its eventual transformation into a
post-communist country. The sense of inevitability of this transformational process within the
Eastern Bloc was further reinforced as communist countries such as Hungary, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and Poland dissolved their communist parties and introduced
governance by multiparty systems (Jung, 1997, p. 213). Following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991, the
socialist bloc that had been one of the pillars of world order after World War II completely
collapsed in late 1992 (p. 213).
Faced with these circumstances, North Korea suddenly was in the position of having
to solve its security and economic problems entirely on its own. Instead of relying on the
military and economic support of the Soviet Union and China as a backup, which it had done
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during the Cold War, North Korea now was compelled to chart its own independent course
without the assurance of support from major allies.
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a shift in the world order from a bipolar to
a unipolar system centered on the United States (Waltz, 1993). In a flush of enthusiasm
stemming from its new status, the United States focused on strengthening all its important
national capabilities, including its military, economy, and democratic ideology. This further
accelerated the restructuring of the world order by the United States that had begun already
after the successful conclusion of the First Gulf War in January 1991. The United States
emerged from its first full-scale post-Cold War international crisis as the world's leader and
premier military power (Nye, 1992, p. 88). Moreover, in an increasingly unipolar world order
centered on the United States, the spread of the liberal democratic ideology's conception of a
market economy also was accelerated. Similarly, the United Nations and other international
organizations were given an enhanced role as international regimes were created around a
comprehensive concept of pursuing security by integrating politics, diplomacy, and economy
(Christopher, 1995, p. 14).
North Korea perceived these international changes as merely a temporary aberration
at odds with the fundamental trends of historical development. As was mentioned above,
North Korea attributed the rapid political changes in Eastern European countries to
ideological and cultural infiltration as well as economic pressure by U.S. imperialists. Kim Il
Sung made this point in his New Year's address in 1989:
It is a counter-historical, anti-people maneuver and a foolish delusion that imperialists
are trying to block the development of socialism and set it back on the path of
capitalism. …Despite these imperialist maneuvers, socialism is deeply rooted in the
world's people today, and will eventually prevail on a global scale.112
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This assessment indicated a belief that the changes in the communist countries in the Eastern
Bloc were a temporary phenomenon. North Korea also pointed to the political changes in the
Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European countries as responsible for the imperialists'
military aggression, intensifying ideological and cultural penetration, economic subversion,
and promotion of divisiveness among socialist states.113
In his May 24, 1990, speech during the 1st session of the 9th Supreme People's
Assembly, Kim Il Sung described the changes underway in the Eastern Bloc as follows:
While adhering to power politics, the imperialists are now resorting to what they call
the “peaceful transition” strategy to undermine socialism. They are attempting to turn
the socialist countries back to capitalism by paralyzing the people’s revolutionary
consciousness through ideological and cultural infiltration, bribing them economically
with “aid” as a bait and brewing socio-political disturbances by instigating antisocialist elements.114
He also pointed out that the changes were rooted in internal problems arising from external
factors driving the transition of political systems and economic reforms in communist
countries.
In Kim Il Sung’s view, then, the development of socialism in the Eastern Bloc was
dependent on the people being armed with socialist ideology, but the people were misled into
giving up their role as the owners of socialism. In addition, socialist countries failed to
consistently abide by the fundamental principles of socialism and accepted the capitalist
market economy. This infidelity to socialism ended up destroying the unity of the people and
causing social disorder. Therefore, the serial collapse of the Eastern Bloc countries was the
consequence of a weakening of the ideological solidarity and spirit of cooperation among
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socialist countries.115
Developments in South Korea and Japan were additional geopolitical factors
compelling North Korea to change its policy toward the United States. As was noted
previously, South Korea’s Northern Policy in 1988 was a milestone in its efforts to improve
relations with Eastern Bloc countries. From both economic and diplomatic perspectives,
South Korea by this date far surpassed what North Korea had to offer and its competitive
advantage was enhanced by its relations with its allies, especially Japan and the United States.
Japan also was becoming a superpower on its own with an economy that could be converted
into military power, including the development of nuclear weapons (Waltz, 1993, p. 55). It
had expanded its economic influence in the Asia-Pacific region by implementing Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) policies, which were
designed “to integrate the region under Japanese leadership” (p. 58). The notion of Japanese
economic development as the East Asian model manipulated capital, technology, and trade in
the region.
In sum, all these external environmental changes, beginning with the abandonment of
North Korea by the Soviet Union and China, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and the
emergence of a unipolar geopolitical system centered on the United States and its allies, put
North Korea in a vulnerable position.

6-1-2. Internal Concerns
After having these experiences of abandonment by its allies and the potential threats
posed by the United States-Japan-South Korea alliance in a unipolar system, North Korea
developed a ‘siege mentality’ which consisted of a negative emotional valence, fear of an
115
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adversary's threat, and distrust of the international community. This siege mentality became
deeply associated with the development of North Korea’s nuclear program as a deterrent
against external threats and to draw the U.S.’s attention to the problem.
While it is commonly assumed that North Korea’s nuclear program had an offensive,
rather than a defensive, purpose from its inception, it is intriguing to note Kim Il Sung’s
fulsome endorsement of the “anti-nuclear peace movement” in the May 24, 1990 address
cited above:
The Government of the Republic will work hard to frustrate the imperialist policy of
aggression and war to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone
[emphasis added] and will give strong support and encouragement to the anti-war,
anti-nuclear peace movement of the people in many lands.116

It seems these were not just empty words since the commitment to the goal of making the
Korean peninsula a NFZ was formalized two years later in the Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that was signed by both Koreas and submitted
to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament on March 25, 1992.
The fear of external threats leads countries to seek risk-acceptance policies ‒ either
offensive or defensive ‒ to make up for losses in their situation. When a country cannot fight
against external threats on its own, it distrusts itself and always feels exposed to threats from
other countries. Countries with a sense of siege mentality build independent defense
capabilities that do not rely on outside support and strive to develop nuclear weapons despite
international opposition and sanctions (Lee, 2017, p.179).
The siege mentality is also a belief system of members of groups within a society
who believe that the outside world has a negative intent to act against them. It is defined as
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"the perception of group members who believe that external groups have the intention to do
bad things or do harm to their group" (Boo, 2017, p. 93). The proponents of this view stress
that the siege mentality should be considered a key belief system involving the conviction
that "no-one will help us in time of need" (Bar-Tal & Dikla, 1992, p. 49). To overcome the
siege mentality, a country must promote the solidarity of its people and the strengthening of
its military power.
Indeed, Kim Dong-soo, a former North Korean diplomat who served in Italy from
1989 to 1992 has claimed that 20% of North Korean elites were completely disarmed
ideologically after the former Soviet Union collapsed in the late 1980s and the Republic of
Korea established diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union. They thought that
"We [North Korean socialism] are over."117 At that time, Kim Jong-Il reportedly sent
handwritten letters to the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Korean People's Army, the Ministry of
National Security, the Ministry of People's Security, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
letters made the stakes clear: "If this system collapses like the former Soviet Union and the
Eastern European bloc, you will be the first to climb the people's gallows and be decapitated.
You must be prepared to avert this outcome and guard against it with your guns. There's
political power at the end of a gun."118
According to Kim Dong-soo, however, the feelings of the country's diplomats at the
time favored unification, and the most persistent question among the disaffected elites was:
"Why can't we have free presidential elections? When will that day come? Why can’t we hold
elections in a free and democratic way like the United States and South Korea?" Whenever he
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went abroad, his family told him not to return to North Korea. Kim also pointed out that
North Korea’s conventional forces such as tanks and airplanes could not conduct routine
training exercises due to fuel shortages and other economic difficulties. There also were
incidents in which military officials stole oil for fighter jets and filled oil reservoirs with
water to cover up the theft. Diplomats were concerned that fighter jets could not be
dispatched in case of an emergency and that North Korea would surely lose if war broke out.
North Korea's single overriding concern was the economic crisis in the mid- to late1990s. As was noted, the end of the socialist market system following the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the decoupling of socialist economic ties with China brought about both an
ideological and an economic crisis. Traditionally, North Korea touted its emphasis on
promoting a self-reliant economy. Within the parameters of its understanding of self-reliance,
however, North Korea had managed to maintain its level of economic growth only because it
had access to the resources and technology needed for economic development through its
trade relations within the socialist bloc. After the collapse of the socialist bloc and the
transition of its member countries to a market economy, however, North Korea’s traditional
trade relations were brought to a sudden halt. North Korea's economic system suddenly faced
grave difficulties.
The failure of North Korea’s agriculture system and unprecedented flooding in the
early 1990s deepened the economic crisis. Precise estimates of the number of people who
died in the 1990s due to starvation are unavailable, but sophisticated attempts to estimate
excess deaths suggest a range from around 600,000 to one million or approximately 3-5% of
the population (Gray and Lee, 2021, p. 132). Hundreds of thousands of people fled the
country in search of food, and conflicts within the military community increased due to
divergent views on unification-related issues on the future of the Korean peninsula.
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The German unification had taught the lesson that the stronger party in a divided
nation could absorb the weaker party, suggesting that South Korea inevitably would unify the
two Koreas due to the superiority of its economic and military power.119 Overall productivity
and capacity utilization rates in North Korea dropped to the level of 10-15 percent because
many factories had shut their doors or had been “cannibalized for scrap metal that could be
traded across the border with China in exchange for food” (Snyder, 2001, p. 526).
To solve this economic problem, Pyongyang decided that it had to make efforts to
receive food aid through the UN’s World Food Program (WFP), which has its home office in
Rome, Italy. The Foreign Ministry summoned its diplomats stationed in Italy and instructed
them to work with relevant experts in the ministry on obtaining emergency food aid from the
WFP. As Kim Jung Il put it: "Today, nuclear and food issues are at the core of the enemy's
efforts to suffocate and collapse our country. The Foreign Ministry should hold talks with the
U.S. on the nuclear issue and simultaneously push ahead to solve the food issue."
Table 9. Trends in North Korea's Economic and Trade Growth (1965-2002)
Year
1965
Economic growth rate (%) 8.5

1970
10.2

1975
5.4

1980
3.8

1985
2.7

1990
-3.7

1991
-5.2

1992
-7.6

1993
-4.3

Trade growth rate (%)
2.6
7.2 -14.3 23.2 11.6 -13.1 -38.1 -0.8
3.5
Source: Bank of Korea (1996) and Statistics Korea (2003). Economic and Social Comparison
between South and North Korea.
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The North Korean ambassador to Italy went on CNN and BBC to request food aid
from the international community. The request was based on the ‘difficulties’ North Korea
was experiencing due to natural disasters.120 The country's public distribution system
whereby North Koreans previously had received most of their food and other essential items
had collapsed totally, and people had begun to suffer from starvation, dire circumstances
which had never happened during the Cold War-era. To overcome the economic crisis and
ensure the regime's survival, the North Korean government adopted omnidirectional
diplomacy with western countries, including the United States, focused on the concerns about
its nuclear program.

6-2. Principles of Foreign Policy
In line with the changes in international affairs, including the unification of Germany,
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the introduction of the capitalist market economy by
China, North Korea established a new direction for its foreign policy toward the U.S., Japan,
and other Western countries to adjust to the changes in the international order. North Korea
defined the primary purpose of re-positioning itself in the new international order in terms of
the preservation of self-reliance and equality within the international community. Accordingly,
North Korea laid out its views on the implications of this new international order for
international politics, military security, and the international economy.
First, North Korea’s position was that both the principle of self-reliance ‒ including
its corollaries of territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs ‒ and equality
had to be recognized as essential features of the new order. All countries were entitled to
120
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participate in international politics without regard to the differences between the great and
small powers, the strong and the weak, and the rich and the poor. Second, disputes between
nations and regions had to be resolved through dialogue and negotiation with a guarantee of
military security. Military threats and interventions in other countries had to be stopped,
military deployments in foreign countries must end, and regional military alliances had to be
reorganized. Third, in the field of the international economy, discriminatory international
financial and monetary systems, unequal trade relations, and the biased international division
of labor should be reformed to establish equality and reciprocity.121 The external debt
problems of developing countries also had to be resolved equitably. Attitudinal changes in the
developed countries in these three areas would be needed, and the active role of the United
Nations in enabling these changes was emphasized.122
North Korea signaled the changed stance in its foreign policy initially through a
diplomatic outreach to the U.S. in Beijing. Another major signal of the change in North
Korea's foreign policy was sent in September 1990, when it held high-level inter-Korean
talks and agreed to promote normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. Subsequently,
the two Koreas joined the United Nations in September 1991 and established a free trade
economic zone in December of the same year to promote inter-Korean coexistence and a new
phase of an open-door policy. Meanwhile, North Korea continued its policy toward the Third
World after hosting the 13th World Youth Festival in Pyongyang in July 1989. Also, after
Kim Il Sung called for the development of friendly cooperation with all countries in his 1991
New Year's address, Pyongyang actively pursued improved relations with Southeast Asian
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countries. North Korea's foreign policy continued to adapt to changes in the world order right
up until Kim Il Sung's death on July 8, 1994.

6-2-1. North Korea’s Goals in Relations with the United States
Kim Il Sung explained the reason for his efforts to improve relations with the U.S. as
follows: “The United States is the country directly responsible for the division of the Korean
peninsula, and the solution of the reunification problem is closely related to U.S. policy on
the Korean peninsula." Also, as the condition for improving relations with the U.S., he added:
"The U.S. must re-examine its Korean Peninsula policy in line with the trend of the times and
take steps to foster the reunification of the Korean peninsula."123 In an interview with of The
Washington Times on April 12, 1992, Kim Il Sung provided a more detailed explanation of
his position:
With the end of the Cold War, it is reasonable that the issue of improving abnormal
relations between North Korea and the United States is on the agenda. The end of the
Cold War is a failure of the policy of power, which can be regarded as an essential
prerequisite for the realization of the self-determination of all countries in the world.
The process of equality and self-reliance in the international community will
accelerate in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the coming 21st century will be a new
era of happiness and prosperity in a new world of freedom and peace.124
North Korea’s Prime Minister Yeon Hyung-mook also stressed the urgent need for an
improvement in U.S.-North Korea relations in a report published on September 8, 1992, to
mark the 44th anniversary of the establishment of the country:
If the U.S. embarks on a path to improve U.S.-North Korea relations from an
amenable position in line with the current trends toward self-determination, without
setting unfair preconditions, we will not look back on the past, but look forward to the
future.125
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Given these statements on North Korea's position, it is apparent that North Korea
was actively seeking to improve its relations with the United States in response to the
changes in the world order. This meant that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the
United States as a sign of its recognition of North Korea had become very important to
counterbalance the recognition of South Korea by the Soviet Union and China. It had become
a policy shift directly related to the survival of the North Korean regime and its only way out
of isolation.
For its part, the U.S. called on North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue, advance
inter-Korean dialogue, repatriate the remains of U.S. military personnel from the Korean War
era, suspend anti-U.S. propaganda activities, stop terrorism and violence, reform its human
rights practices, and curtail the sale of weapons of mass destruction. North Korea countered
these demands with a request for direct dialogue and improved relations; a declaration of the
non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea; the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South
Korea; the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty; the holding of threeparty talks; and the suspension of the Team Spirit joint military exercises with South Korea.
The point was that bilateral relations could be improved only when all these preconditions of
each country were met.
The U.S. showed an interest in conducting high-level talks with North Korea only
after its nuclear program had emerged as an international issue. The first nuclear crisis was
triggered in February 1993 when the IAEA demanded inspections of two sites in North Korea
that it had identified as suspected nuclear waste storage depots. North Korea refused the
IAEA inspections and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT through a
government statement on March 12, 1993. This threat could be interpreted as North Korea's
attempt to use its nuclear weapons program as leverage in getting the U.S. to engage in high-

１７５

level talks (Lee, 1995, 182). That is, in effect, it was a stratagem to overcome the U.S.'s lack
of response to North Korea’s attempts to initiate a dialogue with the U.S. ever since the 1970s
(Suh, 2008, p.133).
Whatever the intention, the result was a series of negotiations between North Korea,
on one side, and the United States and the IAEA, on the other side, that lasted for over a year.
Multiple joint statements and agreements centered on North Korea allowing IAEA inspectors
to access the disputed facilities in exchange for U.S. security assurances were issued during
these negotiations, but none lasted for more than several months. The crisis reached a boiling
point but was resolved only after former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang in
June 1994 and negotiated the outlines of a deal with Kim Il Sung that was acceptable to the
Clinton administration.
A significant step on the way to a breakthrough was the second round of high-level
talks between the United States and North Korea held in Geneva over a six-day period
beginning on July 14, 1993. Following this round of talks, North Korea announced in a joint
statement that it was “prepared to begin consultations with the IAEA on outstanding
safeguards and other issues.” It also seemed to the U.S. negotiators that North Korea was
prepared to discuss inspections of its nuclear facilities with the IAEA. The joint statement
even indicated that Pyongyang might consider a deal with the United States to replace its
graphite nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWRs), which are proliferation
resistant.126 These hints at a broader agreement foreshadowed the Agreed Framework that
was negotiated the following year after Carter’s intervention.
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A previous high-level meeting between North Korea and the United States that was
held in New York City on June 11127 of that same year concluded with a joint statement of
principles as follows:

1) assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons;
2) peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including impartial
application of full scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's
sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and
3) support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

Consistent with these principles, the two Governments also agreed to continue dialogue on an
equal and unprejudiced basis. Finally, in view of this joint agreement, North Korea made a
unilateral decision “to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its
withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
While the results of these meeting represented unprecedented progress, neither the
U.S. not North Korea obtained all their negotiating objectives. In the case of North Korea, the
objectives included: "1) a U.S. guarantee of the non-use of nuclear weapons against North
Korea; 2) a declaration of the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula
by the U.S.; 3) the suspension of large-scale, joint military exercises such as Team Spirit; 4)
the signing of a peace treaty ending the Korean War; 5) the removal of North Korea from the
U.S.’s sponsors of terrorism list; and 6) support for the establishment of the Korean
Confederation as a step toward reunification. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement on
April 28, 1994, formally proposing negotiations to replace the armistice with a peace treaty
and establish a new system to guarantee the peace guarantee in place of the armistice
agreement.128 With the sole (and only temporary) exception of the second objective,129
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North Korea’s objectives have not been achieved during three decades of negotiations with
the U.S. These objectives remain unmet despite two historic summit meetings between the
U.S. and North Korea in 2018 and 2019.
For these reasons, North Korea asserts it cannot give up its nuclear weapons until its
goals are achieved. The former North Korean diplomat, Kim Dong-soo, emphasized that
North Korea had a munitions industry after World War II that enabled it to manufacture
conventional weaponry comparable to those South Korea possessed up until as recently as
early 2013. The Kim Jong-un regime launched its program of simultaneous nuclear and
economic development in March 2013 to overcome the widening gap in conventional weapon
capabilities between the two Koreas. North Korea’s only option for closing this gap was to
complete its nuclear program, but not at the expense of the ongoing efforts to foster the
development of the economy as well. As a result, Kim asserted: “North Korea has overcome
its military and strategic imbalance with South Korea by developing nuclear weapons."130

6-3. The Emergence of the Confrontational Approach
North Korea perceived the strategic nuclear weapons the U.S. had deployed in South
Korea shortly after the armistice was signed in 1953 to be the primary threat. A close second
were the Team Spirit joint military exercise with South Korea that were conducted annually
beginning in the mid-1970s. In September 1991, after President George H.W. Bush
announced the withdrawal of all strategic nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula,
President Roh Tae Woo made an official confirmation that no U.S. strategic nuclear weapons

again in 2017 by the Trump administration. See Byman 2017.
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remained in South Korea. The authorities in Pyongyang welcomed this development as a
confidence building measure (Davenport, 2020).
It was a turning point for North Korea’s efforts to engage South Korea, the U.S., and
Japan in its desperate efforts to overcome its isolation and to recover from its economic
downturn. In December 1991, the North and South Korean governments signed the Joint
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which prohibited both
plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment. In January 1992, South Korea and the
United States canceled the Team Spirit joint military exercise scheduled for that year. In
February 1992, the U.S.’s undersecretary of state for international affairs, Arnold Kanter, and
the DPRK’s secretary for international affairs of the Worker's Party, Kim Yong Sun, met in
New York City for the first high-level meeting between the United States and North Korea.
During the meeting, North Korea affirmed its willingness to engage with the U.S. and to
conclude a comprehensive safeguard agreement with the IAEA.131
Soon, however, a controversy developed after the IAEA began to suspect there might
be a discrepancy between declared and actual volumes of plutonium extracted from
reprocessed fuel. Seeking clarification on the actual amount of reprocessed plutonium in
North Korea, for first time in its history, the IAEA made a formal request in September 1992
to conduct a ‘special inspection’ of two undeclared sites at Yongbyon believed to be nuclear
waste sites. For the IAEA, the success of the September 1992 inspection depended on
obtaining samples from the two unreported facilities. North Korea rejected the IAEA's
demand for access to these sites, however, on the grounds of its right to protect the opacity of

131

The North Koreans were ready and willing to engage while the Americans were still divided into pro-engagement and
anti-engagement camps. This left the burden on the North Koreans to trust that good things would come their way if they
opened up to the outside world ‒ as the Americans were urging ‒ even though the U.S. government was not able to make
any concrete offer of benefits because of the conflicting camps. Kanter wasn't even permitted to use the term
'normalization' in discussing future relations. See Wit et alia, 11-13.

１７９

its past nuclear activity.
Meanwhile, South Korea called for inspections of both military and civilian facilities.
This call was for general inspections, but it also designated suspected sites that it wanted to
be subjected to a special inspection protocol without prior notice. North Korea countered by
agreeing to general inspections of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon but demanded in return
the right to inspect all U.S. military bases in South Korea on the principle of simultaneous
action. On the issue of a special inspection, however, North Korea drew the line and
maintained its refusal to permit them. As justification of its position, North Korea cited the
clause in Article 4 of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
stipulating that the parties can select and inspect only the targets agreed upon by both sides.
South Korea, the United States, and Japan jointly declared that North Korea was
hampering the inspections to buy time for the development of its illicit nuclear program. The
three countries did not take North Korea’s security concerns related to the strategic nuclear
weapons of the U.S. Forces in South Korea into consideration. They had been a source of fear
for decades, but neither the U.S. nor South Korea showed any concern for how sensitive the
issue was in North Korea. In addition, in March, the U.S. had imposed sanctions on two
North Korean corporations for missile proliferation activities. As a further complications,
while the dispute over inspection was raging, the U.S. and announced the decision to hold the
Team Spirit joint military exercises in March 1993. This insensitive attitude toward North
Korea’s security concerns on the part of the U.S. and South Korea was both the cause and
justification for the events that triggered the 1993 crisis (Kim, 1995).
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6-3-1. Withdrawal From the NPT
The U.S. had been skeptical about the potential for improving U.S.-North Korea
relations since at least early 1992 due to a perception of North Korea as being uncooperative
on nuclear-related issues. In September 1992, North Korea’s envoy Kim Yong Sun proposed
a second bilateral dialogue in a letter addressed to Arnold Kanter. Kim claimed that the
simultaneous inspection issue was not making progress, despite North Korea’s maximum
efforts to fulfill their commitment to cooperate with the IAEA due to South Korea's
recalcitrance. Kanter characterized this proposal as “interesting” but predictably rejected talks
“absent progress on North-South inspections and cooperation with the IAEA” (Wit, Poneman,
and Gallucci, 2004, p. 14).
The situation took a turn for the worse from North Korea’s perspective on October 8,
1992. During the annual Security Consultative Meeting, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney confirmed the intention to go ahead with the Team Spirit 1993 joint military exercise
at the urging of South Korea. The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the U.S.
Forces Korea military installations and the suspension of the Team Spirit in 1992 were the
most important and visible security and political achievements of North Korea’s nuclear
diplomacy efforts from 1989 to 1991. The reinstatement of the exercises was a major blow
from North Korea’s perspective. Even a year later, in October 1993, when the Team Spirit
exercise came up during a conversation with U.S. Congressman Gary Ackerman, Kim Il Sung
suddenly raised his voice and waved his hand in anger (Oberdorfer, 2013, p. 273).
North Korea responded immediately to the announcement of the resumption of the
Team Spirit exercise. On October 13, 1992, North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful
Reunification of the Fatherland warned that “all inter-Korean dialogue will break down” if
the drill resumes. In addition, at the Joint Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation
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and Exchange held on October 22, Kim Jung-woo, chairman of the Foreign Economic
Committee, issued a statement that inter-Korean dialogue cannot proceed under the
conditions of a “large-scale nuclear war exercise to attack us preemptively.” At the Joint
Inter-Korean Nuclear Control Committee held on the same day, the North Korean delegation
threatened that the “inter-Korean basic agreements” could be “a piece of paper” if the
decision to resume the training was not withdrawn by the end of November. On October 27,
North Korea held a joint meeting of government parties and adopted a decision to freeze all
inter-Korean talks if Team Spirit 1993 was carried out. Beginning in November, North Korea
froze all four inter-Korean joint committee meetings and suspended the ninth high-level talks
scheduled for December.132
Against this backdrop, on February 9, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix formally
requested an unprecedented ‘special inspection’ of nuclear facilities in North Korea. On
February 21, 1993, an article in the Rodong Sinmun warned: "Should any special inspections
or sanctions be imposed on us, or our sacred homeland be invaded by a great power, it will
become a dangerous trigger for the North and the South as well as the rest of the world to be
devastated by war."
Despite North Korea's warnings, however, the IAEA passed a resolution on February
25, 1993, calling on North Korea to permit the special inspection to resolve the suspected
anomalies in North Korea’s declaration of the previous year.133 On March 8, as the Team
Spirit exercise was about to get underway, Kim Jong-il declared a state of emergency
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declaring that "a war could break out at any moment.” In his capacity as the supreme
commander of the North Korean People's Army, Kim ordered the military and the people ‒
the entire nation ‒ to assume a quasi-state-of-war posture. This was the first time since 1983
that North Korea had made such a declaration.
Then, on March 12, North Korea shocked the world with the following official
declaration of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT):134
The U.S. and South Korean authorities have resumed the Team Spirit joint military
exercise, which is a nuclear war exercise directed against our Republic. At the same
time, some U.S. entities followed up on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
"Resolution" to try to enforce "special inspections" on our military installations that
have nothing to do with nuclear activities. This is an infringement of our Republic's
independence, interference in our internal affairs, and a hostile attempt to crush our
socialist system. Under these abnormal circumstances, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea declares that it inevitably must withdraw from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a measure to protect our highest interests.135

The major reason for North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was its strategic
calculation that this drastic measure would contribute toward the elimination of the nuclear
threat facing the country. The gamble was that the withdrawal would force the U.S. to engage
in direct negotiations that ultimately might result in a breakthrough in its so far unsuccessful
efforts to normalize relations with the U.S. North Korea had laid the foundation for pursuing
this strategic goal by playing the nuclear card for a period of three years beginning from 1989.
The resumption of Team Spirit, however, was interpreted as evidence that the United States
was not willing to abide by the progress being made toward improved relations during 1992.
The risk entailed in North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was clear from the
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U.S.'s perspective. Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. had made the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction its top priority security strategy, with particular
emphasis on nuclear weapons. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT would increase the
incentives for many of the countries that had entrusted their security to the superpowers to
ensure their military security on their own by developing nuclear weapons. If North Korea
chose the path of nuclear armament, it would not only set a bad precedent for other countries
with nuclear armaments but also could cause profound instability in East Asia.
Initially, the U.S. attempted to pressure North Korea to back down from its
declaration by garnering broad international support for its efforts. On March 18, the U.S.
National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Chief of Staff Committee, chaired by Sandy Berger,
decided to refer North Korea to the U.N. Security Council. Having lined up the IAEA's
cooperation, the U.S. also sought the cooperation of South Korea and Japan. Accordingly, the
U.S. launched a diplomatic campaign to refer North Korea to the U.N. Security Council by
arranging for the adoption of a resolution to this effect at the IAEA's special board meeting
on April 1 (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, 2004, p. 30). As a result, in May 1993, the United
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution of 825, which called on North Korea to return
to full compliance with its international nonproliferation obligations.

6-3-2. The U.S-DPRK Joint Statement
North Korea's foreign ministry issued a statement on April 5, 1993, that seemed to
hint at a possible step back while reiterating its previous position. North Korea warned that it
would take “self-defense measures” if the U.N. Security Council decided to impose sanctions.
At the same time, however, it affirmed that it was ready to allow IAEA monitoring of its
nuclear facilities on the understanding that it was not rescinding its intention to withdraw
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from the NPT. Further, the statement clarified that a special inspection was not acceptable,
but a “continuity of safeguards” inspection by IAEA to prevent further nuclear material use
would be acceptable.136 With these conditions on the table, negotiations got underway
between North Korea and the IAEA on April 22, 1993.
The IAEA called for both the maintenance of surveillance cameras and the monitoring
of the replacement of fuel rods, but North Korea accepted only the former demand. Instead, it
agreed to allow the installation of additional surveillance cameras to prevent the replacement
of fuel rods without IAEA knowledge while also delaying the replacement of fuel rods in the
interim. As a result, an agreement was reached, and limited inspections were conducted to
maintain the continuity of safeguards in the Yongbyon reactor from May 10-14 (Wit et al,
2004, p. 44).
Meanwhile, the U.S. settled on the approach to be taken in its negotiations with North
Korea during a NSC meeting on May 6. Instead of demanding that the North return to the
NPT and comply with the IAEA safeguards agreement, the U.S. decided to offer inducements,
including the suspension of the Team Spirit 1994 exercise, a promise of the non-use of
nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, a reconfirmation of the withdrawal of tactical
nuclear weapons from South Korea, and trial inspections of U.S. military bases in South
Korea. Additional inducements, such as improving U.S.-North Korea relations, would be put
on the negotiating table as well but only after North Korea had implemented the North-South
denuclearization agreement (p. 48).
The first high-level talks between North Korea and the U.S. since January 1992 were
held in New York from June 2-11, 1993. In his opening statement during these talks, First
Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, North Korea’s chief delegate, reiterated that North Korea
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would never return to the NPT. He added that his country was facing an important decision:
whether to use its nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapons or to produce electricity.
Unexpectedly, Kang also asserted that North Korea had the capability to produce nuclear
weapons but had concluded it would make little sense for it to do so since the U.S. already
possesses a huge nuclear arsenal. Kang added that his government’s ultimate decision on
which way to go, however, hinged on the outcome of this meeting. Switching to English for
dramatic effect, he then offered a deal: If the United States stopped threatening North Korea,
his country would promise never to manufacture nuclear weapons.
This admission of a capability to produce nuclear weapons was a glaring departure
from Kim ll Sung’s habitual assurance to visitors that his country did not have the capability,
desire, or need to build nuclear weapons. Kang Sok Ju's remarks were the first time that
North Korea claimed to have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, while at the
same time proposing a deal to refrain from producing them.
In his opening statement, Gallucci reiterated the U.S.’s willingness to provide
security guarantees according to the relevant principles of the U.N. Charter. He also urged
North Korea to return to the NPT and to implement the safeguards agreement. Later, in a
private conversation, Gallucci responded to Kang’s earlier threats with his own veiled threat:
namely, the international community would have to take its own measures if North Korea did
not return to the NPT. Understanding this comment as a hint about potential UNSC sanctions,
Kang Sok Ju replied that sanctions are a “declaration of war," in which case, "We will
disclose our ability to manufacture nuclear weapons and extract plutonium from waste fuel
rods" (Kim, 1995. p.15).
Since North Korea had not replaced the fuel rods of its 5MWe reactor in 1991, if it
shut down the reactor and withdrew all 8,000 fuel rods, it could by 1993 have extracted
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sufficient plutonium for the manufacture of at least three to four nuclear weapons. The
number of North Korea's nuclear weapons would increase in proportion to time, as it could
extract enough plutonium from the 5MWe reactor every year to manufacture one to two
nuclear weapons.
At that time, preventing the extraction of used fuel rods was a hot issue already. The
replacement of the fuel rods for the 5MWe reactor was originally scheduled for May 1993,
but North Korea delayed the replacement. At the same time, North Korea insisted that it
could not accept intervention beyond IAEA observation of the replacement work because it
had already declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Preserving the integrity of the
international non-proliferation system based on the NPT was the primary concern of the U.S.
State Department, but what mattered most to the Pentagon was prevention of the proliferation
of nuclear weapons.
In a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard in March 1993,
Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter had made this difference in priorities clear by
stressing that his concern was fuel rods, not special inspections. Similarly, the state
department routinely called for economic sanctions, while the pentagon called for military
action. The department of defense claimed that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons
would be an infringement on the U.S.’s vital interests, and it was willing to wage war for this
reason (Sigal, 1997, p. 59). In a similar vein, the ROK Ministry of National Defense was
focused on the plutonium that North Korea allegedly had produced from 1989 to 1992, while
the U.S. State Department was focused on the plutonium that North Korea might produce in
the future. In this latest round of high-level talks, the U.S. had reiterated that its promise not
to launch a preemptive military strike pertained specifically to countries which are signatories
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
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In response, North Korea indicated it would consider suspending (i.e., delaying) its
withdrawal from the NPT if the U.S. would agree to issue a joint statement declaring “it
respects North Korea's sovereignty and is committed to the non-use of force” (Quinones,
2008, p. 203). On June 11, 1993, a North Korea-U.S. Joint Statement was released with the
following main points:
1) an assurance against the use of force and threats, including nuclear weapons;
2) an impartial application of the IAEA Full-Scope Safeguards;
3) mutual respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs
of the other party;
4) support for the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula;
5) continuation of dialogue on an equal and fair foundation; and
6) the unilateral suspension of North Korea’s declaration of an intent to withdraw
from the NPT for as long as it considers necessary.
From North Korea's perspective, this statement represented the achievement of its four major
demands from the United States, including a passive security guarantee, the suspension of
special inspection demands, the abandonment of hostile policies, and acceptance of direct
negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. This was taken as a confirmation that the
strategy of seeking concessions from the United States through a confrontational approach
had succeeded. Additionally, the North Korea-U.S. joint statement was politically significant
since it was the first time the U.S. had deviated from its longstanding principle of not
discussing the issue of peace on the Korean peninsula directly with North Korea.

6-3-3. South Korea and IAEA Demands
The second round of high-level talks between North Korea and the United States was
held in Geneva from July 14-19, 1993. This round was based on complaints about the
outcome of the first round by South Korea and the IAEA. Initially, South Korea was
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concerned that the U.S. might adopt a hardline policy stance toward North Korea, but it
reversed its position after the North Korea-U.S. joint statement was released. On July 1,
President Kim Young-sam cautioned that North Korea was manipulating its current
negotiations with the United States “to buy time to finish their project” to build nuclear
weapons. He also expressed his hope that the United States “will not continue to be led by
North Korea” when talks over nuclear inspections enter another round in Geneva in two
weeks.137 These comments reflected a growing anxiety in Seoul that U.S.-North Korea
relations were outpacing inter-Korean relations. As a result, the U.S. goals for the second
round of talks were to establish a firm foundation for IAEA inspections and to kickstart an
inter-Korean dialogue.
For its part, North Korea agreed to discuss the IAEA inspection issue but rejected
inter-Korean relations as a suitable subject for North Korea-U.S. talks. North Korea also
reiterated its position that it could not accept a special inspection by the IAEA. Meanwhile,
North Korea unveiled a ‘clear and new order’ from its leadership in Pyongyang. This was a
proposal to replace its graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactor (LWR) power
plants. The terms of the proposal called for the U.S. to guarantee the supply of LWRs in
exchange for a commitment by North Korea to freeze its existing nuclear facilities and allow
IAEA monitoring while the LWRs were under construction. The proposal also included a
commitment by North Korea to rejoin the NPT once the LWRs were operational. This was
characterized as a ‘freeze-to-reward proposal’. Kang Sok Ju also affirmed that North Korea
would allow the IAEA to visit the two undisclosed facilities previously declared to be offlimits to IAEA inspectors, provided the visits were not conducted under the designation of a
special inspection. Finally, he indicated that Pyongyang was willing to begin immediately an
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inter-Korean dialogue and to engage in consultations with the IAEA (Wit et al, p 69).
Based on North Korea's proposal, the two countries announced an agreement during
the second round of high-level talks on July 19, 1993. The points of the agreement were:
1) a reaffirmation of the principles set forth in the June 11 North Korea-U.S. Joint
Statement;
2) a commitment of U.S. support for North Korea’s acquisition of LWRs, including
exploring the ways and means of such a project;
3) reconfirmation of the need for a complete and impartial application of IAEA
safeguards;
4) negotiations on the safeguards agreement with the IAEA would begin as soon as
possible;
5) North Korea would take part in inter-Korean talks on bilateral issues, including
nuclear issues, as soon as possible; and
6) North Korea and the U.S. would hold the next round of talks within two months to
discuss technical issues related to the acquisition of LWRs and other pending issues
related to the resolution of the nuclear issue.

This second agreement was a compromise that largely met the needs of North Korea, the
United States, South Korea, and the IAEA.
In short order, however, negotiations between North Korea and the IAEA stalled
once again over two familiar issues. First, there was the special inspection problem. The
IAEA no longer used the term ‘special inspection’, but it maintained the substance of this
term by insisting on the ‘complete’ application of the safeguards commitment in the second
agreement. For its part, North Korea continued to raise the issue of an impartial application of
the inspection protocols. The core sticking point was the IAEA’s desire to clarify past nuclear
activity, which was North Korea’s Maginot Line in warding off what it regarded as overly
intrusive IAEA inspections. The U.S. had demonstrated a willingness to not press North
Korea in this issue in the first high-level talks.
Second, a more urgent and controversial topic was the question of how far to define

１９０

the scope of the continuity of safeguards and related concerns. As it only had suspended its
withdrawal, North Korea had not fully returned to the NPT but remained in a ‘special status’.
North Korea took the view that restricted inspections ‒ such as maintaining IAEA monitoring
capabilities for some facilities ‒ were acceptable, but ad hoc and general inspections were not
acceptable (Kim, 1995, p. 125). North Korea and the IAEA became embroiled again in a
tedious battle over these issues once the IAEA inspectors returned to Yongbyon in August
1993 to service safeguards monitoring equipment. Although there were two or three
restrictive inspections to maintain the surveillance cameras in the facilities, the IAEA's
complaints about North Korea's intransigence and concerns that it might be secretly
conducting nuclear activities continued unabated.
There also was no progress being made in inter-Korean relations. On August 4, South
Korea proposed the resumption of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee. North Korea
rejected this proposal. Instead, on August 31, it proposed the exchange of special envoys by
the two Koreas (Kim, 1995, p.23). As preconditions for exchanging special envoys, however,
North Korea demanded that South Korea suspend future Team Spirit exercises and abandon
its cooperation with the U.S. and Japan in their efforts to force a resolution of the nuclear
issue. On September 2, South Korea accepted the proposal to exchange special envoys, but
agreed only to discuss the nuclear-related issue and deal with it together with the other major
pending issues. As North Korea had withdrawn unilaterally from South-North talks in late
1992, following the announcement of the Team Spirit 1993 exercise, the complete suspension
of inter-Korean dialogue continued until October 1993.
To re-start the talks, on September 20, the South Korean government offered to
suspend the Team Spirit exercises scheduled for 1994 if North Korea indicated it was serious
about resolving the nuclear issue. On September 12, in a letter addressed to Kang Sok Ju,
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Gallucci reinforced this offer by implicitly threatening to end U.S.-North Korea talks: “If
there is no progress in talks with the IAEA and South Korea, we have no choice but to doubt
the willingness to talk with the United States” (Wit et al, p 73). Bowing to this pressure from
the United States, North Korea finally agreed to hold a working-level meeting with South
Korea on October 5 to exchange special envoys. In the end, despite three working-level
meetings on October 5, 15, and 25, no agreement was reached on the special envoys’
proposal due to a lack of consensus on the timing and mission of the exchanges. This episode
ended with a dramatic flair as North Korea cut off all further contacts with South Korea after
taking umbrage over a comment by its defense minister Kwon Young-hae who was quoted as
saying: "If sanctions are adopted, North Korea may launch provocations, so both South Korea
and the U.S. should be prepared to deal with them" (Quinones, 2008, p. 212).
In this stalemated situation, the U.S. finally decided to put a package deal on the
table. The essence of the deal was to get North Korea’s agreement to allow the resumption of
regular IAEA inspections and to return to inter-Korean talks in exchange for the cancellation
of the Team Spirit 1994 exercise and the convening of the long-delayed third round of U.S.North Korea negotiations. Once the third round of talks had gotten underway, the plan was to
discuss the controversial issue of an inspection of the two disputed sites at Yongbyon by the
IAEA as well as the issue of diplomatic recognition of North Korea by the U.S., and trade and
investment concessions from the U.S., South Korea, and Japan (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2013,
p. 231).
After news of this package deal leaked to the press, however, strong resistance to it
emerged immediately both in Seoul and in Washington.

On Nov. 23, 1993, at the start of his

first official visit to the U.S., South Korea’s president Kim Young-sam was ushered into the
Oval Office for what was supposed to be a ceremonial sign off on the U.S.-proposed package
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deal. Instead, with his “eyes flashing and his gestures emphatic,” Kim made his strong
dissatisfaction with the package deal crystal clear. He explained that it looked to him and his
people as if the United States were bending over backwards to be accommodating to North
Korea without even consulting with South Korea.
Faced with this reaction, the U.S. agreed to reformulate the package deal, and the socalled “thorough and broad approach” finally was agreed upon by both sides. This revision of
the deal represented a compromise between the positions of South Korea and the U.S. Kim
Young-sam was adamant that the Team Spirit 1994 exercises should not be cancelled even if
the IAEA inspections or an inter-Korean dialogue got underway. As a result of this
compromise, however, inter-Korean talks remained bogged down in arguments about the
exchange of special envoys and the suspension of the Team Spirit 1994 exercise (p. 231-232).
Table 10. Core Issues Between North Korea and IAEA (1993-1994)

Special Inspection

•
•
•

Continuity of
Safeguards

•

Source: Im Soo-ho 2007, 190.

North Korea
Refusal of special inspections
Principle of fairness in
inspections
Restricted inspection
- Maintenance of surveillance cameras
- Limited to some facilities
Emphasis on the special status
due to the suspension of its
withdrawal from the NPT

•
•
•

IAEA
Content Observation
Principle of completeness
in inspections
Comprehensive
Inspection
- Maintenance of
surveillance cameras
- Temporary and General
Inspection
- Apply to all reported
facilities
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6-3-4. The June Crisis in 1994
Negotiations between North Korea and the IAEA, which took place throughout
January 1994, were stalled again as the debate over limited and full inspections of the 5MWe
reactor and the reprocessing facilities continued unabated as usual. The U.S. believed that the
continuity of safeguards would be seriously damaged if IAEA inspections were not conducted
by the end of 1993. This situation led to a rapid rise in a hardline stance in the U.S. toward
North Korea. On February 3, Hans Blix added to the state of alarm by issuing a warning that
the IAEA might have to announce within a week that the continuity of safeguards has been
lost.138 On February 6, the U.S. media reported on a U.S. plan to wage war on the Korean
peninsula.
North Korea had issued its own warning on January 31: “If the U.S. finally reverses
its promise, we will not be bound by our promise.” It added: “If the U.S. does not want to
hold U.S.-North Korea talks, we have no intention of holding the talks either.”139
Several crises had arisen at the working-level as well involving both the IAEA
inspections and the exchange of special envoys between the two Koreas. The IAEA
inspectors discovered a damaged seal during an inspection of the reprocessing facility and
demanded permission to conduct a sampling, but the demand was rejected. As a result, the
IAEA inspectors were withdrawn from North Korea on March 14.
Meanwhile, the inter-Korean working-level talks to exchange special envoys on
March 19 broke down within an hour of being convened. During a contentious debate, Park
Yong Su, the North Korean delegate, threatened his South Korean counterpart, Song Young
Dae, saying: “Seoul is not far from here. If war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it
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will probably be difficult for you to survive” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, pp. 237-38). The
northern team then walked out of the meeting. Thus, the prospects for convening a third
round of talks between North Korea and the U.S. evaporated, and the Korean peninsula
quickly fell into a severe state of crisis.
On March 21, 1994, addressing a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Director
General Hans Blix made a hair-splitting declaration that “overall, the continuity of safeguards
in North Korea had not been broken. But the agency could not conclude whether nuclear
material had been diverted from Yongbyon since it had been prevented from re-establishing
continuity of safeguards at the reprocessing plant.” This declaration set off a heated debate
during which China cautioned against creating an atmosphere filled with “the smell of
gunpowder” in an unsuccessful effort accentuate the positive. After a further flurry of behindthe-scenes diplomacy, during which only the Libyan representative came to North Korea’s
defense, the IAEA Board adopted a resolution declaring North Korea in further
noncompliance with its safeguards obligations and referring the issue to the UN Security
Council (Wit et alia., p. 154).
Surprisingly, China abstained from voting on the resolution, which marked a sharp
departure from its past practice of consistently voting against IAEA resolutions on North
Korea. On the same day, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that it
would complete its withdrawal from the NPT unless the U.S.-North Korea talks were
resumed, and the Team Spirit 1994 exercise was suspended. North Korea also repeated its
warning that it would regard an imposition of international sanctions as a declaration of war.
At the end of March, a contingent of the U.S. advance team for the Team Spirit 1994
exercises arrived in South Korea. South Korea and the U.S. had announced around a week
earlier that a Patriot Missile Battalion would be deployed to South Korea. The Patriot system
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is an interceptor missile system designed to protect land forces from in-coming enemy
missile attacks during hostilities.
On April 19, 1994, North Korea pulled out a new card to trigger the war crisis further.
Yun Ho-jin, a North Korean envoy to the international agencies headquartered in Vienna, sent
a letter to the IAEA asking if he could pay a visit. Explaining the purpose of the visit, the
letter indicated that North Korea intended to start replacing the fuel rods in its 5MWe reactor.
This immediately set off alarm bells. If the 8,000 expended fuel rods mounted in the 5MWe
reactor were reprocessed after their replacement, the extracted plutonium potentially would
be sufficient to manufacture from three to five nuclear weapons. In that case, combining this
new plutonium with its presumed store of existing plutonium, North Korea might have the
material needed to manufacture from four to seven nuclear weapons.
True to its word, North Korea pushed ahead with the extraction of the fuel rods on
May 4, and the IAEA reported this unsupervised extraction to the U.N. Security Council as “a
serious safeguards violation” on May 19. The IAEA sent negotiators to North Korea on May
24 in what turned out to be another failed attempt to reach an agreement. The IAEA expected
the extraction of all the reactor’s fuel rods to take about two months, but North Korea used
two extraction machines and was able to complete the process much sooner than expected.
On June 3, Hans Blix reported to the Security Council that all the extracted fuel rods
were randomized and mixed with other fuel rods, eliminating any possibility of
distinguishing plutonium potentially reprocessed from the recently extracted rods versus
plutonium that resulted from suspect past nuclear activity. This was the breaking point, and
the IAEA finally pulled the trigger for international sanctions (Kim, 1995, p. 24).
The war drums grew louder in June. The Pentagon began preparing a series of
options that included increasing the number of U.S. forces in South Korea up to 50,000 and
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deploying air and naval supporting forces. The planning included basing cruise missiles and
F-117 stealth fighters in South Korea that could be used to strike the nuclear facilities at
Yongbyon (McIntyre, 1999). Defense Secretary William J. Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili briefed President Clinton on the grave consequences if war
broke out. The Pentagon estimated it would result in 52,000 U.S. military and 490,000 South
Korean military casualties just in the first ninety days. The number of North Korean military
casualties also would be enormous as would be the number of civilian casualties on both
sides of the DMZ. The financial outlay was estimated to be in the range of $61 billion, and
this burden would fall primarily on U.S. shoulders.
Unsurprisingly then, the Clinton administration began veering back toward the
search for a diplomatic way out. Still, war remained a real possibility, because as Clinton said
to reporters: “I just don’t think we can walk away from this” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, p.
247). The U.S. embassy in Seoul even began planning for the evacuation of American
citizens on an urgent basis (McIntyre, 1999). In a meeting with the former South Korean
president, Kim Dae Jung, on December 7, 1998, William J. Perry ‒ who was the U.S.
secretary of defense in 1994 ‒ confirmed that the U.S. truly was planning actively for war at
the time, one it undoubtedly would have won, although the casualties would have been
enormous (U.S. Department of State, 2016).
The biggest worry for the United States was that a nuclear-armed North Korea would
be a destabilizing factor in Northeast Asia and would result in the proliferation of nuclear
weapons to other regions of the world. Nonproliferation and arms control policies were a
central component of U.S. diplomacy in the post-Cold War era (Christopher, 1995, p. 22).
The U.S. government determined that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program undermined
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global proliferation controls, the security of the U.S. allies in the region, and the vital
integrity of the NPT (p. 24).
Despite the projected enormous costs of a war, both in terms of human lives and
financial outlays, Secretary Perry said that the U.S.’s assessment was that it would be better
to risk the Korean peninsula being reduced to burning ashes than to allow North Korea to
possess nuclear weapons. This is a clear indication that the U.S.’s geopolitical calculations ‒
preventing a threat to stability in East Asia and avoiding a domino effect of global nuclear
proliferation ‒ outweighed the human and financial costs of war. If unavoidable, war was an
"unpalatable option," but instability in East Asia and global nuclear proliferation were a
"disastrous option" that could not even be considered.140
What North Korea hoped to gain through improved relations with the U.S. as the
fruit of its confrontational approach was economic development. North Korea had proposed
since October 1993 to exchange its graphite modulated reactor for the more proliferationresistant light-water reactor as part of a package deal on the nuclear issue with the U.S. North Korea’s proposal had been approved already by the U.S. during a NSC meeting in
November 1993 ‒ as part of a potential package deal ‒ and was agreed upon a month later in
a communication between North Korea and the United States via the New York Channel.
On the economic front, in a concluding speech for the 21st Plenary Session of the 6th
Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Korea on December 8, 1993, Kim Il Sung
announced the adoption of a revolutionary economic strategy:
We must boldly change the direction of foreign trade toward the countries in
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and other newly-emergent countries, the
third-world nations. …We must restructure the economy in keeping with the changed
situation and the requirement for the development of the revolution and work for
several years in the direction of giving the highest priority to the development of
140
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agriculture, light industry, and foreign trade in economic construction.141

His rationale for this new ‘direction’ was the need for North Korea to adapt to the collapse of
socialism and the resultant loss of its trading partners and markets in the now-defunct Eastern
Bloc. By refocusing foreign trade on the third-world countries, North Korea could evade the
U.S.’s attempts to isolate and blockade the country since these nations “do not study the
pleasure of the United States.”
Table 11. North Korea’s Confrontational Behaviors
Provocation
• Refusing inspections of
its plutonium facilities
• Turning Seoul into a 'Sea
of Fire' threat
• Criticizing the U.S. as a
war maniac
• Refusing inspections of
its nuclear facilities
• IAEA’s referral to the UN
Security Council

Crisis
• North Korea’s Declaration
of Quasi-War
• NPT withdrawal (1993)
• Korea-U.S. Team Spirit
Training Resumes
• Deploying Additional
U.S. Forces
• Extracting of spent fuel
rods (1994)
• Withdrawal from the
IAEA and restarting
nuclear facilities

Deal
• North Korea-U.S. Joint
Statement (1993)
• Accepting inspection of
nuclear facilities
• Demanding the U.S.’ s
Security Guarantee
• The Agreed Framework
between (1994)
• Normalization with the U.S.
• Exchanging graphitemoderated reactor for a
light-water reactor (LWR)

At the same, Kim Il Sung also begrudgingly recognized that normalizing U.S.-North
Korea relations and resolving the international concerns about the end goal of North Korea’s
nuclear program were essential conditions for the long-range, successful implementation of
this policy.142 The proposal to trade the graphite modulated reactors for light-water reactors
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In the December 8, 1993, speech on the re-focusing of the economy cited above, Kim Il Sung described the issue of
nuclear inspection as an expression of inveterate U.S. hostility: “The United States is doggedly raising the issue of
nuclear inspection for the purpose of producing an excuse for a continued presence of their armed forces in South Korea.
We have already made it clear more than once that we have no intention or ability to develop nuclear weapons. …if we
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was one way for North Korea to signal a lack of interest in the development of a nuclear
weapons program. North Korea did not want to give up its nuclear ‘card’ prematurely,
however, as it was still hoping to obtain some economic compensation and security
guarantees from the United States. Therefore, it continued to pursue its confrontational
approach through the third round of U.S.-North Korea talks.

6-3-5. The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework
On June 6, former president Jimmy Carter stepped into the breach by acting on a
longstanding invitation to visit North Korea. While the invitation had been extended by Kim
Il Sung, Jimmy Carter assumed that Kim Il Sung most likely would be surrounded by Kim
Jong-il and his aides and be generally disconnected from current affairs in the outside world.
Nonetheless, Jimmy Carter believed that direct communication with him was necessary to
solve the crisis. As a result, Carter crossed the DMZ early on the morning of June 15 to begin
his visit to North Korea ‘as a private citizen’ armed only with Clinton's reluctant approval
(Wit et al., p. 221).
On June 16, Clinton was preparing to choose one of three provocative military
options he had been offered by Secretary of Defense William Perry when a call came from
Pyongyang. It was Carter on the phone reporting that he had received three promises from
Kim Il Sung. First, Kim promised not to expel IAEA inspectors. This meant that the extracted
fuel rods would not be reprocessed, which could be interpreted as a message that North Korea
was seeking a way out of the crisis. Second, Kim promised that North Korea would give up
its graphite-moderated reactors if the U.S. agreed to provide light water reactors as
accept nuclear inspections, they will raise a new issue, clamoring about human rights and whatnot, to bring pressure to
bear upon us. The imperialists’ pressure upon our country will continue as long as we advance under the banner of
socialism” (Ibid, p. 243).
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replacements.143 Again, the inference was that North Korea was willing to give up its nuclear
weapons program. While North Korean negotiators had said as much previously, the offer
was viewed as more meaningful since it was being made by Kim Il Sung personally.144
On the same day, Clinton delivered his response personally in the White House
briefing room. The statement (p. 229) concluded with the following critical paragraph:
If today’s developments mean that North Korea is genuinely and verifiably prepared
to freeze its nuclear program while talks go on ‒ and we hope that is the case ‒ then
we would be willing to resume high-level talks. In the meantime, we will pursue our
consultations on sanctions at the United Nations.
Gallucci also gave more details about Clinton's message during the following press
conference. He said that high-level talks could be resumed if the 5MWe reactor were shut
down, the spent fuel rods were not reprocessed, and the continuity of safeguards were
maintained. On June 20, Gallucci sent a letter to Kang Sok Ju, proposing to resume the third
high-level talks on July 6 if Pyongyang accepted these three conditions. On June 22, Kang
Seok-ju replied that his government accepted all three conditions. As a result, the war crisis,
which began with the extraction of fuel rods, was resolved, and the path to U.S.-North Korea
negotiations was resumed
The third high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea were held in two
separate sessions. The first phase of the talks was held in Geneva from August 5-12, 1994,
and the second phase lasted from September 23 to October 21. The first phase of the talks
initially was slated to get underway on July 8, but Kim Il Sung’s sudden death that very day
inevitably led to a postponement. The third round of talks were focused on negotiations for a
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“What we have is nothing new. The problem is that North Korea now has a former president as its spokesperson” (Ibid, p.
228)
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package deal as previously agreed between the U.S. and North Korea. In return for North
Korea's agreement to have its graphite-moderated nuclear power reactor replaced with
proliferation-resistant light-water reactors, the U.S. promised to provide passive security
guarantees, ease economic sanctions, and improve U.S.-North Korea relations.
During the 40-day third round of talks, there were about five major issues that were
hammered out by the hardworking teams of negotiators on both sides.
First, there was the question of how the U.S. could guarantee support for the
construction of the light water reactors. North Korea wanted legal guarantees, but the
U.S. contended it was impossible to provide such guarantees. Instead, the U.S.
president could provide a political guarantee in the form of a memorandum.
Second, there was the question of the manufacturer of the light-water reactors. The
U.S. suggested a South Korean-manufactured model as the logical choice, but it was
politically difficult for North Korea to accept nuclear reactors manufactured by its
political nemesis on the Korean peninsula. This issue was resolved by a compromise
based on the U.S.’s commitment to play a leading role in an international consortium
that would be organized to fund and manage the construction of the light-water
reactors in North Korea. Effectively, the can was kicked down the road, and the issue
of the manufacturer of the reactors was left to be addressed later by expert
negotiations.
Third, there was the thorny issue of the reprocessing of the fuel rods extracted from
5MWe reactor and the freezing of any future nuclear activity associated with this
reactor. The United States demanded that the reactor be shut down immediately,
following receipt of the presidential memorandum by President Clinton, and the
extracted fuel rods be sent to a third country. Instead of agreeing to this proposal,
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however, North Korea decided to delay the extraction of fuel rods and their export to
a third country until after the completion of the light-water reactors. In the interim, it
agreed to work with the United States on storage issues.
Fourth, the special inspection to determine any past nuclear activity demanded by the
IAEA continued to be the most sensitive issue. At the same time, North Korea
recognized that if the special inspection issue were not resolved, the U.S. would not
receive support at home and abroad for raising the billions of dollars required to
complete the light-water reactor project. In this connection, North Korea reaffirmed
its promise to comply fully with its safeguards-related obligations, including for all
Yongbyon facilities, through consultations with the IAEA on the issue of identifying
past nuclear activities. The only proviso North Korea made was that the consultation
would begin only after 80 percent of the construction work on the light-water reactors
had been completed.
Fifth, the last issue was the status of the inter-Korean dialogue. North Korea accepted
the U.S.’s position that clauses pertaining to inter-Korean dialogue should be included
in the agreement, but it insisted that the status of the inter-Korean dialogue could not
be a prerequisite for the completion of the light-water reactor project.
Through its confrontational approach to the U.S., North Korea obtained an official
guarantee from the U.S. ‒ in writing! ‒ of its promise of the non-use of nuclear weapons on
the Korean peninsula. In addition, it obtained a promise to work toward the normalization of
U.S.-North Korea relations. These were not only important achievements from the security
perspective, but they meant as well that North Korea had taken its first major step toward
overcoming the international isolation that was hampering its efforts to revitalize its economy.
The core of the economic crisis was the challenge of resolving the energy shortage. North
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Korea was promised two 1,000 MWe modern light-water reactors by 2003 in return for the
suspension and future dismantlement of the 5 MWe reactor, and the halting of the
construction work on the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors. The projected output of these
reactors was 16 billion kWh of electricity per year.
In North Korea, the Agreed Framework concluded in Geneva with the U.S. was
being hailed as a ‘glorious achievement’ of the three-year ‘diplomatic war’ with the United
States. The prospects of improved U.S.-North Korea relations and the resolution of the
energy crisis became critical assets for Kim Jong-il. They contributed greatly to the
consolidation of his political authority following Kim Il Sung’s death. In addition, North
Korea had secured a nuclear option in preparation for uncertain situations that might arise in
the future. That is, if necessary, North Korea could suspend the Geneva agreement and
resume its nuclear program with an explicit focus on the development of nuclear weapons. Its
nuclear facilities were slated to be frozen but not dismantled prior to the completion of the
light-water reactors. On the other hand, the agreement’s implementation was not legally
binding, and its fulsome implementation would be dependent on the political situation in the
two countries. Given the opposition of the Republican Party in the U.S., and the emergence
of a military-first system in North Korea, a deadlock in implementing the agreement was
inevitable.

２０４

２０５

２０６

6-4. Alternative Explanations of North Korea’s Foreign Policy Behavior
6-4-1. Theoretical Foundations
The alternative explanations of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior generally
assume that by the early 1990s – if not earlier – efforts were well underway in North Korea to
realize its presumptive, long-term goal of becoming a nuclear-weapons-possessing state. In
seeking to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons program, North Korea was seen as posing
a direct challenge to the U.S.’s role as the ultimate guarantor of the NPT regime. There is a
further assumption underlying these explanations that North Korea is hell bent on launching a
second brutal assault on South Korea – in line with the ethos of its military-first policy – to
realize its longstanding goal of the reunification of the Korean peninsula by force should the
opportunity be afforded. These three intertwined components of the most prevalent
alternative explanations of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior account for the branding of
North Korea as a rogue state that poses a dire and imminent threat to South Korea,
undermines security in the Indo-Pacific region, and ultimately plays a destabilizing role in the
international community writ large.
Accordingly, beginning in the immediate post-Cold War era and continuing up to the
present, national security analysts, pundits, and mainstream media outlets in the United States
consistently have depicted North Korea as posing a unique existential threat to the U.S.
national interest both in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. Legitimate concerns about
North Korea’s violations of human rights have provided further grist for the mill. As a result,
for the U.S. and its allies, North Korea has become thoroughly stigmatized as a uniquely
malignant force that exacerbates regional conflicts and undermines world peace. As the sole
superpower in the unipolar system that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
United States inevitably has played the leading role in the efforts to constrain North Korea’s
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foreign policy behavior. The rise of China and Russia’s resurgence of influence in recent
years have imposed limits on the U.S.’s capacity to play this role, but the perception of North
Korea in the U.S. – as well as in South Korea and elsewhere in the West to a lesser extent – is
still largely refracted through this residual post-Cold War prism.

6-4-2. Threat to the NPT Regime and Regional Security
By the beginning of the 1990s, the United States had already demonstrated its
leadership in building a democratic world.145 The major challenges that the United States
faced in this effort were the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
establishment of arms control agreements. Warren Christopher, a former U.S. secretary of
state, emphasized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union would pose the most pressing threat to the security of the
United States and its allies (Christopher, 1995, p. 22). Under the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program, by the mid-1990s, the U.S. had achieved the goal of stabilizing
the NPT regime by eliminating the Soviet-era nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus. The CTR program made provisions for U.S. scientists and engineers to work with
their counterparts in these three countries to arrange for the decommissioning and removal of
nuclear warheads and related facilities.146 Nevertheless, the U.S. government remained
concerned about the viability of the NPT regime due to advances in technology and the
diffusion of expertise that has put nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their
delivery systems within reach of a growing number of nations, including North Korea. Based
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on intelligence findings of nuclear weapons-related activities, the U.S. government assessed
North Korea to have the potential to ignite a destabilizing nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia
and thereby to undermine global proliferation controls.
Given these assumptions about underlying ‘real’ intentions, the issue of how to
interpret North Korea’s foreign policy behavior – and negotiating techniques, in particular –
is a major concern for proponents of the alternative explanations. Scott Snyder (1999) made
an influential contribution to the conceptualization of this issue by proposing what many
Americans found to be a persuasive cultural interpretation of North Korean negotiating
behavior. This interpretation introduced ‘brinksmanship’ and ‘crisis diplomacy’ as terms of
art to characterize North Korea’s efforts to set the stage for negotiations with the United
States by threatening to withdraw from the NPT regime and refusing inspections by the IAEA.
According to Snyder, brinksmanship as practiced by North Korea entails deploying such
tactics as making unconditional demands, blustering, bluffing, threatening, and even walking
out of negotiations. In his view, these ‘unorthodox’ negotiating stratagems are deployed by
North Korea explicitly to induce a sense of crisis as a means of gaining its objectives
illegitimately by forcing changes in the counterpart's behavior (Snyder, 1999, p. 69).
Subsequently, the characterization of North Korean negotiating behavior by reference to these
terms became a canonical usage among leading experts in foreign affairs. As ‘just so’ cultural
interpretations, however, Snyder’s descriptions of North Korea’s diplomatic ‘bag of tricks’ do
not render a definitive conclusion about underlying intent. What they do convey is a
conviction that North Koreans are not forthright, reliable negotiators.
According to North Korean sources, the reliance on brinkmanship involving the
threat of developing a nuclear weapons program was intended solely as a stratagem to deter
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“the United States’ strategy of eliminating the regime.”147 Behind the scenes, the leadership
in Pyongyang calculated each step of the negotiating process and assessed the costs and
benefits of conducting crisis diplomacy for the security of their regime. In short, the
negotiating behavior was intentionally managed by the leadership in Pyongyang to defend the
regime. This approach to negotiations was modeled on the guerrilla tactics Kim Il Sung
deployed in Manchuria in fighting the Japanese colonial forces. In the mid-1990s,
negotiations also were guided by the military-first policy’s objective of enhancing domestic
solidarity – the unity of the public, the military, and the party – to overcome the looming
economic and political crisis (Chun 2009). In this regard, the threat of developing a nuclear
weapons program as a brinkmanship tactic in its diplomacy served North Korea well in
deterring external threats, securing the regime, and minimizing public complaints. Given its
consistency with Kim Jong Il's military-first policy, however, suspicions were raised about
North Korea’s diplomatic behavior. Was it really just bluffing as an expression of what some
observers term the ‘tyranny of the weak’ or was it a cover for the development of nuclear
weapons to ensure the regime's survival and autonomy, and eventually to transform North
Korea into a strong and prosperous country.148 Just as Japan had sought to develop nuclear
weapons during WWII, and South Korea had attempted the same in the mid-1970s, it seemed
likely that North Korea’s definition of a “strong and prosperous country” would include the
possession of nuclear weapons (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014, pp. 196-197).
From the perspective of U.S. negotiators, then, brinkmanship behavior was little
more than a means of covering up bad faith in the negotiating process. Bruce Klingner, a
former CIA analyst, gives his take on this issue by describing North Korea’s approach to
negotiations as “deny, deceive, and delay” (Klingner 2012). Like many of his colleagues in
147
148

Kim, Bong -ho 2004, pp. 148-158.
Kim, Ngin-ngok 2003. p. 193.

２１０

the U.S national security establishment, Klingner believes North Koreans participate in
negotiations solely to gain concessions. According to this interpretation, the goal of
negotiations for North Korea is not to reach agreements, but merely to gain time to pursue
their nefarious objectives and to deflect attention away from these objectives. Hence, in a
play on President Reagan’s famous dictum about dealing with the Soviet Union, former
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s stance toward dealing with China – “distrust and verify” –
effectively always has been applied to North Korea’s foreign policy behavior as well.

6-4-3. North Korea as a Nuclear Weapons State
While it was far-fetched to assert that North Korea already possessed nuclear
weapons at the beginning of the 1990s,149 nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems
have been developed since the collapse of the Agreed Framework in late 2002.

It is

hypocritical to single out North Korea as a violator of the NPT when there are three other
known violators who are excused from opprobrium. Nonetheless, North Korea’s claim in
November 2019 that it has become a full-fledged nuclear state casts a retrospective shadow
on all previous and potentially even future denuclearization negotiations. For some, it even
calls into question whether North Korea ever sincerely sought détente with the U.S. As has
been argued previously, however, there were rational grounds for North Korea to seek detente
with the U.S. in connections with the geopolitical shift caused by the U.S.-China détente in
the early 1970s and the same argument applies to the early 1990s given the momentous
changes that transpired in North Korea’s national security environment.
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Reading intentions backwards from the post-2002 context in which North Korea
developed a nuclear deterrence is not the interpretation advanced in this research project, but
it is an accepted position – at a minimum, from a worst-case scenario perspective – among
those who offer alternative interpretations. Which interpretation is more defensible based on
the empirical evidence of the actual track record of negotiations since the first high-level
U.S.-North Korea meeting in 1991? This question is roundly disputed. The answer depends
on discerning North Korea’s long-range strategic intentions and on an assessment of how
those intentions might be modified through ‘diplomatic entanglement’. From the perspective
of the alternative explanations of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior, however, diplomacy
to advance peace and denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is a fool’s errand. In this view,
North Korea’s sole intention is to coerce the U.S. into recognizing its nuclear status and to
stop obstructing its plans to reunify the Korean peninsula by military means. Hence
diplomatic inducements such as an end of war declaration or a lifting of economic sanctions
are ultimately pointless since these measures merely play into the hands of a bad faith actor
like North Korea. This has become a politically charged debate in late 2021, as South Korea
prepares to inaugurate a new presidential administration in March 2022.
The hawk engagement approach (Cha 2002) that has governed U.S. policy toward
North Korea since the George W. Bush administration emerged in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Agreed Framework. This approach is focused on building a ‘coalition for
punishment’ as exemplified by the maximum pressure sanctions regime. It draws on lessons
learned from what many U.S. analysts view as the farcical diplomacy of ‘peace and
denuclearization’ promoted by progressive administrations in South Korea. The primary
lesson learned is that it results only in providing North Korea with opportunities for extortion.
The concept of negotiating in good faith with North Korea, in this view, is the very definition
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of insanity. It is a losing game that ends up benefiting only North Korea. What sealed this
interpretation for many was the evidence uncovered in the early summer of 2002 of North
Korea’s clandestine experimentation with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) technologies that
violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Agreed Framework. This was viewed as a
retrospective confirmation that the Clinton administration had made a serious strategic
miscalculation in 1994 by effectively rewarding North Korea for its refusal to comply with
international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
Today, there are far more compelling reasons to be skeptical about the potential for a
successful denuclearization of North Korea. It now has a sizeable nuclear arsenal composed
not only of atomic bombs fueled by plutonium or highly enriched uranium but likely also
hydrogen bombs at least ten times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.150 North Korea's nuclear capabilities can serve for deterrence, international
prestige, and coercive diplomacy. Also, the current North Korean regime has described its
'national nuclear forces' as a powerful and reliable war deterrent.151 Howell (2020) has called
it "Nuclear Ideology," which is embedded in North Korea's national ideology of Juche. As was
explained in Chapter 2, Juche could serve as a rationale for the regime to legitimize the
possession of nuclear weapons in terms of its domestic audience (p.1055). Once North Korea
has reinforced the regime’s domestic legitimacy by the development of a nuclear deterrence,
it can catalyze this domestic legitimation to justify its right to existence and to invoke
international sovereignty norms by framing its WMD development as a legitimate means
of deterring external threats to its national security (p. 1056).
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6-4-4. Known Unknowns and Constructive Entanglement
In a recent article on ‘principled negotiation’ as explained by Roger Fisher and
William Ury (2014) in their influential book, Getting to Yes, John Delury (2021) asks if it is
even possible in the context of U.S.-North Korea relations. Clearly, there are two competing
schools of interpretation of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior. In an intriguing
formulation of this hermeneutical challenge, Delury improbably draws on the language of
literary theory. For the purposes of this study, he characterized the alternative explanations
of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior as the ‘comedic school’ while the interpretation
offered in this research project is described as the ‘tragic school’. The question is whether the
tragicomedy of U.S.-North Korea relations can be transcended in a way that would make
principled negotiation feasible. This question ultimately is beyond the scope of this research
project, but Delury suggests two principles of interpretation that help to contextualize it:
namely indeterminacy and entanglement.
In presenting an empathetic perspective on North Korea’s foreign policy behavior,
this project has attempted to raise doubts about the predetermined outcome of diplomatic
efforts to transform U.S.-North Korea relations from hostility to amity. Of course, ardent
advocates of engagement can be as unduly certain of their interpretations as are the sceptics
of engagement. The point of engaging in empathy is to legitimate a degree of ambiguity
about political motivations, desired end states, and all those factors that make it difficult to
achieve principled negotiation. To draw on the insights of Fisher and Ury, as outlined by
Delury, the objective is to separate the problem from people, to identify mutual gains, to
invent new options, and to stick to objective criteria. Obviously, the achievement of this
objective requires taking an empathetic perspective as well toward those who advocate
alternative explanations of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior. The oft-quoted dictum that
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North Korea is one the U.S. most long-running failures of the U.S. intelligence agencies
underscores the need to respect the principle of indeterminacy.
The second principle of entanglement also ultimately relates to the practice of
empathy in analyzing human behavior and its situational imperatives. Empathy is like the
scant cup of water that usually is sufficient to prime the pump that gives access to the
wellspring of human motivations. Without investing a requisite minimum amount of trust in
an unfolding relationship, however, it is impossible to plumb the intentions underlying human
behavior even assuming that the trust may be judged unwarranted after a verification process.
In this context, the cultural interpretations of negotiating behavior can obfuscate as
much as they reveal about the intersubjectivity of intrinsically hostile negotiating partners.
Snyder (pp. 66-67) cites kibun (기분) or ‘good feeling’, kojip (고집) or ‘stubbornness’, and
punŭigi (분위기) or ‘atmosphere’ to characterize the negotiating style of North Koreans.
Arguably, the use of this terminology tends to define North Koreans as ‘the Other’ which
undercuts the need to foster intersubjectivity in pursuit of a mutual accommodation through
negotiations. After all, there is nothing uniquely Korean about these characteristics, but they
may be made to seem so by a strategic use of Korean terms.
In a fundamental sense, entanglement highlights the critical need to bracket hostile
sentiments in the pursuit of principled negotiation. Ironically, there is a Korean term that can
be usefully cited in this context. This term is nunch’i (눈치), which lacks an direct English
equivalent since it typically doesn’t have a behavioral equivalent either. Literally, nunch’i
means to ‘read eyes’ to know how to act in each situation, especially how to treat other
people appropriately based on your relationships and relative positions. It has been
characterized as the ‘social grease’ that keeps social interaction running smoothly. There’s a
faint echo of it in the English term ‘tact’ but it functions on steroids in the Korean context.
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Therefore, it is nearly impossible to conceal underlying sentiments from Korean counterparts
as their nunch’i antennae are picking up signals constantly.
In conclusion, grabbling with the realist challenges underscored by the principle of
indeterminacy and the constructivist opportunities afforded by the principle of entanglement
is a potential way out of the stalemate between the comedic and tragic interpretations of
North Korean diplomatic behavior. Discerning North Korea’s long-range strategic intentions
in a clear-eyed way is surely a legitimate realist imperative but making a constructivist
assessment of how those intentions might be modified through ‘diplomatic entanglement’ is
equally imperative if the goal is to realize peace between the U.S. and North Korea.
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Chapter Ⅶ: Conclusion

7-1. The Grand Summary
This research project has challenged the view that North Korea’s decision to pursue
the development of nuclear weapons and missiles – which it acknowledged for the first time
in 2005 – constituted a fundamental shift in the objectives of its foreign policy toward the
United States. Instead, it argues that North Korea has preserved the basic parameters of the
rapprochement policy that Kim Il Sung first announced in the early 1970s in response to the
U.S.-China détente. Its findings have demonstrated that the policy reorientation toward the
United States ‒ from rapprochement in the 1970s to provocation in the 1990s ‒ was a change
in the means, not the ends, of the policy. In other words, it was a tactical rather than a
strategic change in North Korea’s foreign policy.
This change was in response to the U.S.’s indifference to North Korea’s efforts to
obtain its assistance in overcoming the acute security anxieties that beset it, beginning in the
late 1980s, due to the geopolitical/geoeconomic transformations associated with the end of
the Cold War. The linkages between these two factors – the U.S.’s indifference to North
Korea’s plight in the face of these exogenous factors, and the tactical shift to what effectively
was an asymmetrical deterrence posture in North Korea’s foreign policy toward the United
States – have not been analyzed systematically by the leading experts in the field of North
Korea studies.152 Nor have the implications of the underlying causes of this change in North
Korea’s foreign policy received adequate attention from the policymakers of successive U.S.
administrations over the last thirty years. As a result, a nearly invincible conviction has
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emerged in recent decades, and increasingly is being deepened among foreign policy analysts,
that diplomacy with North Korea is a feckless endeavor inevitably doomed to failure (Tuang
2021).
This research also suggests that an analysis of this neglected policy dimension can be
parlayed into a model, or diplomatic tool kit, for constructing an effective U.S. North Korea
policy. The main components of this model readily emerge from an empathetic investigation
of North Korea’s foreign policy decision-making in recent decades. Specifically, the
investigation shows how North Korea generally has responded pragmatically to the changing
international environment of the Northeast Asian region. Its foreign policy behavior routinely
has been adapted to the situational context. While the policy matrix was modified
significantly when the confrontational approach began to displace the rapprochement
approach in the 1990s, the findings of this research project confirm that North Korea’s core
foreign policy objectives over this period remained basically unchanged since the early 1970s.
When the nuclear program-related developments of the early 1990s are taken out of context
and made the critical starting point for analysis, however, the continuity in the core objectives
of North Korea's foreign policy is bound to be misconstrued, if not entirely overlooked.
By oscillating between cooperation and confrontation in the modality of its
reciprocity, North Korea finally was able to achieve its long-term objective of holding a
series of working level meetings with U.S. counterparts beginning in the late 1980s and direct,
high-level talks on three occasions in the early 1990s. North Korea used these opportunities
both to pursue its longstanding core policy objectives and to develop some new policy
objectives (e.g., the provision of LWRs). Eventually, North Korea’s diplomatic
brinksmanship during this period resulted in the conclusion of a nuclear deal with the United
States – known as the Agreed Framework – to freeze the operations and ongoing construction
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of nuclear reactors that the U.S. suspected were part of a covert nuclear weapons program. In
exchange, the United States agreed to take the leading role in a multilateral, international
project to replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors with two proliferation-resistant
light-water reactors. This historic breakthrough ultimately turned into a pyrrhic victory for
North Korea when the Agreed Framework finally collapsed in late 2002 due to the
unrelenting political opposition to it in the U.S. Congress. By the same token, however, any
sense that the collapse of the Agreed Framework was a victory for the U.S. ‒ or the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime ‒ was dispelled decisively when North Korea
successfully carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006.

7-1-1. The Rationale for Rapprochement
The shift in North Korea’s policy toward the United States in the early 1970s was
inspired by the Nixon Doctrine, which was the policy foundation for the Nixon
administration’s decision to pursue détente between the U.S. and China (Gannon 2008). The
Nixon Doctrine was a strategic reversal of the Truman Doctrine that was adopted on the eve
of the Korean War. It effectively had launched the Cold War by committing the U.S. to the
prevention of the spread of communism worldwide. The Korean War became the impetus for
transforming the U.S. into “a very different country…with hundreds of permanent military
bases abroad, a large standing army and a permanent national security state at home.”153
Nixon had come into office just when the dire consequences of this transformation were on
full display in the quagmire of the Vietnam War. Needing to find a way out of an increasingly
untenable situation, Nixon decided the time had come for the U.S. to take a less aggressive
stance in its foreign policy. In conjunction with an outreach effort to the leaders of the Soviet
153
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Union and China, Nixon began to frame the conflict between the capitalist and communist
ideologies in terms of a diplomatic debate. The Nixon Doctrine was the foreign policy change
underpinning the gradual 'thawing' of the Cold War during the ensuing two decades.
In a joint statement issued on February 28, 1972 (Shanghai Communiqué 1972), the
U.S. and China affirmed that the détente was based on their mutual acceptance of the
following five core principles:
1) respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity;
2) nonaggression against other states;
3) noninterference in the internal affairs of other states;
4) peaceful coexistence without regard to ideological differences; and
5) equality.
These five principles are fundamentally in accord with the ‘eight-point proposal for national
salvation’ promulgated by the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea in April 1971.154
Kim Il Sung underscored this alignment in January 1972 during an interview in Pyongyang
with visiting Japanese journalists from the Yomiuri Shimbun. Addressing their question
about the process of Korean reunification, Kim said:
We have constantly maintained that the question of the reunification of our country,
an internal affair of our nation, should be solved not by the interference of outside
forces, but by the efforts of the Korean people themselves, and not by means of war,
but in a peaceful way.155
Moreover, in a further indication of its linkage with the negotiations leading to the détente
between China and the U.S., North Korea’s eight-point ‘peace proposal’ was referenced
explicitly in the Shanghai Communiqué.156
North Korea’s rapprochement initiative in the early 1970s was aimed at getting the
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U.S. to adopt its eight-point program, which would make U.S. policy toward the Korean
peninsula consistent with the principles underlying its détente with China. The changing
geopolitical situation in Asia in the aftermath of the U.S.’s adoption of the Nixon Doctrine
had created an expectation among the North Korean leadership that this objective would be
feasible. The successful U.S.-China détente seemed to confirm this assessment.
The withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Korea was the linchpin of North
Korea’s formula for a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. In this formula, the
deployment of U.S. troops in South Korea was the primary obstacle that the Korean people
faced in their efforts to achieve national reunification on their own, without pressure from the
U.S. or other outsiders. In a conversation with the Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu,
during his visit to Pyongyang in June 1971, Kim Il Sung explained how he had come to
realize that reunification would be feasible only “by peaceful means” since any other
“solution” could “trigger a global-scale war” which “the peoples of the world will not
welcome.” More critically, Kim noted, neither China nor the Soviet Union were willing “to
get involved in such a confrontation.”157 While many analysts in the U.S. and South Korea at
the time took Kim’s commitment to peaceful reunification to be subterfuge – as many still do
even today – it is reasonable to wonder why Kim would have said something he did not mean
on such a sensitive topic during a confidential conversation with a kindred spirit
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Figure 5. The U.S.-China Détente and North Korea’s Policy Toward the U.S.

The China-U.S. Détente

The Agreed Issues
Sovereignty & territorial integrity of all states
Nonaggression against other states
Noninterference in internal affairs of other states
Equality and mutual benefit/Peaceful coexistence
Withdrawal of foreign troops from other countries

The Agreed Principles
Progress toward normalization between the two countries
Reduction of the danger of international military conflict
Both do not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region
Both will not collude with one another against other
countries.

North Korea’s Linked-Issue Approach

Goals

Approaches

The Eight-Points:

Rapprochement with People’s Diplomacy:

Withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea
Discontinue military assistance to South Korea
Accord North Korea equal status with South Korea
Prevent Japan from intervening in Korean affairs
Disband UNCURK
Leave the Korean Question to Koreans themselves
Let North Korea participate in the annual UN
debate on the Korean Question unconditionally.

Inviting visits by Korea American scholars
Hosting delegations of anti-imperialist organizations
Establishing ties with the American Communist Party
Supporting progressive Korean-American groups
Liaison with the American-Korean Friendship and
Information Center (AKFIC)
Organizing the Committee for Solidarity with the
People of North Korea in California
Organizing the United Front for Democracy of North
Korea in New York

Other:
To support self-determination, inviolability of
other countries, non-intervention of foreign
governments, peaceful coexistence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and a peace treaty.

Other:
Sending letters to the U.S. Congress (1973 & 1974)
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Moreover, there is no evidence that Kim Il Sung ever wavered for the rest of his life from this
position on peaceful reunification as the only viable option, either in his public statements or
in private conversations.
Accordingly, in Kim Il Sung’s view, a peaceful Korean reunification ultimately
would hinge on successfully meeting two preconditions: the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces
from South Korea and the reinforcement of the “growing revolutionary impetus” in South
Korea. To satisfy the first precondition, however, it would be necessary as well to have an
assurance that Japan would not step into the military vacuum created by the withdrawal of the
U.S. armed forces. As for the second precondition, in Kim Il Sung’s view, reunification
ultimately would depend as well on Park Chung-hee’s removal from office and the
establishment of a “genuine democracy”158 in South Korea.
Despite the strong opposition in South Korea to Park’s dictatorial rule, which gave
rise to a vibrant democracy movement during the early 1970s, the optimism Kim Il Sung
expressed about the feasibility of satisfying the second precondition clearly was misplaced.159
The ‘silent majority’ in South Korea – who at least passively supported Park – did not show
signs of harboring a ‘revolutionary impetus’ or hankering to adopt a North Korean peace
proposal. Still, the proposal represented a potential basis for dialogue since it did not
advocate the ‘unification by absorption’ option, which generally has been unacceptable to
both sides since the 1970s.160 Rather, it envisioned the establishment of a confederation
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wherein both Koreas would retain their own economic and political systems under a federal
parliament and government overseeing the external affairs of the unified state. While there
are many reasons for skepticism about the viability of this kind of arrangement, politicians
and scholars in South Korea have advocated similar proposals over the years. The Nordpolitik
policy launched in 1988 by Roh Tae-woo, the then-president of South Korea, included a
proposal for a ‘Korean Community’ that paralleled North Korea’s proposal for a
confederation. Progressive South Korean political leaders like Kim Dae-jung have shared – in
varying degrees – Kim Il Sung’s optimism about the model’s potential to foster reconciliation
between the two Koreas on the road to eventual reunification.
In late July 1971, immediately after the conclusion of Henry Kissinger’s secret visit
to Beijing, Zhou Enlai traveled to Pyongyang to brief Kim Il Sung on the outcome of the
U.S.-China détente negotiations. During this briefing, on the critical issue of the U.S. troop
deployment in South Korea, Zhou quoted Kissinger as saying:
… after the Indochina war ends and the ROK troops return to Korea, I would think it
quite conceivable that before the end of the next term of President Nixon, most, if not
all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea.161
Zhou also reported that Kissinger had dismissed the prospect of Japanese forces replacing the
departing U.S. armed forces in the Asian theater, whether in Taiwan or in South Korea. For
Kim Il Sung, then, it seemed from Zhou’s briefing that at least the first of the preconditions
for the Korean people to determine their own political future without outside (especially, U.S.)
interference would be met. Accordingly, Kim concluded that Korean reunification through
inter-Korean dialogue based on North Korea’s ‘peace proposal’ was on the verge of becoming
more feasible because of the U.S.-China détente.
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7-1-2. The Obstacles to Rapprochement
Doubling down on the opportunity seemingly being offered by the U.S.-China
détente, North Korea immediately launched the ambitious program of outreach efforts and
civilian exchanges with the U.S. described in Chapter Three. Most notably, the unprecedented
transmittal of two official letters from the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly to the
U.S. Congress essentially demanded a realignment of U.S. policy toward the Korean
peninsula based on the five principles articulated in the Shanghai Communiqué. The
American-Korean Friendship and Information Center (AKFIC) supported North Korea’s
demand by mounting a wide-ranging lobbying effort in the U.S. This effort sought to leverage
the anti-foreign interventionism sentiment in the U.S., which was rampant during final phase
of the Vietnam War, to gain support among the American public for the withdrawal of the U.S.
armed forces from South Korea.
While there was no official reply from the U.S. government or any of its agencies to
the various civilian and inter-governmental outreach efforts by North Korea, a review of the
U.S.’s Korea policy actually was underway already within the U.S. Department of State. The
review was conducted under the auspices of an Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the
Pacific. This group was chaired by the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian
Affairs, Richard Sneider, who subsequently served as U.S. ambassador to South Korea from
1974 to 1978. In early April 1973, the group produced a report that reviewed the U.S.
government’s policy toward the Korean peninsula (Sneider 1972). It addressed the issues of
concern to North Korea, albeit if only by indirection. Specifically, the report analyzed the
main trends in the geopolitical situation of the Korean peninsula and proposed options for
reorienting U.S. policy to accommodate these trends, as feasible, within the scope of the
U.S.’s national interest.
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Judging from its singular focus on the policy implications of the then-ongoing
“accommodation between North Korea and South Korea” (i.e., the inter-Korean dialogue),
the policy review apparently was initiated in response to the North-South Joint Communiqué
of July 4, 1972.162 At the same time, however, the group also had to grabble with the issue of
a growing fear of abandonment that was fueling heated disputes between Seoul and
Washington over trade and American military aid in this same period. The proximate cause of
this fear of abandonment ‒ as a subsequent scandal163 made abundantly clear ‒ was President
Nixon’s decision in 1972 to reduce the number of U.S. troops deployed in South Korea from
63,000 to 43,000.
This partial withdrawal of U.S. troops was exploited by the Park Chung-hee
administration and its supporters who were quick to characterize it as a message from the U.S.
saying “we won’t rescue you if North Korea invades again.”164 For the Park administration,
though, the troop reduction served as a convenient justification for its adoption of the Yushin
(‘Restoration’) constitution, which included a declaration of martial law, dissolution of the
National Assembly, and a ban on all antigovernment activity. This ‘restoration’ retained a
semblance of democratic governance while granting unfettered powers to Park Chung-hee
and making him eligible to remain in office for as long as he wished. In effect, it made Park
Chung-hee’s autocratic rule in South Korea essentially equivalent to Kim Il Sung’s autocratic
rule in North Korea. As a potential further parallel, it also led South Korea to initiate a
clandestine nuclear weapons program, which it abandoned only under pressure after the U.S.
discovered it in 1976.
162

163

164

Gowman, 1972. The choice of the date for issuing the Joint Communiqué – July 4 – was not accidental, which hardly
could have gone unnoticed in Washington.
In 1976, the tensions between Seoul and Washington came to a head when a Congressional influence-buying scandal,
known as ‘Koreagate’, was uncovered. Tongsun Park, the South Korean lobbyist who orchestrated the scandal,
channeled funds from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to at least ten Democratic members of the U.S.
Congress. The goal was to obtain U.S. congressional support for a reversal of Nixon's decision on troop levels in South
Korea.
Oberdorfer & Carlin 2014, p. 11.

２２６

With this complex mix of issues in mind, the report of the Interdepartmental Group
for East Asia and the Pacific determined that inter-Korean dialogue was acceptable to the U.S.
government, provided it remained compliant with the following minimum criteria:
▪

▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

a stable relationship was preserved between South Korea and North Korea at
reduced levels of tension;
a stable framework was maintained for peaceful competition among the major
powers;
political stability and an opportunity for economic growth in South Korea were
safeguarded;
adequate military security was assured for South Korea, including U.S. military
access;
protection was guaranteed for U.S. financial and commercial interests in South
Korea; and
a role was made available for North Korea that was consistent with the need for
stability in the region.

In view of these criteria, the study group suggested four general ways of reorienting
U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula:
▪
▪

▪

▪

allowing South Korea to take the lead in the inter-Korean dialogue with the U.S.
taking only initiatives acceptable and agreed to by South Korea;
retarding the inter-Korean dialogue if the U.S. determined that North Korea was
not seriously interested in détente or if the Soviet Union or China were not
prepared to continue to cooperate over the long term in normalizing relations in
the region;
encouraging the inter-Korean dialogue by playing an active role in line with but
separate from South Korea’s actions, with differing degrees of activity depending
on specific circumstances; and
pursuing major power negotiations, based on the assumption that an active great
power role was essential to the development of inter-Korean relations.

In the final analysis, then, the policy recommendation was that the U.S. could
‘tolerate’ inter-Korean dialogue ‒ or potentially even facilitate it ‒ provided the dialogue did
not threaten regional stability or impede the pursuit of the U.S.’s interests in the region. At the
same time, it affirmed that North Korea’s priorities should be subordinated to all the other
priorities cited in the report. Given these policy guidelines, and the unstable situation in South

２２７

Korea, it was a foregone conclusion that the U.S. government would reaffirm the need to
maintain the deployment of its troops in South Korea and to continue the provision of
military assistance. Both were declared to be critical for deterring North Korean aggression
(pace Kim Il Sung) and restraining the nuclear capabilities of China and the Soviet Union.
As a result, North Korea’s rapprochement initiative in the 1970s failed to gain any
traction whatsoever in Washington. This outcome became irreversible when the inter-Korean
dialogue also proved to be short-lived and North-South tensions were revived. Successive
U.S. administrations determined that managing relations with Seoul during the draconian
military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s was a difficult enough challenge for
Washington without adding the establishment of relations with Pyongyang to the mix. In any
case, North Korea had no leverage over the U.S. during this period. Likewise, while China
had lent its support to North Korea’s eight-point proposal during the détente negotiations in
the early 1970s, ultimately it had other more pressing geopolitical priorities that trumped its
moral support for North Korea’s proposal and the aspiration for the right of selfdetermination embodied in it.165
This series of developments eventually morphed into the U.S.’s default foreign
policy stance toward the Korean peninsula: a self-interested guardianship over South Korea
to ‘protect’ it against North Korea, which canonically was viewed as an existential threat
looming in the background. In the end, therefore, U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea
remained focused squarely on its implications for the Great Power relationships in the
Northeast Asia (or the Indo-Pacific) region with the stable management of the U.S.-South
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This concurrence of views reflected a shared bias about the ‘danger’ posed by the ‘impulsive nature of Koreans’. For
example, during their meeting on February 23, 1972, Zhou agreed with Nixon when he offered the following assessment:
“The Koreans, both the North and the South, are emotionally impulsive people. It is important that both of us exert
influence to see that these impulses, and their belligerency, don't create incidents which would embarrass our two
countries. It would be silly, and unreasonable to have the Korean peninsula be the scene of a conflict between our two
governments. It happened once, and it must never happen again” (Memcon. 1972b, p. 17).
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Korea alliance relationship as a corollary issue.166

7-1-3. The Regime in Survival Mode
In many ways, North Korea in the early 1990s was the mirror image of North Korea
in the early 1970s. This was manifested in the devastating reversal of its geo/ecopolitical
position vis-à-vis South Korea. This reversal directly impacted North Korea’s overall
international standing and its bilateral relationships with the other countries in the region.
Rather than the image of a self-confident (perhaps “overconfident”167) model for the future of
the reunified Korean nation that it had projected convincingly in the 1970s, North Korea in
the 1990s was being outflanked in virtually every sphere168 by a rising South Korea reveling
in the afterglow of its highly successful hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games.
By contrast, North Korea’s only memorable association with this transformative
experience for South Korea is the November 1987 terrorist bombing of KAL Flight 858.
While this act of terrorism is indefensible, and fortunately failed to achieve the goal of
derailing the games, it reveals the intensity of North Korea’s desire to be recognized as a
cohost of the 1988 Olympic Games.169 North Korea felt deep animosity over the highhanded
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On February 1, 1972, Kim Tae-chung (i.e., Kim Dae-jung) – who was the leader of the opposition party in South Korea’s
National Assembly at the time and Park Chung-hee’s main political rival – had a conversation with the staff of the
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Kim expressed his view that the Park Chung-hee
administration was exaggerating the danger of a North Korean attack. By doing so, Kim said, Park was sabotaging the
then-ongoing Red Cross Talks and threatening to curtail the inter-Korean dialogue that Washington nominally supported.
While recognizing that Kim Il Sung had a political motive for proposing peace talks, Kim Dae-jung said that at least Kim
Il Sung was “trying to be more flexible” and “Park was the more militaristic of the two.” Citing a series of ‘provocations’
North Korea had committed – beginning in 1950 (!) – the Bureau’s staff basically dismissed Kim Dae-jung’s prescient
assessment. In their view, these provocations by North Korea were a confirmation of its endemic, aggressive nature that
needed to be countered and suppressed by all available means. As it turned out, the ‘available means’ soon extended to
acquiescing in the suppression of democracy in South Korea (Memcon. 1972a).
Schaefer 2010.
In terms of GDP per capita, South Korea ($205-$208) is believed to have overtaken North Korea ($194-$197) as early as
1969. Schaefer 2010, p. 10.
It was a potential crisis of identity given the competition for national legitimacy between North Korea and South Korea.
Pyongyang compromised by adjusting its initial cohosting request for a fifty-fifty split of the events (i.e., 11 events) to a
one-third split (i.e., 8 events). Eventually, the IOC offered North Korea two full events and two partial events on a takeit-or-leave it basis. While indicating it could be flexible about the types of events, North Korea declared that a one-third
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treatment it had received from both South Korea and the International Olympic Committee.
From its perspective, by stringing North Korea along for three years, as a strategy to undercut
any prospect of it being able to muster support for boycotting the games among its allies,
arguably they had exercised bad faith during the co-hosting negotiations.170
Ironically, however, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games ended up being more than just a
‘coming-out party’ to celebrate South Korea’s debut on the world stage. They also were the
impetus for a crucial pivot in South Korea’s relations with North Korea under the aegis of the
Nordpolitik policy. While wary of the potential existential threat posed by this initiative, in a
familiar pragmatic accommodation to the shifting geopolitical situation, North Korea
accepted South Korea’s invitation to engage is a series of high-level discussions about ways
to improve North-South relations. As a result, the two sides succeeded in reaching two
historic agreements, one on their ‘special interim relationship’ and another on a nuclear
weapons-free future for the Korean peninsula. Known informally as the Basic Agreements,
these historic accords were formalized between December 1991 and January 1992, and
submitted jointly to the Conference on Disarmament by the permanent representatives to the
United Nations of North Korea and South Korea on March 25, 1992.
From the very beginning, though, the prospects for a smooth implementation of the
agreements were clouded. As an assertive engagement strategy, South Korea recognized in
principle that Nordpolitik would succeed only if it were synchronized with a plausible effort
to negotiate with North Korea in good faith. Theory and practice, however, were not always
in accord. For example, while taking the leading role in the drafting process for the Basic
Agreements, South Korea generated 90 percent of the language. Thus, North Korea’s sense of
‘ownership’ of the agreements effectively was marginalized. This became a critical factor in
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split was “a matter of principle” and resolutely refused to budge on its final bargaining position while warning about the
consequences (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, p. 143).
Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, pp. 144-146.
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the case of the agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which predictably
was especially vulnerable to disputes over implementation. Ultimately, issues involving
inspection procedures to verify compliance blocked its effective implementation.
In the 1990s, when South Korea’s international standing was on the rise while North
Korea’s was on the decline, the effectiveness of the Nordpolitik policy as a driver of interKorean reconciliation was increasingly limited. The policy greatly enhanced South Korea's
international standing, but it left North Korea more isolated than previously both
economically and politically (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, pp. 202-206).
In the interim, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened the way for the United States
to become the sole superpower in the international system. This was a sea change in the
international environment and system, and all countries had to adapt their foreign policy
accordingly. By the early 1990s, North Korea was already behind the eight ball in adapting to
this challenge because of the residual consequences of its failed attempts to increase trade
with Western Europe and Japan in the 1970s. It ultimately fell victim to the vicissitudes of the
emerging neoliberal, capitalist world economy in the 1970s, and was unable to service its
growing foreign debts, which precipitated a cascading economic decline during the 1980s.
Ultimately, though, the proximate cause of North Korea’s complete economic collapse in the
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Figure 6. China and the Soviet Union Normalizations with South Korea
and
North Korea’s Confrontational Approach
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mid-1990s was “the geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts associated with the end of the Cold
War.”171

171

Gray and Lee 2021, p. 112.
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The impact on North Korea of the normalization of relations with South Korea by the
Soviet Union/Russia and China was discussed in Chapter Five. Ideally, the newly emerging
inter-Korean relationship facilitated by the Nordpolitik policy could have served as a remedy
for South Korea’s ‘cooptation’ of North Korea’s two most important allies. While the
successful conclusion of the Basic Agreements was a promising step in that direction,
ultimately neither of the ‘preconditions’ North Korea had envisioned for a peaceful Korean
reunification were met. The U.S. armed forces remained deployed in South Korea, and there
were no signs of the emergence of a ‘revolutionary impetus’ in South Korea. The dramatic
breakthrough in the democratization process in South Korea – after the June 29 Declaration
of 1987 signaled the impending end of a quarter century of military dictatorships – largely
satisfied the popular demand for a change of government. In the end, as one leading scholar
of the democratization process in South Korea has argued: “The rapidly changing political
situation in South Korea served as a disincentive for North Korea to proceed with any serious
discussion with Seoul.”172
North Korea’s confrontational approach centered on the development of its nuclear
program in the early 1990s reflected the deliberate prioritizing of a strategy for normalizing
diplomatic relations with the United States. Aware of the failure of its previous démarche in
the 1970s, if it were to be successful this time, North Korea recognized that it needed to
acquire the kind of leverage the U.S. would recognize. While it is impossible to assert with
any certainty precisely when North Korea’s ‘nuclear program’ also became a ‘nuclear
weapons program’, the shift to a confrontational approach is not conclusive proof that North
Korea made a decision at that point to develop a full-blown, active nuclear weapons program.
A more probable interpretation is that North Korea’s confrontational approach was
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Han 1988, p. 60.
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adopted mainly to get the U.S.’s attention by exploiting its determination to prevent nuclear
weapons proliferation.173 Considering the IAEA’s evidence of three experimental plutonium
reprocessing runs conducted by North Korea, nuclear weapons-related research seems to have
begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The development of nuclear weapons was not the
sole or even primary purpose of the nuclear program, however, as is shown by Pyongyang's
initiation of a proposal to have its proliferation-prone graphite-moderated reactors replaced
by proliferation-resistent LWRs. After all, as a tool of diplomacy, ambiguity about the
development of nuclear weapons can serve the purpose just as well as the actual development
of functioning nuclear weapons. The same applies in the context of deterrence.
Once diplomacy had encountered a major, irreversible impasse, as it did when the
Agreed Framework deal ended in 2002, a different calculus became relevant to North Korea’s
foreign policy decision-making. In early 2003, only after the U.S. had signaled its complete
lack of interest in reviving the deal,174 North Korea declared its intention to develop an
arsenal of nuclear weapons and the related delivery systems. Subsequently, following the
succesful conclusion of its first nulear test in October 2006, the development of nuclear
weapons became an integral part of North Korea's national security strategy.
Many analysts have seized on this development as proof that North Korea has never
been serious about denuclearization negotiations. Rather, they argue, North Korea finally was
providing proof in 2006 that it had been determined all along to arm itself with the nuclear
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There are exceptions, of course, to this anti-proliferation stance. When the U.S. has supported a country’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons for geopolitical reasons (e.g., Israel, India, and Pakistan), it has not pressured the country to join the
NPT (Beinart 2021). Some even compare North Korea unfavorably to these NPT-non-compliant countries for having
joined the NPT only to subsequently withdraw from it! It is splitting hairs but I guess the argument is that setting a
precedent for a withdrawal from the NPT is a bigger offense than not joining the NPT in the first place.
Donald Gregg, the chairman of The Korea Society and a former ambassador to South Korea, obtained a personal
message from Chairman Kim Jong-il to President George W. Bush in early November 2002. The message included an
offer to “satisfy U.S. concerns” about the alleged HEU program that threatened to end the Agreed Framework. Gregg
conveyed the message to Deputy National Security Council Adviser Stephen Hadley. After taking only a quick look at it,
Hadley brusquely dismissed the message saying: “We don’t reward bad behavior.” For further details, see Oberdorfer and
Carlin, 2014, pp. 366-377; Gregg, 2014, pp. 290-292.
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weapons and the missiles needed to target the United States. As Leon Sigal of the Northeast
Asia Cooperative Security Project has pointed out, however, there are serious problems with
this ‘proof’:
That criticism overlooks Pyongyang’s willingness to stop making fissile material for
weapons for over a decade in the 1990s – at a time when it had no nuclear weapons.
It also ignores its offer to end the development, production, and deployment of
longer-range missiles in the summer of 2000.175
This determination to adopt a one-sided perspective on North Korea’s foreign policy behavior
smacks of projection. It also reflects a lack of curiosity about what would motivate any
country to develop offensive weapons that make it vulnerable to being labeled an
international pariah by the most influential country in the world.

7-2. The Situational Influences on North Korea’s Foreign Policy Decisions
This study has been guided by a predictive model of foreign policy behavior that
explains foreign policy outcomes as the product of strategic decision-making by relationally
embed actors responding to situational influences in either intentional or ad hoc ways
(Hudson et alia 1989). This analytical framework for interpreting foreign policy behavior is
useful as a counter to the instinctive human tendency to interpret an adversary’s actions as
“blameworthy because of the enemy’s ‘bad’ disposition rather than situational concerns.”176
This tendency is generally given free rein in studies of the foreign policy decision-making of
states, such as North Korea, which have been the brunt of long-standing, propaganda policies
imbued with pervasive ‘demonization’ that were consciously adopted and carefully nurtured
in the U.S. over the last 70 years by government agencies and mainstream media for
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Sigal 2020, p. 2.
Boyd-Judson 2011, p. 4.

２３５

geopolitical advantage or other reasons (Gauthier 2016).177 The result of this systemic
demonization is a widespread perception of North Korea in the U.S. as somehow uniquely
‘evil, aggressive, and irrational’. This perception serves as the underpinning for an almost
kneejerk reliance among U.S. foreign policymakers on coercive diplomacy, or at a minimum,
a policy of diplomatic isolation. Basically, it is a Cold War era survival based on a pernicious
circular dynamic:
They started first, we responded. They broke their word, we adjusted our position.
They are offensive, we are defensive. They invade, we keep the peace. They talk
peace, but plan war. We mean peace, but reluctantly must plan war. We would love to
disarm as long as they disarm first.178
This pervasive conceptual bias is not conducive to an empathetic understanding of
the factors that accounted for the shift in North Korea’s foreign policy stance toward the
United States between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. It may be emotionally or morally
satisfying – by some definitions – to condemn North Korea’s foreign policy behavior as the
manifestation of an evil disposition or the desperation of a failed state. North Korea’s foreign
policy, however, is more readily understood as an adaptation to changes in the international
environment in the Asia Pacific region. This even accounts for the frequent resort to
diplomatic brinksmanship by North Korea. The prioritizing of a dispositional rather than a
situational analysis of North Korean behavior often is further reinforced by a symbiotic
commingling of a human rights discourse with realpolitik policies. This is a self-defeating
diplomatic tactic, however, if the immediate goal is to open a dialogue with North Koreans
(Jasper 2021). Over the last several decades, the tendency to collapse the analysis of political,
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There are some scholars (e.g., Kim 2010 and Cho 2014) who break with the mainstream in the field of North Korea
studies to provide more nuanced second-image analyses that do not conflate the presumed ‘evil’ moral qualities of the
North Korean regime with its foreign policy behavior. While they cite the regime’s insecurity and its mode of decisionmaking as factors accounting for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, they argue that these internal attributes are
linked inextricably with the external security situation. The external security situation is what poses the structural
challenges that primarily drive North Korea’s decision-making in the realm of foreign and domestic policy.
Thompson 1988, pp. 155-167. Quoted in Boyd-Judson 2011, p. 4.
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economic, welfare, and humanitarian issues into a single ‘securitizing framework’ has not led
to a better understanding of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior or to an improvement in
its human rights practices. This framework may have seemed to be a useful paradigm during
the Cold War, but currently it functions more as a rationale for blocking rather than
enhancing the agency of North Koreans (Smith 2000).179
If North Korea is stipulated as the actor whose behavior needs to be explained, the
source or cause of the core problem its foreign policy behavior seeks to address is the United
States and its hostile foreign policy. The subject or entity suffering because of this problem is
the entire Korean nation, not just North Korea but also South Korea and potentially even
Koreans living in the diaspora. In its efforts to address this core problem, North Korea has
developed relationships not just with the primary target of its foreign policy behaviors (i.e.,
the U.S.) but also with several actual or potential facilitators (including the Soviet
Union/Russia, China, South Korea, etc.) who sometimes have assumed instead the subversive
role of an aggravator. The behavioral properties manifested in each of these relationships
include: 1) affect (i.e., manifest feelings of approval or disapproval); 2) commitment (i.e., a
dedication to purpose); and 3) instruments (i.e., the skills and resources of statecraft). As for
the factors affecting the motivation to act, the dimensions with the most significant
implications for an actor’s degree of autonomy include: prior affect (i.e., expressed feelings
toward another); salience (i.e., dependency on the status, actions, resources of another) and
relative capabilities (i.e., comparative standing in terms of security, economic capacity,
international status, etc.).
From the mid-1950s until at least the mid- to late-1960s, North Korea’s prior affect
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Under the Trump administration’s maximum pressure sanctions policy, for example, it became virtually impossible to
organize track II opportunities for North Koreans.
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toward the U.S. was mainly defined by feelings of extreme hostility and disapproval.180
Afterall, the U.S. intervention in the Korean civil war launched by North Korea in June 1950
frustrated a nearly 30-year long project of national liberation. That is, from North Korea’s
perspective, the national liberation project began with the guerrilla warfare conducted by
Korean partisans in Manchukuo in the 1920s against the Japanese colonial occupation of
Korea. For this reason, Kim Il Sung’s desire to end the division of the Korean nation – a
desire shared by virtually all Koreans at the time – was not the sole motivation for igniting
the civil war on June 25, 1950. Another major motivation was the desire to block an apparent
U.S. plan to effectively restore Japan’s suzerainty over the Korean peninsula (Cummings
1997, p. 22).181
Clearly, then, all the components of the situational imperative model would predict
the outbreak of the Korean War as a foregone conclusion given the total mismatch between
American and Korean objectives and perceptions.182 Of course, in terms of relative
capabilities, North Korea should have been defeated decisively by the ‘coalition of the
willing’ that the UN had authorized the U.S. to organize and deploy in Korea under the
misleading designation of the United Nations Command. The day was saved for North Korea
180
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There always has been an element of ambivalence about the U.S. among North Koreans, however, due to the influential
role played by (mostly) American Christian missionaries in the northern half of the Korean peninsula that today is North
Korea. These missionaries played a prominent role in Korea – North and South – from the late 1880s until they were
expelled from Korea by the Japanese colonial authorities in the mid-20th century on the eve of the outbreak of WW II.
Besides religious proselytization, the missionaries introduced Koreans to foreign modernity by establishing Western
educational and medical facilities. By the early 20th century, due to the unusually successful proselytization achieved in
Pyongyang, the city had become known as the ‘Jerusalem of the East’ in Christian enclaves throughout East Asia. Kim Il
Sung grew up in a family of practicing Presbyterians. His father attended Sungsil Academy, which was a Christian
secondary school located in Pyongyang. His mother was a devoted Christian, the daughter of a prominent Presbyterian
elder, who took her son to church with her regularly until he was in his early teens (C’hoe 1986).
Kim Il Sung was not wrong about this U.S. plan. Dean Acheson, the then-U.S. undersecretary of state, was committed to
the establishment of a ‘great crescent’ linking Japan with Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and ultimately the oil of the
Persian Gulf. This would require reorienting U.S. policy “away from the Pentagon’s idea that the Korean peninsula had
no strategic significance, toward seeing its value in the context of rebuilding the Japanese economy and applying the
containment doctrine to South Korea” (Cummings 2010, pp. 208-209).
To describe the outbreak of the Korean War as a North Korean provocation – as Kim Dae-jung’s interlocutors did during
his visit to the state department in 1972 – is problematic. It amounts to saying ‘Koreans invaded Korea’ because the
demarcation line was not a recognized international boundary. Moreover, only a few months later, the UN forces justified
their crossing of the same line in their northward drive on the grounds that the line was an ‘imaginary boundary’. It also
is an uncomfortable truth that the northward drive was not authorized by the UN. Hence it was a better fit for being
described as an invasion.
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only by China’s decisive intervention at the eleventh hour, along with some back up logistical
support from the Soviet Union. The hostilities came to an inconclusive end, with the signing
of an armistice agreement in July 1953. This outcome was enough to enable Kim Il Sung to
claim victory over the U.S. and deflect attention away from his miscalculation in launching
the southward invasion.
Over the subsequent decade, however, North Korea quickly recovered from the
ravages of the war by making extraordinary progress in its reconstruction efforts. It soon
became a poster child of a seemingly miraculous economic development,183 due to the aide
provided by the Soviet Union, China, and several countries in the Eastern Bloc, but mostly
because of the herculean efforts of North Koreans themselves. After successfully recovering
from the massive war damage, especially the destruction wreaked by the unrelenting U.S.
bombing raids, North Korea was brimming with self-confidence by the early 1970s.
It was not surprising that North Koreans at this juncture turned their attention once
again squarely to the core problem of ‘reunification for national salvation’. The development
of an eight-point program for this purpose – inspired by similar programs in Vietnam at the
time – was an effort aimed at defining the terms of an acceptable normalization of relations
with the U.S. To properly analyze the interplay of motivation and capability demonstrated by
this development, however, the unique cultural and historical characteristics and processes
underpinning the foreign policy behavior of North Koreans must be factored into the
model.184
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This was a ‘Miracle on the Daedong’, so to speak, which predated the ‘Miracle on the Han’ in South Korea a little over a
decade later.
While the Situational Imperative Model focuses attention on empirical and observable relations between actors, and
examines declarations, policies and behaviors displayed by one actor towards another, it does not align fully with
behaviorism. That is, it does not assume that actors are ‘black boxes’ whose internal processes are completely
inaccessible. Rather, by “shifting from the orientation of an outside observer to that of one of the actors in the situation”
(Hudson et alia 1989, p. 117), the situational approach endeavors to “see the world as others see it” (Fulbright 1989, pp.
195-196). This shift from an etic to emic perspective in the analysis of international relations, or the utilization of a
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In the 1970s – and even today, albeit less explicitly – both North Korea and South
Korea consider themselves to be the sole legitimate representative of the Korean nation and,
accordingly, claim sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula. In the competition for
national legitimacy in the early 1970s, however, North Korea believed it had a far more
substantial claim to this status than South Korea.

This conviction was based not just on

ideological grounds, but also on its greater success in overcoming post-colonial dependency
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The North Korean leadership confidently concluded
that a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula would come about organically under its
leadership once the U.S. armed forces were withdrawn from South Korea. As the main
obstacle to the autonomy of the Korean nation, then, the salience of the U.S. loomed large in
North Korea’s foreign policy behavior. The challenge was to formulate and implement a
foreign policy capable of neutralizing the U.S.’s greater relative capabilities exemplified by
its deployment in South Korea of troops armed with tactical nuclear weapons.
As was explained in Chapter Four, North Korea’s unilateral decision in the early
1970s to change its foreign policy stance toward the United States from hostile, nonengagement to rapprochement was a direct consequence of the U.S.-China détente. In terms
of the model, at the start of the détente negotiations, North Korea (the ‘actor’) had a prior
affect (the ‘motivation for action’) that was deeply hostile toward the U.S. (the ‘source’)
because of its role in blocking national reunification (the ‘problem’) ever since the Korean
War.185 When it appeared that the U.S. might be willing to reduce its military presence in the
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combination of both perspectives, also underpins the practice of strategic moral diplomacy that entails “conceding
contrary moral positions to reach political goals” (Boyd-Judson 2011, p. 2).
Memories of the relentless U.S. bombing raids during the war, which included an indiscriminate use of napalm, were still
vivid in the 1970s. Nearly 600,000 tons of bombs were dropped by the U.S. in Korea, which was almost four times the
quantity dopped in Japan during the Pacific War. Most were dropped on Korean territory north of the 38th parallel,
including an estimated 428,000 bombs dropped on Pyongyang alone, which was more than the number of the city’s
residents at the time. General Curtis LeMay, the head of the U.S. Strategic Air Command during the war, claimed in his
autobiography that the bombing “killed off over a million civilian Koreans and drove several million more from their
homes, with the inevitable additional tragedies bound to ensue” (Quoted in Beal 2021b, p. 7).
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Asia Pacific region as the price of a new relationship with China, however, North Korea
recognized an opportunity for itself in the détente negotiations. Specifically, the leadership in
Pyongyang reasoned that the eight-point program it had formulated the previous year was
more likely to be accepted by the U.S. if it were conveyed on their behalf by Zhou En-lai (the
‘facilitator’) during the détente negotiations. Therefore, the rapprochement approach (the
‘instrument’) emerged in response to the prospect of gaining leverage over the U.S. (the
‘source’) to overcome its opposition to reunification (the ‘problem’). This prospect
effectively served to neutralize (the ‘commitment’) North Korea’s hostility (the ‘prior affect’)
toward the U.S.
The eight-point program was consistent with the rapprochement approach since it
specified the essential conditions for a de facto détente between the U.S. and North Korea.
The achievement of this outcome, however, hinged on the U.S.’s acceptance of North Korea’s
critical demands. Namely, North Korea was rather stridently186 seeking the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula, the reduction of tensions, and the establishment of
conditions favorable to an autonomous, peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. North
Korea expected China (the ‘facilitator’) to pressure the U.S. during the détente negotiations to
accept these demands, especially the demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South
Korea. Meanwhile, though, South Korea (the ‘aggravator’) was pressuring the U.S. to reject
North Korea’s demands. In the end, Kissinger’s assurance to Zhou Enlai notwithstanding,
South Korea was more successful than China in influencing the U.S. decision-making on the
deployment of its armed forces in South Korea.
Encouraged by China’s efforts on its behalf, and without being daunted by the
prospect of South Korea’s disruptive potential, North Korea doubled down on its
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Kissinger complained bitterly about the tone of the eight-point program when Zhou gave it to him. He regained his
composure after being coaxed by Zhou to focus on the content rather than the tone (Memcon 1971, p. 8).
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rapprochement initiative by taking direct action (the ‘commitment’) to implement its shift in
policy toward the U.S. It did so by launching a wide-ranging ‘people’s diplomacy’ initiative
(the ‘instrument’), which was aimed primarily at the United States but also encompassed
South Korea and Japan. This initiative was propelled by the same core objective of getting
the U.S. government to realign its policies toward the Korean peninsula in accordance with
the principles underpinning the Shanghai Communiqué. As was shown previously, however,
the U.S. had divergent policy goals for the Asia-Pacific region that doomed North Korea’s
outreach efforts to failure. Therefore, the goals that Pyongyang tried to achieve in the 1970s
remained to be pursued again through an alternative, confrontational diplomatic approach in
the early 1990s.
As was detailed in Chapter Five, the Soviet Union/Russia and China détente with
South Korea was the second international environmental change that compelled North Korea
to intensify even further its diplomatic efforts toward the United States. North Korea felt
cornered and pushed to the verge of an existential crisis, both economically and politically, by
this seismic blow to its national security. At this point, Pyongyang’s prior affect toward
Washington was ridden with cognitive dissonance. On the one hand, it remained deeply
resentful of the indifference the U.S. had shown to its persistent efforts to develop diplomatic
relations since the 1970s. Despite its varied and energetic outreach efforts involving diverse
diplomatic instruments, North Korea had failed to make any significant headway with the
U.S. over the intervening two decades. On the other hand, by the early 1990s, North Korea
understood that there was only one possible remedy for its national security vulnerability.
Namely, it needed a diplomatic relationship with the U.S., a country that simply could not be
ignored considering its emerging status as the sole superpower in the world at the dawn of the
post-Cold War era.
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In the 1990s, when suddenly faced with the challenge of regime survival (the
‘problem’), North Korea’s perception of the U.S. (the ‘source’) became more complex and
multi-faceted. In the early 1970s, when the ‘problem’ to be addressed was national
reunification, North Korea envisioned an essentially negative role for the U.S. That is, it
wanted the U.S. (an ‘aggravator’) to stop interfering in the self-determination of the Korean
nation. In the 1990s, however, North Korea began to envision a positive role for the U.S. (a
‘potential facilitator’) that it thought might be achievable if it played its cards the right way.
Namely, with the right inducements, the U.S. might be enticed into supporting North Korea’s
developmental goals – assisting with solving its energy needs, for example – and potentially
it could be helpful as well in restraining challenges from the threat of a South Korea that was
growing more powerful by the day, both economically and militarily. Consequently, North
Korea’s prior affect (the ‘motivation’) toward the U.S. (the ‘source’) became conflicted by a
kind of ‘Palmerstonian complex’187 since the underlying hostility and resentment inevitably
had to be tempered (the ‘commitment’) to deal with the challenges of regime survival (the
‘problem’).
Reflecting on its previous failed experience, the leadership in Pyongyang realized it
had to come up with an issue that would command Washington's attention and make a highlevel dialogue possible. North Korea soon realized that its fledgling nuclear program
possessed a dual strategic value of being a solution to its energy needs as well as an effective
way of getting the U.S.’s rapt attention. Whether by deliberate intent or purely situational
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Lord Plamerston, a 19th century prime minister of Great Britain, once famously said: “Britain had no eternal allies and no
perpetual enemies, only interests that were eternal and perpetual.” He was understood to mean that only those who serve
the nation’s interests qualify as its friends or allies, but it also is good statecraft to ‘sleep with the enemy’ whenever it
serves the nation’s interests. Henry Kissinger was prone to express a similar sentiment, which apparently came to the
attention of the North Korean leadership. According to Fred Carriere (personal communication) Kim Kye-gwan, North
Korea’s then-vice foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator, once looked intently across the table at Henry Kissinger
during a Track II dialogue and said with a mischievous grin: “Dr. Kissinger, when you shook Chairman Mao’s hand, I
imagine your only concern was how best to serve the eternal and perpetual interests of the United States.” Kim got no
pushback from Kissinger.
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necessity,188 North Korea gradually adopted a confrontational approach in the early 1990s to
achieve its longstanding goal of a high-level dialogue with the United States. This entailed
using its nuclear program to threaten the norms and rules of the NPT and IAEA. As a result,
albeit at the risk of reigniting war on the Korean peninsula, North Korea was able to achieve
its goal of three high-level talks with the United States that led to the successful conclusion of
the Agreed Framework in Geneva in 1994.
In a 2003 interview on the PBS program Frontline, former president Jimmy Carter
discussed the circumstances surrounding his critical intervention in 1994 that circumvented
war and ultimately resulted in the successful negotiation of the Agreed Framework. Notably,
when asked what prompted him to go to Pyongyang, Carter said:
…for almost three years, Kim Il Sung sent me a steady stream of invitations and
personal entreaties to come to Pyongyang to let him explain the North Korean
position, and to try to relay some communication back and forth with Washington,
which at that time, seemed to be very difficult, if not impossible.189
This meeting between Jimmy Carter and Kim Il Sung averted a war in which it was estimated
that more than a million people might have been killed, among them some 50,000 Americans,
including both civilians and military personnel.190
Based on Carter’s testimony, Kim Il Sung was actively seeking to dialogue with the
U.S. from the very beginning of the so-called ‘First North Korean Nuclear Crisis’. Yet, the
Clinton administration was preparing to run the risk of launching a war based on an
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North Korea had a legal basis for challenging the validity of IAEA Director-General Hans Blix’s unprecedented demand
for a ‘special inspection’ in February 1993. It was an open secret that this demand was based on intelligence information
acquired – fabricated, according to North Korea – by the United States and then passed surreptitiously to the IAEA.
Reliance on input from a belligerent party (i.e., the U.S.) was not a procedure that was envisioned in the enforcement of
the safeguards agreement. Moreover, from North Korea’s perspective, it was being subjected to unduly harsh and
disrespectful treatment primarily to help Blix save his face after the IAEA had slipped up badly in Iraq. North Korea had
an arguable case, but no one in the Western bloc was willing to come to its defense.
Frontline 2003.
Ibid. President Clinton and his key advisors were briefed on these projected casualties by General Gary Luck, the
commander-in-chief of the U.S. and South Korean military forces in Korea.
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intelligence estimate that later even the IAEA itself called into question.191 The
administration only grudgingly accepted Carter’s offer to make a diplomatic intervention.
Then, after he had returned to the U.S. with the outline of the deal that a few months later
would be transformed into the Agreed Framework, Carter received only a cold shoulder from
the administration. He was told not to bother coming to Washington for a briefing. He went
anyway but never met in person with President Clinton or any Cabinet official to discuss his
meeting with Kim Il Sung. This reveals the striking contrast between the U.S. and North
Korea in terms of prior affect and its impact on foreign policy decision-making, in the mid1990s, as well as in the diplomatic instruments (or lack thereof) they were preparing to
deploy.192
As explained in Chapter Six, North Korea’s strategy of a confrontational approach
had been successful in obtaining an official guarantee in writing from the U.S. of its promise
of the non-use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, the United States
promised to work toward the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations and to take the lead
in the construction of two 1,000 MWe modern light-water reactors by 2003 in return for the
suspension and future dismantlement of the 5 MWe reader, and the halting of the construction
work on the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors. Based on this significant development in its
relations with the U.S., North Korea affirmed its commitment to the implementation of the
Agreed Framework.
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The Baltimore Sun 1992.
Of course, it also reflected just how toxic the issue of North Korea had become in domestic U.S. politics after the
‘Gingrich Revolution of 1994’ gave control of both houses of the U.S. Congress to the Republican Party.
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7-3. Guidelines for a New Beginning in U.S.-North Korea Relations
The core foreign policy problem North Korea has grabbled with from its inception is
the struggle to overcome the opposition of the U.S. and other Great Powers to the political
self-determination, unity, and development of the Korean nation. This is a problem North
Korea shares with other post-colonial countries that gained their independence in the mid-20th
century. The division the U.S. imposed193 on the Korean nation in tandem with its ‘liberation’
from colonial rule in 1945, however, added a relatively unique dimension.194 The
anachronistic Cold War origins of the unresolved division of the Korean nation is another
unique dimension. Examining how North Korea adjusted its foreign policy behaviors to the
evolving situational imperatives of the 1970 through the 1990s, as it grabbled with the core
issue of the division of the Korean peninsula, offers some useful guidance for launching a
new beginning in U.S.-North Korea relations.
This is a challenging project since the ups and downs in the efforts to normalize
U.S.-North Korea relations over the last half-century metaphorically might be characterized
as ‘diplomatic bipolar disorder’. Taking a cue from First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju
use of a literary metaphor to characterize the nuclear negotiations in 1994, North Korea can
be said to have maintained a Baroque-like basso continuo in its foreign policy behavior since
the 1970s, as evidenced by its dogged commitment to the normalization of its bilateral
relations with the U.S. (“the caravan moves on”), despite those who constantly were working
against this outcome (‘barking dogs’). By contrast, the U.S. marches to a different drummer
with a penchant for a Jazz-like staccato and syncopation as each incoming presidential
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The Soviet Union was complicit in the division, but it was conceived and implemented by the U.S. for geopolitical
reasons inextricably linked with the U.S.’s plans for its future relationship with Japan.
Vietnam and China are the only other instances in East Asia, and both have long since been reunified under communist
regimes (Gills 1996, pp. xv-xviii).
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administration strikes a new chord in its North Korea policy. Except in the face of dire
circumstances, such as North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, the most consistent
feature of U.S. foreign policy is to avoid a normalization of relations with North Korea. The
result has been a very nonlinear diplomatic process in which time often seems to run
backwards in violation of the laws of physics. ‘Back to the Future’ generally has been the
guiding principle for each incoming U.S. administration’s North Korea policy review.195
Ironically, however, the positive potential of this fundamental mismatch of
diplomatic practices cannot be exaggerated. While it causes a repetitive pattern of ‘highs’ and
‘lows’, the mismatch also points to a way forward if its symptoms are managed properly.
Namely, North Korea’s seemingly single-minded focus on its bilateral relationship with the
U.S. is a powerful indicator of the feasibility of achieving a diplomatic resolution of the
endemic conflict on the Korean peninsula. We can even sketch the general outlines of that
resolution based on an analysis of the ‘bipolar symptoms’ highlighted in this research project.
First, North Korea got off on the wrong foot with the U.S. in the early 1970s by
demanding the complete withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Korea, without first
making a realpolitik calculation of its feasibility in terms of the existing geopolitical
environment. This misstep was based on an erroneous assumption that the Nixon Doctrine
amounted to a total retreat by the U.S. from the Cold War policies embodied in the Truman
Doctrine.196 While the Nixon Doctrine did represent a shift from an ideological to a
transactional stance toward relations with China and the Soviet Union, its primary objective
195
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In a presentation on the topic “Is There a Diplomatic Way Forward with North Korea?” April 22, 2021, Bob Carlin –
who participated in most of the North Korea-related policy reviews conducted during his 30-odd-year career working as
an intelligence analyst for the U.S. government – quipped that the only memorable review that immediately comes to
mind was the one former secretary of defense William J. Perry conducted as part of the Perry Process in 1998. Dr.
Perry’s rule was that “the U.S. must deal with North Korea as it is, not as we wished it to be.” (See
https://video.syr.edu/media/t/1_avk4dy6m.) Other informed insiders have assessed U.S. policy discourses to be
excessively mired in propaganda (Lewis 2014).
Kim Il Sung welcomed the U.S.-China détente, in part, due to an exaggerated assessment of its geopolitical implications.
This was apparent from his characterization of Nixon’s visit to Beijing as “the march of the defeated or a great victory of
the Chinese people and revolutionary peoples worldwide” (Kim, Eungseo 2017).
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was to preclude U.S. involvement in future Vietnam-type quagmires by not putting boots on
the ground in far off lands in the first place.197 In this respect, it did not signal a new policy
in terms of fundamental geopolitical objectives, as Nixon explained to a critic who feared it
would lead to a total American withdrawal from Asia:
[T]he Nixon Doctrine was not a formula for getting America out [of] Asia, but one
that provided the only sound basis for America’s staying in and continuing to play a
responsible role in helping the non-Communist nations and neutrals as well as our
Asian allies to defend their independence.198
Clearly, given this interpretation of the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine, North Korea was
not positioned to become one of its beneficiaries. As deterrence on the Korean peninsula
was judged by the U.S. to be stable, which is still largely the case today, the U.S. troop
deployment in South Korea has not posed the risk of developing into a quagmire-like
outcome as was the case in Vietnam.
Still, the possibility of forcing a troop withdrawal from South Korea remained a live
issue at least until the final phase of the Carter presidency in the late 1970s. There were
reasonable grounds for envisioning a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea as a
possible outcome. For one thing, the U.S. seemed certain to make good on its commitment
to withdraw its troops from Taiwan. 199 Moreover, Kissinger had suggested in his
conversation with Zhou that all U.S. troops would be pulled out of South Korea as well as
Taiwan before the end of Nixon’s second term. Also, Jimmy Carter’s plan to withdraw all
U.S. troops from South Korea – albeit for different, mainly moral reasons – became widely
known as early as May 1975. True to his moral convictions, Carter picked up the baton to
orchestrate the implementation of this commitment shortly after entering the White House
in 1977 (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014, pp. 68-86). In the end, though, the universal
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This rule has most often been observed in the breach since the 1970s, but it passed for a serious commitment at the time.
Gannon 2008.
The withdrawal occurred in 1979.
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opposition of the U.S. national security establishment frustrated Carter’s efforts. Nearly all
South Koreans also opposed the troop withdrawal, thanks at least in part to Park Chong hee’s manipulative use of the ‘North Korea card’. Carter’s failure to achieve his goal
reflected the near impossibility of overcoming the strategic logic of the U.S. presence on
the Korean peninsula in that era. From the national security establishment’s perspective,
the Cold War was still on and “South Korea was still a frontline state against a terrifying,
more-Stalinst-than-Stalin totalitarianism.” 200
A second erroneous assumption was the failure of the North Korean leadership to
appreciate how much public sentiment in South Korea had become aligned with the U.S.’s
Cold War logic. The broad-gauged pushback in South Korea against Carter’s proposed
withdrawal of U.S. troops clearly was exploited – if not engineered – by the Park Chung-hee
regime specifically to justify its imposition of the repressive Yushin constitution, as Kim Daejung had suggested during his visit to the U.S. State Department in February 1972.201 All the
same, Park was able to play the ‘North Korea card’ successfully at critical junctures during
his regime’s eighteen-year tenure by fanning the security anxieties felt by most South
Koreans at the time. Even those who opposed the regime generally bought into this politically
motivated fear mongering over the threat of a potential second North Korean invasion.202
The decade of the 1980s was a period of fundamental recalibrations for North Korea,
politically, economically, and even ideologically. First, North Korea carried out two terrorist
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Kelly 2019. Second-image analyses based on the assumed ‘evil’ moral qualities of the North Korean regime are de
rigueur among analysts like Kelly. As Kim Il Sung pointed out to U.S. Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, during his
August 1980 visit to Pyongyang, North Korea never once took advantage of politically chaotic times in South Korea to
invade or engage in other mischief. He cited the student revolution in 1960 that forced the resignation of Syngman Rhee,
the assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979, and the Kwangju Uprising in 1980 as examples of ‘opportunities’ North
Korea did not exploit (Jimmy Carter Library. 1980, pp. 9-10).
Kim Dae-jung’s analysis was prescient since only nine months later, in October 1972, Park Chung-hee engineered the
adoption of the Yushin Constitution that institutionalized his dictatorial powers.
Kim Il Sung got the straight story from Solarz during his August 1980 visit. As Solarz pointed out, unlike in the
Philippines and Iran, “even the opponents of the Park Chung Hee and Chon Doo Hwan regimes do not want U.S. forces
withdrawn, because they fear the possibility of an invasion by the North” (Jimmy Carter Library. 1980, P. 24).

２４９

incidents in the 1980s that were related directly or indirectly to its competition with South
Korea for national legitimacy. Second, Kim Il Sung made two official visits to Moscow – in
May 1984 and October 1986 – both to seek military and economic assistance and to conduct
a firsthand assessment of the likely future political course of the Soviet Union. Third, the
Sino-Soviet split was exploited to get Beijing to play a more active role in North Korea’s
outreach efforts toward the U.S. Fourth, beginning in the early 1980s, North Korea undertook
its most important diplomatic initiatives toward both the U.S. and South Korea in over a
decade.
The first terrorist incident was the unsuccessful attempt in October 1983 to
assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan during his state visit to Rangoon, Burma
(Myanmar). This incident was focused on the domestic dimension of the competition for
national legitimacy. Its goal was to facilitate peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula
by releasing the ‘revolutionary impetus’ in South Korea from the constraints of the
Park/Chun military dictatorship. This ‘release’ would fulfill one of the two preconditions for
national reunification immediately and lay the groundwork for the eventual achievement of
the other precondition, which was the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. The second incident was
the bombing of Korean Air Lines Flight 858 in October 1987, which was discussed above (pp.
220-221). This incident also was focused primarily on the competition for national
legitimacy.203 The specific objective was to block South Korea from enhancing its
international standing as the sole host of the 1988 Olympic Games. When its act of
desperation failed to block or downgrade South Korea’s ‘coming out party’, North Korea
tried to one-up South Korea the following year by pouring $4 billion into hosting the
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Kim Hyun-hui, one of the North Korean agents responsible for the bombing of KAL Flight 858, explained the goal of the
mission to a BBC journalist as follows: “I was told by a senior officer that before the Seoul Olympics we would take
down a South Korean airliner. He said it would create chaos and confusion in South Korea. The mission would strike a
severe blow for the revolution” (Wingfield-Hayes 2013).
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1989 World Festival of Youth and Students (Waxman 2018).
Both terrorist incidents utterly failed to achieve their stated goals. Moreover, as is
often the case, history was a stern teacher. All that North Korea garnered from these desperate
acts was a degraded international standing – the U.S. added North Korea to the list of state
sponsors of terrorism after the 1987 incident – and a powerful refutation of its misguided,
idealist belief in the prospects for achieving national reunification by harnessing a real but
only marginal revolutionary spirit in South Korea. If anything, the incidents undercut the
credibility of North Korea’s peace proposal in South Korea. North Korea’s deeds seemed to
contradict its words, even among those struggling against the Chun regime’s repression. The
North Korean leadership appears to have gotten the message, however, as these were the final
acts of terrorism aimed at realizing an imaginary nationalist dream carried out by North
Korea.
By contrast, Kim Il Sung’s trips to Moscow were successful in rehabilitating North
Korea’s relations with the Soviet Union after two decades of cool ties. As the visit in 1984
occurred prior to the advent of perestroika and glasnost, the atmospherics were congenial and
Kim Il Sung was able to obtain major commitments of economic and military assistance. As
an added benefit, given the Sino-Soviet split, seeing Kim Il Sung making headway with the
Soviet Union led Beijing to make greater efforts to enhance its own relations with Pyongyang.
The commitments made in 1984 were reaffirmed during the 1986 visit to Moscow. While
Gorbachev already had reservations about Kim’s unique ideology and personality cult, he had
been in power for only a year and a half by that time, and his liberalizing reforms had not
fully kicked in yet. “As a result of Kim Il Sung’s diplomacy and the intensification of the
Cold War in the early years of the Reagan presidency, cooperation between Moscow and
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Pyongyang flourished in many fields in the mid-1980s.”204
In this same timeframe, U.S.-China relations were improving rapidly following a
visit to Beijing by President Ronald Reagan in April 1984. This gave the Chinese leverage
with the U.S. that they used to lend strong support to North Korea’s three-way talks proposal,
which was an unprecedented call for talks exclusively between the U.S. and the two Koreas.
Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the Communist party, also urged Reagan to withdraw
U.S. troops from South Korea. Only three days after Reagan’s visit, Hu arrived in Pyongyang
for an eight-day official visit. North Korea mustered a massive crowd of two million people
to give Hu “the greatest welcome in Korean history.”205 This was a dramatic example of
North Korea’s default balancing act between Beijing and Moscow in the decades prior to the
1990s. Of course, due primarily to the constraints the U.S.’s maximum pressure policy has
imposed on North Korea’s other relationships, the salience of China in North Korea’s foreign
policy has increased exponentially over the last decade or so.
In any case, long before the maximum pressure policy became a dominating factor in
its web of relationships, North Korea had begun to court both the U.S. and South Korea on its
own initiative. Pyongyang asked Beijing to pass its message to Washington affirming its
willingness to participate in three-way talks (i.e., Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington). This
was the first time Pyongyang had ever proposed to accept Seoul – its competitor for national
legitimacy – as a full-fledged partner in a dialogue with the U.S. Subsequently, the formula of
three-way talks became the basic format for North Korea’s diplomacy on issues related to
peacemaking on the Korean peninsula for the rest of the decade and even into the early 1990s.
Once again, by using the Beijing channel, North Korea was trying to link its diplomatic
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Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014, p. 125.
Ibid, p. 121. This is ironic since historically – especially in the northern half of Korea – it was more typical to
muster huge armies to fend off the Chinese, rather than to welcome them!
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efforts to the budding relationship between China and the U.S. since the détente in 1971.
Inexplicably, the Rangoon bombing occurred just one day after Beijing had conveyed this
conciliatory message to the U.S. at Pyongyang’s behest.206
Ultimately, even though the results were mixed at best, a series of thirty-four
dialogues were conducted between American and North Korean diplomats between late
December 1988 and September 1993. As a result, North Korea achieved its long-sought goal
of opening a mutually authorized, direct channel for conducting diplomatic business with the
U.S. This outcome would not been possible, however, if North Korea and South Korea
simultaneously had not begun engaging in intensive bilateral dialogues under the Nordpolitik
policy. In short, the outcome of these two parallel, bilateral diplomatic dialogues hinged on a
carefully coordinated initiative between South Korea and the U.S. More tellingly, as was the
case in 2018 as well, Seoul took the lead and Washington followed. While the U.S. had
divided Korea on its own initiative in 1945, in the Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, North
Korea and South Korea agreed formally to assert the right to determine the future of the
Korean peninsula on their own. They also have reaffirmed this right of political selfdetermination in all their subsequent bilateral agreements. Once the denuclearization issue
began to dominate the dialogue on the future of the Korean peninsula, however, satisfying
this requirement of recognizing the primacy of their right of self-determination became more
challenging.
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This simultaneous pursuit of contradictory initiatives suggested the possibility of a lack of policy coordination at the
highest levels in Pyongyang. Deng Xiaoping believed that Kim Jong Il was responsible for the failed attempt on Chun’s
life. He was so angry at Pyongyang for putting him in an embarrassing position that he refused to meet with Kim Jong Il
for the rest of his life (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014, p. 113). In a parallel situation, during his meeting with Lee Hu-rak in
1972, Kim Il Sung claimed that he was unaware at the time of the North Korean attempt in January 1968 to assassinate
Park Chung-hee. As he explained to Lee: “The incident was entirely plotted by the extreme leftists and did not reflect my
intent or that of the Party… I demoted the head of [the] Security Department, [the] Chief of Staff and the Director of
Reconnaissance” (Wilson Center 1972). Similarly, Kim Jong Il complained to Madeline Albright that his people didn’t
always do what he asked them to do. Perhaps he was trying to suggest that sometimes they did things he didn’t ask them
to do?
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The developments surrounding the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994, its
troubled implementation over the ensuing eight years, and its eventual collapse in 2002
provide a case study of the strengths and weaknesses of this kind of diplomatic balancing act.
In the first instance, it was a bilateral deal between the U.S. and North Korea. This was
problematic in terms of domestic politics for both the U.S. and South Korea. In actuality, of
course, it was a de facto multilateral deal since South Korea, Japan and (later) the EU
provided most of the funding required to implement the U.S.’s commitments to North Korea.
The establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in
1995 by the United States, South Korea, and Japan essentially codified the multilateral
dimensions of the deal. Of course, the multilateral dimensions of the Agreed Framework did
not cause the U.S. any pause when it decided unilaterally to end the deal in October 2002.
Involving the other parties in the U.S.’s ‘bilateral’ deal entailed disadvantages but
was advantageous overall. In terms of disadvantages, the main issue was that it made the
implementation process lengthier and more complicated. This not only led to delays in
meeting deadlines but also to a growing distrust by the North Koreans that probably
contributed to hedging behavior involving HEU. Ironically, though, the extended timeframe
for implementation gave the U.S. “time to adapt the 'single issue' Agreed Framework to
realities both domestic and international that required a more comprehensive deal” (Martin
2002, p. 65). This eight-year time-out from the full-blown practice of coercive diplomacy
created an opportunity to explore confidence building measures aimed at facilitating a more
complete transformation in North Korea's relationships with the outside world. Who knows if
South Korea’s 'sunshine policy' would have been possible without this moment of ‘peace in
the feud’?207 Without the benefit of time, the collateral dialogues, such as the Four Party
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Talks, negotiations on missile moratoriums, discussions of MIA recovery operations, etc.
might not have developed either.
What is undeniable is that the Agreed Framework was deemed a necessary
diplomatic project in 1994 by the Clinton administration – albeit reluctantly because of the
anticipated blowback from domestic political rivals – since the available coercive alternatives
entailed unacceptable risks to the U.S. and its regional allies, especially South Korea and
Japan. Moreover, the diplomats who had been engaged in dialogues with North Koreans for
nearly a decade by that time, understood that it would open the door to negotiations on
related concerns apart from nuclear weapons. They knew as well that it would forestall North
Korea’s desperate resort to military provocations as a means of assuaging its security
concerns.

None of these related concerns evaporated into thin air in 2002 when the George

W. Bush administration decided precipitously208 to abrogate the Agreed Framework in
October 2002. On the contrary, they have re-emerged repeatedly in subsequent decades,
proving once again the essential truth of William Faulkner’s dictum: “The past isn't over. It
isn't even past.”209
At the end of the day, the hostility borne of half a century of antagonism, is not easily
dispelled, or just explained away. The challenge is to overcome what Paik Nak-chung, the
eminent South Korean scholar and activist, has called the division system:
These are two divided states within one nation, two highly organized but separate
systems engaged every day in maintaining the status quo and enhancing their own
status. Those who most vociferously rail against the other side are the true patriots,
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that were structurally prone to the risk of war also had an inherent structural capacity for peace. This capacity for ‘peace
in the feud’ was due to these political systems being based on networks of concrete human relations. Unlike the Cold War
political system that is based on competitive politics of absolute alignment, these systems allowed space for crosscutting
ties among competing parties. (Kwon 2020, pp. 1-14). This concept can be applied usefully to the study of inter-Korean
relations.
Fred Carriere (personal communication) says Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly’s instructions allegedly were changed while
he was already in mid-flight on his way to Pyongyang in October 2002. The ‘bold approach’ he was expected to outline
during his visit was replaced by a curt, sharply worded message written by hardliners about an alleged HEU program.
Kelly also was instructed to repeat this message verbatim every time North Koreans asked for further clarifications.
Faulkner 1951.
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the ones most rewarded by the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang. Those who try
to bridge the gap between the two Koreas are the most vulnerable – for decades the
surest ticket to jail and personal oblivion in the South was to praise the North, and
prison awaits anyone who in the North praises the South, even today. International
forces also reinforce the Korean division: Korea is a central nation in the postwar
world-system, one of the critical pivots, nodal points, and arenas wherein the structure
of world politics was formed and sustained, made and remade.210
That is, both North Korea and South Korea are still struggling to free themselves from the
legacy of a symbiotic relationship designed not to bring about reunification but to perpetuate
division. The unfinished objective of the Agreed Framework was to initiate a process that
would resolve any legitimate concerns about the threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program. In a more comprehensive perspective, however, the fundamental challenge
is to create the diplomatic space for the two Koreas to find their own answer to the Korean
Question. The Korea Peace Initiative (KPI), which was launched by South Korean president
Moon Jae-in following his inauguration in May 2017, focuses on the critical importance of
proactive diplomacy that entails facilitating inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. dialogue, as
well as cooperation with China, Japan, and Russia (Moon & Delury 2019). Based on the
findings of this research, the strategies encompassed in the KPI – peacekeeping, peacemaking
and peacebuilding – are best understood as basic components of a proactive diplomacy.211 As
such, if they are true to the anti-status quo impulse, the policies should be effective in
“overcoming the stalled odyssey to peace in Korea” and in the process make a substantive
contribution toward ending the division system.212
Some insights into the causes of this ‘stalled odyssey’ can be gleamed from the
report on a recent virtual Track II discussion on North Korea and the international system
210

Paik 2011, pp. vii-viii. This explication of the concept is from the Foreword to the English-Language Edition by Bruce
Cumings.
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A ‘proactive diplomacy’ is more activist, innovative, and anti-status quo. For example, it should reject a ‘maximum
pressure’ policy that expects magical outcomes from the imposition of sanctions that are effectively designed to punish
perceived bad behavior rather than calibrated to reward good behavior. Decades of empirical research have accumulated
overwhelming evidence that “the popularity of sanctions owes more to the domestic interests of politicians than their
ability to achieve geopolitical goals (Hanania 2020; Jasper 2021).
Moon 2021.
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(Daniels 2021). Hosted by The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP),
the participants in this discussion included scholars and former officials from the U.S., China,
South Korea, Russia, and Japan. The most telling of the takeaways detailed in the report is
the lack of a consensus among the five parties on how to work cooperatively on North Korearelated diplomacy even when they are grabbling with a compelling shared objective such as
denuclearization. This reflects the growing strategic distrust among the five parties
represented in this Track II discussion – especially, the U.S. and China – which is being
manifested in various other contexts as well.
Their disagreements are especially apparent in their respective positions on the most
effective ways to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Each party has its
own organizing principles and narratives that are deeply entangled in issues of domestic
political legitimacy. This results in clashes that stymie multilateral cooperation on North
Korea. It spills over even into their conversations on core issues such as the envisioned longterm outcomes of the peace process on the Korean peninsula. Ironically, though, the
geostrategic competition between the two major facilitator/aggravator actors – the U.S. and
China – is reinforcing their pre-existing commitment to preserving the status quo on the
Korean peninsula, unless North Korea ‘rocks the boat’. Just as the U.S. and China favored the
stability of the division system on the Korean peninsula over the uncertainties of reunification
in the era of détente beginning in the 1970s, due to their shared geostrategic competition with
the Soviet Union, they still remain essentially committed to the status quo even though today
they are the parties embroiled in a geostrategic competition. The shrimp’s back gets broken
either way.213

213

According to a Korean proverb: “When the whales fight, the shrimp gets its back broken” (Beal 2021a, p. 17).
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The report offered several policy recommendations that are consistent with the
findings of this study. The first is that all countries should find “pragmatic channels of
communication” (p. 2). Specifically, both bilateral and multilateral dialogues are
recommended, based on what has worked in the past, especially dialogues with North Korea
by the U.S. and South Korea both separately and jointly. The challenge in this case will be to
overcome the wariness North Korea has shown for further meetings with either Seoul or
Washington since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit.214 The only viable strategy requires the
ratcheting back of the so-called maximum pressure strategy that relies on intertwined
economic, political, and (implicit) military coercion. Excessive reliance on coercive
diplomacy has served only to escalate tensions, rather than generate positive outcomes,
primarily because it reduces the space for dialogue.215
The critical importance of dialogue can be highlighted by reaffirming the previous
commitments to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula made by the relevant parties,
including the Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula of
the April 2018 inter-Korean summit meeting in Panmunjom (Panmunjom 2018), the Joint
Statement of the June 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held in Singapore (White
House 2018), the Joint Declaration of September 2018 North-South summit meeting in
Pyongyang (Pyongyang 2018), and the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party
Talks held in Beijing (National Committee on North Korea 2005). By doing so, the parties
are able to demonstrate a sincere resolve to bind themselves to future behavior consistent
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Their wariness was acerbated by the failure to reach a mutually acceptable compromise in the follow-on working-level
meeting held in Stockholm on October 14, 2019 (Seo et alia, 2019).
Reducing (not to mention ending) the reliance on coercive diplomacy is a major challenge for U.S. foreign policymakers.
The bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress on the effectiveness (righteousness?) of economic and financial sanctions
is an example of how foreign policy gets entangled in issues of domestic political legitimacy. The same dialectic applies
to North Korea since domestic political legitimacy makes it difficult for the North Korean leadership to agree to dialogue
with the U.S. while sanctions remain in place (Woo 2015).
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with these agreements and to make it clear that they do not have ‘cheap lips’ as the Korean
idiom characterizes those who make unreliable promises. The achievement of strategic
foreign policy goals also depends upon the coordination of all bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic initiatives.
Over the last two decades, the period inaugurated by the first North-South summit in
2000, South Korea has tried both reciprocal and reconciliatory approaches towards North
Korea. Even though North Korea has responded with reciprocal cooperation at times, it has
never totally ceased to engage in provocations. This shows that a moderate and cooperationoriented approach by South Korea in isolation cannot compel North Korea to adhere
consistently to a pattern of absolute reciprocity. For example, in the most provocative act
aimed at South Korea since it helped to launch the unprecedented series of summit meetings
between North Korea and the U.S. in early 2018, North Korea blew up the inter-Korean
liaison office building located just north of the DMZ in June 2020. While it is easy to
understand why North Korea is considered an ingrate for engaging in such provocations, its
ostensible ingrate behavior cannot be fully understood if viewed solely through the lens of the
North-South bilateral relationship. Rather, it is necessary to factor in the impact of the U.S.South Korea bilateral relationship – the fact that the U.S. did not permit South Korea to make
good on the commitments it had made in Panmunjom – amounts to adding a kind of
multilateral dimension that is required to provides the full context (Kim 2020).
What all these observations taken together clearly establish is that the goal of a
nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsula is predictably achievable, in the long run, if a tit-fortat process of denuclearization is pursued in tandem with confidence building measures
designed to foster non-hostile relations among all the actors in the Northeast Asian region.
The transformation of U.S.-North Korea relations from hostility to amity is a fluid process
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that was launched out of geopolitical naivete half a century ago in the early 1970s. It was
accelerated, not aborted, in a quasi-neorealist modality by North Korea’s resort in the mid2000s to a nuclear deterrence strategy toward the U.S. As this change in diplomatic strategy
by North Korea was adopted in response to the collapse of the Agreed Framework, the U.S.
and North Korea are jointly responsible for the dangerous brinkmanship associated with the
subsequent U.S.-North Korea relations. Interventions by the other regional actors with major
equities in realizing the peace – notably South Korea and China – are indispensable to the
achievement of an active peace on the Korean peninsula.
The complex linkages between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy among these
regional actors – as well as the interplay between their domestic politics and their foreign
policy – have become much more sharply defined, especially during the decades since the
end of the global Cold War. Just as the U.S.-China détente in the early 1970s held out the
promise of a new relationship between the U.S. and North Korea, as the recent NCAFP report
has confirmed, the emerging signs of an effective reversal of the U.S.-China détente are
threatening to undermine the final realization of that promise. Every agreement between
North and South Korea, beginning with the Joint Communique in 1972 and continuing with
the declarations issued following the five summit meetings held since 2000, has stated the
fundamental principle that the reunification of the Korean nation is the sole prerogative of
Koreans themselves. In fact, self-determination is a core principle of international law that is
protected in the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights as a right of “all peoples.” In practice, however, the full implementation of interKorean agreements always has hinged upon the interplay of bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy involving the U.S. and China in particular.
If the major regional actors do not coordinate their strategy for achieving a
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denuclearized Korean peninsula with the efforts by the two Koreas to promote reconciliation
as the foundation for eventual reunification, the most likely outcome is that neither
denuclearization nor perpetual peace on the Korean peninsula will be realized. The failure of
North Korea’s efforts in the 1970s to establish amicable diplomatic relations with the U.S.
was directly linked with the ideological rivalries of the Cold War. Similarly, the failure to
achieve this objective in the post-Cold War period has been underpinned by the ‘single
superpower’ mindset of the U.S. that assumes its interests automatically subsume the interests
of allies and partners, misjudges the limits of U.S. agency, and fails to factor in the interests
of other actors in its foreign policy decision-making.
According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, the Biden
administration’s plans to offer partial sanctions relief to North Korea in exchange for partial
steps toward denuclearization may not be politically feasible. This is due to the
comprehensive nature of the U.S. sanctions on North Korea which “target not just weapons
development but also human rights abuses, money laundering, weapons trade, international
terrorism, and cyber operations.” At the same time, however, the report also notes that “the
U.N. has documented North Korea’s growing success in evading sanctions” and “China and
Russia have blocked new sanctions… and have called for lifting several categories of
sanctions.”216 There appears to be a bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress that sanctions
should not be lifted or even wavered to any significant degree unless North Korea satisfies all
the issues targeted by the sanctions. Essentially, satisfying this requirement would amount to
regime change, an outcome that is not supported by South Korea or the U.S.’s regional
competitors.
The inter-Korean dialogue that reached its climax in the early 1990s and resulted in
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the historic Basic Agreements should be viewed as the founding documents of a post-Cold
War international order for the East Asian region with the Korean peninsula as its pivot point.
The half dozen or so declarations are additional documents that specify in greater detail the
terms and conditions for the achievement of a stable peace regime on a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula. The signatories to these diplomatic instruments, which were intended to guide
future negotiations, were North Korea, South Korea, and the United States with the other
major actors in Northeast Asia serving at least implicitly as witnesses. This diplomatic tool
kit was expanded by other bilateral and multilateral agreements, including most notably the
Agreed Framework and the agreement establishing the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO). Taken together, all these documents constitute the
functional equivalent of the agreement that ultimately led to the end of the Cold War in
Europe (Helsinki Final Act 1975). They provide a guide for the conclusion of a
denuclearization deal that is fully integrated into the overall inter-Korean process of
reconciliation, non-aggression, and cooperation. A deal negotiated in this comprehensive way
would reveal a reality still obscured in many ways217 by the lingering miasma of the Cold
War:
The peninsula is one nation refracted into two states and systems. Even after 70 years,
South Koreans can still look north of the DMZ and imagine not the Other, but their
own lost self. This underlying spirit of identity and solidarity creates the possibility
for the two sides, despite their profound differences, to come together in brotherly and
sisterly love.218
The transformation of North Korea from an enemy into a security partner is a
possible pathway to denuclearization in a less politically polarized world that would
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An American watching Portugal pounding North Korea in the 2010 World Cup match on a TV screen in a sports bar in
Seoul made a surprising observation: “With each goal, the foreigners around me… would gesticulate with glee: ‘Yeah!
Suck it, commies!” They were genuinely elated that North Korea was being humiliated. The South Koreans were much
more hesitant. Some shook their heads in disappointment that their compatriots were getting embarrassed on the world
stage, even if they were enemies” (Abrahamian 2020, p. 15).
Moon & Delury 2019, p. 276.
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complement the inter-Korean dialogue (Halperin et alia 2018). This intriguing proposal by
veteran North Korea hands envisions the U.S. Forces Korea adding a ‘pivot-deterrent role’
between the two Koreas to their playbook on the Korean peninsula while preserving their
stabilizing role in the Northeast Asia region. The resultant trilateral cooperative and
collaborative security relationships on the Korean peninsula could be forged by modifying
the mission of the UN Command. The advantage of this approach is that it is more politically
viable for the U.S. than a traditional security alliance with North Korea, which it might
demand as a quid pro quo for agreeing to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This
security partnership would complement a comprehensive regional security framework in
Northeast Asia created jointly by the U.S. and China. Ideally, it would encompass a variety of
OECD-type mechanisms that could serve to implement a denuclearization deal, which might
even include a regional nuclear weapons-free zone. There is broad agreement about the
urgent need for a multilateral mechanism to promote dialogue among the major regional
actors in Northeast Asia (Goodby & Heiskanen 2021).
If all that is on offer for the future of the Korean peninsula is a bullying strategy
based on a neorealist view of the international system as an anarchic environment, the best
that can be hoped for an endless series of petty zero-sum games in which the prospect of war
could never be fully dispelled. In this logic, offers of cooperation and a willingness to make
concessions would be interpreted as signs of weakness to be punished or exploited by a
tougher or more reckless opponent (Blinka 2015). On the other hand, there have been
significant instances of cooperation between Pyongyang and Seoul – especially over the last
two decades – and sometimes even between Pyongyang and Washington or more rarely even
among Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington. There are numerous other instances that are
epitomized by a well-known Korean proverb: “Sleeping in the same bed while dreaming
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different dreams.” Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington may not be in the same bed, but they
certainly are in the same boat. A revised version of the proverb might be: “Sleeping in
different beds while dreaming the same dream.”
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